FOOTBALL CROWD VIOLENCE IN SCOTLAND ANALYSED BY THE VALUE-ADDED THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR

by

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents,

Marilyn and Frederic Collison,

without whose financial assistance, encouragement and all round support this project would not have been possible.

DECLARATION

I declare that I am the author of this thesis and that unless otherwise stated all the work is my own and has not been submitted in part or in full for any other degree.

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ABSTRACT

Football has existed as a popular sport in Britain and the world for several centuries. The game has evolved from a violent rural participant sport into a global entertainment with thousands of amateur and professional teams vying for national and international honours. Since 1960 a 'new' phenomenon 'football hooliganism' has become a 'moral panic' amongst the media and the public. Crowd violence at football matches has become a major social concern. Various explanations have been presented to explain football hooliganism, but none of these explanations have been completely satisfactory.

Football crowd violence is not a new phenomenon, it has existed in a evolving relationship with football since the sport's inception. The modern problem is a media created moral panic over a long established human condition namely collective crowd behaviour. Although many explanations have been offered to explain and solve football hooliganism, none has attempted a detailed investigation of football crowd violence through theories of collective behaviour.

Collective behaviour offers a viable alternative explanation for the causes of football crowd violence. Using Neil Smelser's value-added theory and building block approach, football crowds are analysed to determine the factors that contribute to football hooliganism including: social stress in Scottish society including religious intolerance and class influences, the football crowd structure, the media, the police, and factors leading to violence. The results offer an explanation of the specific structure required to create violence which in turn indicates how violence can be controlled.

Football is unique in that the crowd is triangular in nature since it consists of two opposing support groups and the police. Each Saturday these three groups are in confrontation with each other on the terraces while two teams play football, but only in rare instances does actual violence occur.

As a result of the analysis of football crowds through the value-added theory of collective behaviour, conclusions are drawn which indicate that steps can be taken in the wider society and by the police to reduce the possibility of football crowd violence. The focusing of support group attention on the opposition support is vital to crowd violence. The police are generally able to restrict crowd violence by disrupting this focusing process. Although collective violence can never be totally controlled, the non-violent ritualised behaviour on the terraces can be maintained while at the same time reducing the possibility of collective crowd action. This can be achieved by altering police activities, reducing social stress in the community, and altering preconceived ideas of individual who attend matches.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Soccer hits the ultimate depths"

AT LEAST 42 KILLED AT EUROPEAN CUP FINAL

TV millions see carnage at match

A NIGHT OF DEATH and dishonour, and still the bodies pile up on the terraces. Riot police and the paratroopers called up in a bid to control fighting hooligans.

FORTY-TWO football fans were killed and 150 seriously injured last night in the most appalling and tragic display of crowd violence ever seen in Europe.

Supporters of Liverpool and Juventus were battling on the terraces of the Heysel Stadium in Brussels an hour before the European Cup Final was due to start.

As Italian fans tried to escape, a dividing wall collapsed. Many people were crushed by the tumbling masonry and others were trampled to death as the hysterical crowd surged over them.

But even as the people lay dying and the screams of the injured filled the stadium, the hooligan hordes carried on fighting each other and the Belgian police, who seemed powerless to halt the mayhem.

In the confusion it was several minutes before rescuers could reach the injured, 50 of whom are in critical condition.

The dead were carried away on police riot shields, some draped with the flags of the clubs which they had been waving proudly only minutes before. Liverpool manager Joe Fagan donned a soccer shirt and walked across the pitch to plead for calm from his side's 15,000 supporters. But it took police riot squads and officers on horseback to separate the fighting fans.

As the enormity of the tragedy was realized most of the 52,000 crowd stood shocked and silent, many in tears.

But the hooligans, many of them wild through drink, continued to fight

and bombard the police with sticks and other missiles.

The dead were in sections Y and Z. Y section included mostly British supporters while the Z section was a mixture of British, Italian and Belgian.

Liverpool fan Paul Fry, 28, from Stevenage, said: 'I was in section Z and saw it all.

There were Liverpool fans in there by right. They charged the Juventus fans. There was no segregation. If there had been I don't think this would have happened.

Then Liverpool fans in Section X fired flares. Then they charged.

I was trying to get back where it was safer.

The police did not help, even though the fault was the Liverpool fans. They continued to wield their batons on anybody. They helped spread the panic'.

Outside the ground, the car park became a temporary mortuary as the dead were laid out in rows.

A helicopter ran a shuttle service of the injured to hospital.

In an office behind the main stand, officials of UEFA and the two clubs met to decide whether the game should go ahead.

The players were against it, but it was decided that the match would be played in the hope of preventing even more bloodshed.

And more than 80 minutes after the scheduled start the two teams did come out. As they did so, dozens more riot police entered the stadium. At the kick-off there were 1000 circling the pitch". [1]

Soccer: The Creation Of The Social Problem

Football crowds have been associated with violence throughout the history of the sport.[2] The problem of football crowd violence is a universal one,[3] but it is only

1. Daily Mail, 30 May 1985, pp. 1 and 2.
2. Neil Offen, God Save The Players: The Funny Sometimes Violent World Of Sports Fans, Chicago, 1974, pp. 131.

since 1960[4] that the relationship between football crowds and violence has become a matter of major public concern. It is from this point that this thesis begins an investigation into crowd violence at football matches.

Football crowd violence has caused a great amount of property damage, personal injury, death, police activity, court time, public condemnation, and government action since its identification as a major social problem. This thesis will look at the historical relationship between football and crowds with the intent of looking into the real relationship between the game, participants and spectators; it will also present an analysis of that change and how it relates to the modern day problem of football crowd violence. Football violence may not be as serious or as common as property crime or crimes of violence in the wider community, but the fear created by the larger social problem of football crowd violence - of which the Brussels riot was an extreme example - has placed football hooliganism in the public eye with a resulting demand for its control. From a theoretical analysis of the football crowd, an attempt will be made to explain how violence occurs utilizing evidence collected through direct observation of incidents at matches over a period of six years.

Football crowd violence or football hooliganism as a matter of social concern has existed at many points in British history, [5] and has now returned as a focus again.[6] The identification of any issue as a social problem takes place, not as an objective decision by the author, but as Herbert Blumer states:

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3. John Williams, Eric Dunning, and Patrick Murphy, Hooligans Abroad, London, 1984.
4. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness and Soccer Hooliganism" in Stanley Cohen ed. Images of Deviance, Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 156.
5. See chapter two for a historical analysis of football crowds.
6. See chapter four, five and six for evidence on how the current problem has been identified and dealt with.

> "The societal definition, and not the objective make-up of a given social condition, determines whether the condition exists as a social problem. The societal definition gives the social problem its nature, lays out how it is to be approached, and shapes what is done about it". [7]

In the case of general violence in society the social problem has existed for all of recorded time. The trend in recent years has been for a general increase in crimes of violence [8] with a general increase in media coverage of crime, [9] but

> ". . . the total number of crimes against the person is still small compared with the number of offences of dishonesty".[10]

In the case of general hooliganism the increase in the number of offenses and public awareness is well documented prior to 1960, when football hooliganism re-emerged as a point of social concern. [11] For any issue to become a social problem it must meet a series of specific criteria in a structured order to establish itself in the minds of the whole society. "The emergence of a social problem" [12] is the identifying of any social activity as a legitimate matter of concern both by observers and the general society. In the case of football crowd violence observers have noted its existence for many centuries [13] and the process has been further enhanced by media coverage [14] "The legitimation of social problems" [15] takes what the observers and the public perceive to be a problem and gives it 'official' recognition through moving the discussion into the

7. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior", Social Problems, 18:197, pp. 300.
8. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Against The Person, Manchester, 1963, pp. 10.
9. F. H. McClintock, Op. Cit. pp. 1.
10. F. H. McClintock, Op. Cit., pp. 7.
11. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Of Violence, London, 1963, pp. 10.
12. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit. pp. 301-302.
13. See chapter three.
14. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit., pp. 302.
15. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit., pp. 302.

media, civic organizations and into parliament. Once this has occurred a "mobilization for action" [16] takes place in which all interested groups present conflicting evidence as to the cause and cures for the problem. From this basis, a "formation of an official plan of action",[17] takes place through governments and other official bodies to combat the problem. The final step in the "implementation of the official plan ", [18] occures when actual action is taken to correct the social problem. [19] At any point in the process, a social issue can fail to be defined as a problem due to the lack of recognition, lack of public interest, lack of media interest, no legislative debate, no plan of action, and no action taken resulting in the issue remaining a major topic of discussion. The major source of identification of a social problem is the awareness of the collective, which in turn demands that action be taken by official bodies to remedy the situation.[20] Football crowd violence meets all of the criteria set out by Blumer and others [21] to be identified as a social problem. This identification has taken place throughout history [22] and more recently has been the subject of research by many scholars. [23] The issue has been taken up by the media in both a reflective and projective stance which has brought the issue to the attention of the wider public. Through public concern and media publicity the issue has come to the attention of legislators, the Football Association and the Scottish Football Association. [24] From this basis, Parliament and other official bodies have drawn laws and regulations to try and combat football crowd violence.[25] The implementation of laws and regulations

16. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit. pp. 303.
17. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit., pp. 303.
18. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit., pp. 307.
19. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit., pp. 304.
20. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit.
21. Malcolm Spector and John Kitsue, Constructing Social Problems, London, 1977, pp. 142.
22. See chapter two.
23. See chapter three.
24. See chapters four, five and six.

has only served to alter the scope of the problem but has not, so far controlled or solved it. [26]

It is contended in this thesis that one important aspect of the analysis of football crowd violence has for the most part been overlooked. This is the concept of football crowd violence known as "collective behaviour". Collective behaviour is the study of people in acting together in groups or crowds and the influence the crowd has on the individual. Collective behaviour can be used to analyze any mass participation event; including social movements, panics, crazes, fashion trends, public opinion, and collective violence. [27]

Historical Perspective: The Evolution Of The Game And Spectator Crowds

Football violence has existed as long as the sport itself has existed. For this reason, the historical setting of football is important to the analysis of contemporary football hooliganism. Football was based on mass collective participation and is now based on mass collective spectator participation. The change in the relationship between playing and spectator participation in football has only altered the collective participation patterns of the sport and as a result, collective violence associated with football in past centuries has simply altered its form as football has evolved from an unorganized sport to a modern international media event. Participants in football, whether playing in mass or watching in mass, have always reflected the stresses and value conflicts of the wider society, and as a result have been susceptible to bouts of collective violence.

25. See chapters four, five and six.
26. See chapter six.
27. Detailed analysis of collective behaviour theories appears in Chapter Three.

The historical setting of football and its relationship to collective violence therefore becomes important in investigating the modern pattern of violence. [28] The game has been affected by a changing society in which football has adapted to new economic and social conditions. Football has adapted from a gregarious mass participation sport to a sport played by relatively few and watched by many, stadiums have been built, players have gone from amateur to professional, league and Cup competitions have developed, and players have become household names due to media coverage. All these influences have vital parts to play in the evolution of the sport and the participation of the mass society. Any time mass society gathers collective violence can take place, but it is an extreme case when this happens. [29] The social economic and cultural changes in Great Britain since the middle of the eighteenth century have only altered the form of mass violence, not its actual occurrence. Collective violence has generally occurred in groups of incidents linked to a specific issue of the day although isolated incidents do occur. [30]

Not only has football adapted to economic and the resulting social changes of the industrial revolution, it has adapted within the class and cultural settings as well. During the historical development of football it has become associated with the class system and passed from the influence of the upper class, middle class and lower class and is now in a balancing act between these three influences, reliant on each to exist. The upper class own or finance the clubs, the middle class occupy expensive private box seats and the working class supposedly occupy the terraces. [31] The class differences are often reflected in the location of clubs and their grounds, which most

28. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit.
29. Karl Mannheim, Man And Society: In An Age Of Reconstruction, London, 1940, pp. 288.
30. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behavior, New York, 1962.
31. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit.

often are in working class areas. Football clubs also reflect the cultural influences of the communities they represent. Some clubs play a smooth fast flowing passing game while other clubs play a harder game based on physical exertion and tough tackling depending on the demands of the supporters.[32]

Within a theoretical framework, the historical development of football may have significant influence on the analysis of existing work dealing with football crowds. [33] Most of the theoretical perspectives of the modern social problems do not take into account the historical relevance of football crowd violence, and this very fact may bring these theoretical perspectives into question, since most of these perspectives assume that football crowd violence is a relatively new phenomenon. As a result, it is important to establish the historical relationship between football and football crowd violence as any theoretical perspective must be able to account for violence at all points in history, not just in the modern context.

Theoretical Framework For The Study of Football Violence

The study of football crowd violence has been undertaken from many theoretical perspectives,[34] none of which fully account for the total explanation of 'football hooliganism'. It is therefore argued that in order to develop a more satisfactory and useful explanation of football crowd violence, it is necessary to study that phenomenon in the context of the broader framework of collective behaviour. Collective behaviour offers a broad, yet highly structured framework in which to study the occurrence of

32. Bill Murray, The Old Firm, Sectarianism Sport And Society In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984.
33. Eric Dunning, "The Development of Modern Football" in Eric Dunning ed. The Sociology Of Sport: A Selection of Readings, London, 1971.
34. See chapter three.

collective violence at football matches without disregarding any of the analysis previously undertaken of football crowd violence. Collective behaviour offers the opportunity for the analysis of football crowd violence in a historical, social, cultural and physical environmental setting which other theoretical perspectives may not be able to accommodate. Collective behaviour also offers the ability to accommodate a wide variety of social and cultural stresses into the analysis which other perspectives single out as a basis for the theoretical analysis of the football crowd problem. This allows for a greater variety of social issues to be analyzed as they appear on the football terraces of Scotland.

Collective behaviour offers advantages over other traditional analysis of football crowd violence, such as subcultural, conflict, anthropological, labelling and amalgamations of the perspectives.[35] These perspectives make important contributions concerning social conditions that result in stress on the terraces; social stress which can result in violence. None of these perspectives explain why there is violence at one match and not at another. Collective behaviour theory offers a conceptual framework that can accommodate the relationships between violence and social stress. In addition, it progresses beyond the question of underlying reasons for the violence to the analysis of how the violence actually starts and why it starts at one match and not at another. This major advantage of collective behaviour analysis provides for both the investigation of social stresses that exist on the terraces, and how those stresses manifest themselves in violence.

The field of collective behaviour expressly deals with crowd violence, and football crowds by definition fall within the confines of collective crowd action. Previous

35. These perspectives are discussed in Chapter Three.

research has made general reference to the process of crowd activity and the relationship to football crowds, [36, 37] but no specific analysis of football crowds has been carried out to date. As a result, the objective of this study is to systematically investigate football crowds in the context of collective behavior. Since the identification of football crowd violence as a major social concern in the 1960s, many theories have been presented trying to explain why football crowds in particular seemed to become involved in violent activity. [38] The vast majority of these theories have looked at the social origins of football and at changes in the socio-economic and physical make-up of football and related them to crowd violence. These, along with a limited amount of actual crowd-related investigations, make up the basis of current knowledge about football crowds and why they seem to be involved in a continuous stream of violent incidents. These investigations have left a specific and significant gap in the analysis of football crowds which has not been thoroughly researched, that of collective behaviour. Although some authors have looked into crowd structure [39, 40] no known study to date has systematically analyzed football crowds using a theory of collective behaviour. To accomplish this type of analysis it is necessary to do two things; one, select a theoretical framework of collective behaviour suitable to undertake the analysis of football crowds [41] and, two, choose a method of investigating the crowd activities which provides evidence which supports or denies the theoretical concepts. [42] To this end, the major concepts within the field of collective behaviour are analyzed to provide

36. Michael Smith, "Sport and Collective Behavior" in Donald Ball and John Loy, Sport And The Social Order: Contributions to the Sociology of Sport, London, 1975.
37. Fred Coulter, Brian Dunfield, Malcolm Foley, John Mulloy and Sue Walker, Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984.
38. See chapter three.
39. Michael Smith, Op. Cit.
40. Fred Coulter et. al. Op. Cit.
41. See chapter three.
42. See chapter three and eight.

a theoretical framework for research into football crowd activities. From this reference point, a method of investigating the crowd also is necessary to provide evidence to support or deny the theoretical ideas. The most common form of research to date in this area has taken up the point of view of the outside observer. [43] However, participant observation is used here as the method for gathering evidence about football crowds. Participant observation has been successfully used by several authors [44] who have investigated football crowds under different theoretical perspectives. [45, 46] Taking into account these studies, an "inside method" of observation has been selected for the study of football crowd violence in Scotland. Once a theoretical perspective of collective behaviour has been selected and football crowds investigated using the framework, conclusions can be drawn concerning the theoretical perspectives of

43. Eric Dunning, Soccer: The Social Origins of the Sport and its Development as a Spectator Sport, London, 1979.
Eric Dunning, "The development of Modern Football" in Eric Dunning ed., TheSociology of Sport: A Selection of Readings, London, 1971.
Desmond Morris, The Soccer Tribe, London, 1981.
H. F. Moorhouse, Op. Cit.
Bill Murray, The Old Firm Sectarianism, Sport and Society in Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984.
Ian Taylor, "On the Sport Violence Question, Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in J. Hargreaves, ed., Sport Culture and Ideology, London 1970.
Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology of Football Hooliganism", in Eric Dunning ed., The Sociology of Sport, London, 1980.
Eric Dunning ed., The Sociology of Sport, London, 1980.
Ian Taylor, "Hooligans: Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society, Vol. 14.
Ian Taylor, 1971, Op. Cit.

44. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit.
John Williams, et. al., Op. Cit.
Peter Marsh, Aggro, The Illusion of Violence, London, 1978.
Peter Marsh, E. Rosser and R. Harre, The Rules of Disorder, London, 1978.
Perte Marsh, "Life and Careers on the Soccer Terraces", in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, London, 1978.
Steve Butlers, "The Logic-of-Inquiry of Participant Observation", in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson ed.,Resistance Through Rituals, Youth Subcultures In Post War Britain, London,1978.

45. Participant observation has also been successfully used to investigate crowd violence outside the realm of football crowd violence. Ibid.

46. See the following section for a complete methodological explanation of this study.

collective behaviour, and ways to reduce the amount of violence at football matches.

Scope And Methodology Of The Empirical Research Into Soccer Violence

This thesis will stay within the concise narrow subject matter directly relating to collective football crowd violence in Scotland. Although there are many contexts of violence in society as a whole, [47] this study is only concerned with the violence that occurs in and around football matches, and with the why and how of football crowd violence. These narrow parameters eliminate several avenues of investigation, but to do otherwise would alter the aim of the research, this being to examine empirical evidence in support of explanations of violence in football grounds which in turn can have an impact on policy and lead to a reduction to violence in this context.

The research design for this study has to take into account the amount of observation that can be carried out by one person over a six year period. Although football crowd violence exists in many countries around the world, this study is restricted to Scotland, and the violence that takes place on Scottish football terraces. Even though football violence is an international problem, crowd violence in Scotland is representative of the problem as it exists around the world and thus capable of being singled out for analysis as a representative sample. Even though Scotland is a representative sample of football and football crowd violence, it is a an independent culture which reflects problems that maybe unique to it, just as Brazil or England have cultural and social problems which make local analysis applicable in a world wide problem. Football crowd violence in

47. F. H. McClintock, "Crimes Against The Person", in Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society 1962-3, Manchester, 1963.

Scotland has implications that may separate it from England or other countries, these include history, culture and social make-up which are unique to all countries. As a result situations in countries should be studied separately, even though the general conclusions may be applicable to football crowds in all countries.[48]

Although the main emphasis of this study is on Scottish football crowds, observations of English football crowds are used for purposes of comparison and research is carried out in England to test the differences between supporters in the respective countries. The historical, cultural and social differences that exist between England and Scotland make grouping the two countries together highly undesirable, but the opportunity for comparison still exists. In a comparative perspective some of the problems associated with English crowd violence will be analyzed.

Restricting the research to Scotland allows for individual observations of supporters both at home and away matches over a prolonged period of time. This type of observation allows for the analysis of existing patterns of crowd behaviour on a club by club basis whereas infrequent observations of many clubs would eliminate this type of analysis. The history of modern football crowd violence in Scotland indicates that the major clubs with large support groups tend to have the most incidents of hooliganism.[49] Restricting the research area to football clubs in Scotland allows for the seeking out of potential violent situations for observation and analysis.

The survey includes all the Scottish Football League clubs, but is focused specifically on the ten clubs of the Premier Division. [50] Games in the first and second divisions

48. See H. F. Morehouse, Op. Cit.
49. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., 1984.
50. During the term of this study the Premier Division had ten teams. For the 1986-1987 and

were attended for comparative information. The original research design included planned systematic visits to every Scottish football club ground and to see every team play at home and away. This design was discarded after the first year since this survey method limited the opportunity to observe numerous matches with large crowds and local derby matches which are more likely to have episodes of hooliganism. [51] The research design was altered to focus on the ten teams playing in the Scottish Premier League in order to concentrate on clubs with large support, local derby matches, and to allow for more in depth analysis of the supporters observed. Trying to observe every clubs' supporters at home and at away matches would have restricted the observations to a general analysis whereas observing fewer clubs allows for a more detailed analysis of the events that may cause violence in football grounds. By focusing on the ten clubs in the Premier League, their supporters were systematically observed, both at home and as visitors, playing in the Scottish League, Scottish Cup, League Cup and European competitions. All teams were observed systematically both at home and away but certain criteria were developed based on the first year of observations as a basis for selection of matches in the last five years of the study. When none of the following criteria were applicable then match selection was based on the premise of systematically seeing each team both at home and away during each season. The selection criteria are: 1.) Probability of crowd violence. This was based on rumours, prior knowledge of past incidents between supporters and local issues which were likely to be reflected on the terraces. 2.) Local derbys, whose past history of violence is often a predicator of further violence. 3.) Crowd size. After initial observation it was found that large crowds with roughly equal support group sizes were more likely to have a greater

following season the Premier Division has been expanded to twelve teams.

51. Preliminary research indicated that local derby matches and matches with large crowds often produced a greater likelihood of violent incidents and this is supported by the publications listed in footnotes 43 and 44.

likelihood of producing crowd violence. 4.) Religious divisions. Crowds which were divided between Catholic and Protestant supporters have a greater probability of collective action. 5.) Importance of the match. Matches with great symbolic or practical importance often raise the emotional level of the supporters and add to the possibility of violence. and 6.) Inter city rivalry. Matches between teams from cities vying for social, economic and cultural position often produced animosity between the support groups. Based on these criteria all Rangers versus Celtic matches from 1979 to 1983 were observed along with all Hearts versus Hibs matches in the 1983 - 1984 season. Since scheduling conflicts placed local derby matches on the same day, only one Dundee versus Dundee United match was observed, although many Dundee United versus Aberdeen matches were observed over the course of the study.

Over the course of the six year study period an average of fifty matches were attended each season. Two hundred and sixty club matches were attended in Scotland, approximately sixty matches in England, seven matches in the 1982 World Cup in Spain, three matches in Europe following Scottish club sides, two European club matches between Scottish and English clubs in England, four Scotland versus England matches, twenty two Scotland matches against teams other than England, and several friendly matches between English and Scottish club sides were observed. The total number of hours of observation inside football grounds amounts to approximately seven hundred, with an additional three hundred and fifty hours of observation done before and after the matches on the streets of the cities visited. In addition to the observations made in and around football grounds approximately three hundred hours were spent on various forms of public transportation with football supporters which included doing many open ended interviews. Many hours were also spent in various

pubs, on terraces and walking from grounds conducting open ended interviews.

The entire research project was self financed which limited the physical territory that was covered due to the cost of transportation and admission to the matches. Being a single observer also restricted the number of matches attended due to the schedule being set up to have most matches played on Saturdays with a few on Wednesdays and other mid week matches being attended. Despite these restrictions, the Scottish Premier League through observance of the clubs, based on the afore mentioned criteria over the six year study period has provided ample data for the analysis of football crowd violence. The research for this study and analysis is based on participant observation, not as a supporter of any club, but as an impartial spectator on the terraces. After a one year orientation, [52] the observation cites were chosen based on standing on the terraces in each support group both home and away and observing from the stand at all Premier Division grounds. Observation points were chosen from within the crowd so that each identifiable segment of the support groups were studied, but the main focus of the observations are centred on the group of supporters most identified with football crowd violence. The most frequently used positions for observation were: 1.) the Jungle at Celtic Park, 2.) the Enclosure and Copland Road Stand at Ibrox Stadium, 3.) the Corner at Tynecastle, 4.) the centre of the main terrace at Easter Road, and 5.) the Shed at Tannadice. The observations were not restricted to these positions, but these represent the majority of the positions from which observations were made. In addition to terraces observations, all support groups were observed from outside by using the seated sections of the ground and by traveling with supporters to away matches. From these positions observations were made of home supporters, visiting

52. Not having attended a soccer match before arriving in Scotland one seasons matches were attended to become familiar with the clubs, grounds and supporters.

supporters, play on the pitch, and the police for their relationship to collective crowd action. Even though several matches attended had violent incidents [53] no violence was participated in, except in self defense. As part of participant observation open ended interviews [54] were conducted with supporters. These interviews were conducted after a pilot study of a formal questionnaire was carried out and abandoned[55] which provided the basis for many of the questions asked of supporters. The interviews were carried out before the matches, at half time, after matches, in pubs after matches, and on public transportation to and from the matches. No interviews were carried out during the match as the supporters were uncooperative due their interest in watching the play on the pitch. Most of the interviews were not tape recorded due to problems and restrictions placed on tape recorders, cameras and other physical equipment by the clubs and police. The interview answers were recorded in hand written notes and written up immediately after returning home. The interviews consisted of approximately six hundred hours of formal discussion and thousands of hours of informal discussion with all kinds of football supporters. All interviews were conducted in total confidentiality in order to allow those interviewed to relate experiences and attitudes which might have been illegal or unpopular.

Although aware of the conceptual framework used in this study, the research data collected will be used to examine the validity of the Value Added approach to collective behaviour by Neil Smelser. The study is not an empirical test of the Value Added

53. See chapter seven for descriptions of of several incidents personally observed at matches.
54. Robert Merton, The Focused Interview, New York, 1962.
55. During the early development stage of the methodology for this thesis, a formal questionnaire was prepared and pilot interviews conducted on the terraces. The formal questionnaire was eventually discarded under advice from Dr. A. N. Oppenheim who recommended that other forms of investigation be used to collect information as the questionnaire had sampling problems within football crowds and the amount of information asked was too large to be easily collected on the terraces. See appendix B.

approach to collective behaviour, but uses the framework for the development and modification of the concept with the view to creating a more adequate explanation of crowd behaviour at football matches.

Participant observation in this case is the best way to become involved, to a limited extent, and view the crowd from the inside and get the supporters immediate interpretation of what has taken place. Being an American with a definite American accent, and never wearing a scarf or other identifying mark of any club, allowed me to go where I wanted and talk to anyone who was interested. Many supporters were very interested to know why an American was on there terrace with a notebook recording information about them and offered many insights to the game and the people who watch it. Even with the advantages of being an American on Scottish terraces, participant observation has some definite drawbacks which cannot be overlooked.

> "The actual process of crowd behaviour, . . . is extremely difficult to study for several reasons: First, the time and place of collective outbursts are unpredictable making it difficult for interested observers to be on the scene. When, on occasion, trained observers are present, the risk of personal injury tends to persuade many to make their observations from a distance. Events, moreover, usually occur quickly and over a wide geographic area, and many events may occur at once. Second, participants in the crowd are unlikely to stop what they are doing to cooperate with the investigator. Third, the account of the crowd members who are interviewed, during or following the disorder, are especially vulnerable to conscious or unconscious distortions since members often have 'very vested interests in the interpretation of the phenomenon' (The dramatic nature of crowd outbreaks, of course, excites strong emotions which add to any distortion). Fourth, experimental control is almost impossible to achieve. Fifth, it is hard to sample from populations of collective episodes." [56]

With knowledge of these limitations, every effort was made to compensate for them. Even though collective action is hard to anticipate the selection process previously

56. Michael Smith, Op. Cit., pp. 285.

outlined increased the possibility of observation of violent incidents and several nasty incidents of crowd violence were observed, [57] most noteworthy being the Hampden Park Cup Final riot of 1980 between Rangers and Celtic in Glasgow. At one point in this riot, observations were made while standing in the street outside Hampden Park between the support groups watching rocks, bottles and other objects flying overhead. Other observations [58] have been made in the middle of battles on Gorgie Road and while dodging flying glass on the Bothwell Street bridge in Edinburgh.

While the research and the writing of this study has been taking place John White was writing a thesis on a parallel subject. Under agreement within the Centre for Criminology and the Social and Philosophical Study of Law at Edinburgh University there been a minimum of overlap in the approach to the subject of football hooliganism. Our respective studies were designed to deal with different aspects of the phenomenon of spectator violence. [59]

Definition Of Terms Used In This Study

A number of terms used in the discussion of violence and football violence are often highly vague in meaning or are used with multiple definitions. In this study, an attempt has been made to be as objective and precise as possible in the description of events of

57. See Appendix A for descriptions of the major incidents of violence observed at matches.
58. Standing in the roughest part of the crowd allowed the opportunity to interact with many supporters and pick up several souvenirs as a result of battles between opposing supporters. Several coins were picked up or caught as they came flying into the terraces form the opposition supporters. One Celtic supporter was so angry at a Dundee United supporter at Tannadice that he threw his well adorned hard hat into the United support which missed the target and now makes a wonderful souvenir. A Rangers supporter so depressed by a Rangers loss to Celtic at Ibrox threw his scarf at the Celtic support, it fell short and is now another souvenir.
59. John White, A Socio-Legal Approach To Football Hooliganism, Edinburgh Ph.D. Thesis, 1985.

football crowd violence. In particular, the following terms have been used in the way indicated.

Clamjamfry:

> "(1) A company of people, generally used contemptuously, hence a mob rabble, the riff-raff of the community; 'frequently used to denote pruse-proud vulgal'... (2) Hurly-burly row commotion... (3) Worthless odds and ends, rubbish... (4) to crowd, clutter." [60]

From this definition the term clamjamfry will be used to describe football supporters who attend matches regularly, wear team colours in the form of scarves and jerseys, and stand in predesignated sections of the terrace. These supporters are the most vocal and animated in their support for the team which makes them stand out form other segments of the crowd due to their tight packing on the terraces and continuous singing and chanting. This group of supporters tend to be young, ranging in age from 12 to 21 years of age and are the most likely to be involved in violence in the ground.

Ordinary Supporters: form the basis of all football crowds. These supporters attend selected matches in support of their team, wear scarves and other identifying garments in moderation, stand at varying distance from the clamjamfry, and participate in limited singing and chanting. The average supporter varies in age from the very young to the very old. The average supporter does not identify with the clamjamfry or the activities that they engage in so stand at varying distances from the clamjamfry and do not participate in violence.

Violent Supporter: is a person who stands with and participates in the clamjamfry activities but enters the ground with the intent to participate in any violent activity, and thus may instigate or be the first to follow the leader should violence occur. Violent

60. William Grant ed., The Scottish National Dictionary, Edinburgh, 1941, pp. 113 -114.

individuals can be naturally violent in a biological [61] or anthropological sense. [62] [63] Naturally aggessive individuals who seek to create violence or simply take advantage of the situation can have a major impact on football crowd violence. The violent supporter is impossible to distinguish from supporters in the clamjamfry until some form of overt violence takes place, then the violent supporter will emerge to engage in the violence.

Casual Supporter or Casuals: are a self labeled group of individuals originating in Aberdeen who dress in expensive clothes, hence the name, and go to football matches looking for violence. The group is well organized and attends selected matches with the intent of starting violence on the terraces. The causuals are not football supporters, they do not wear team colours or support any particular club, they only attend matches to find and create violence.

Football Hooligan: is a term used as a label by the press and broadcast media to identify supporters who become involved in spectator violence. This label has taken on a wide ranging definition and is often applied to anyone wearing a football scarf and falling under the afore mentioned definitions. As a result, the term football hooligan will only be used in this thesis as it is used by the media otherwise more specific afore mentioned definitions will be used.

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61. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, New York, 1966.
62. Robert Ardrey, African Genesis, New York, 1963.
63. Ashley Montegu, Man And Aggression, Oxford, 1968.

CHAPTER II

FOOTBALL: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

Football has always been a mass participation sport, either as a mass player sport or as a mass spectator sport. The violence associated with football since the 1960s is not new to it but a continuing evolution of violence that can be and often is associated with any mass participation event. The following history seeks to set out patterns of violence that have always existed in football and how those patterns have evolved with football as it has developed in relation to socio-economic developments in Britain. Football crowd violence is not a new social issue but an issue that has not been identified until recently. The historical relationship and the evolution between football and violence is vitally important to any future explanation of the problem since the modern issue of hooliganism can not be investigated in isolation.

Collective violence is not isolated to any time period or strictly associated with any individual social issue. Any time people gather with a common desire or goal the possibility of a group or crowd becoming violent exists. Crowd violence has often been associated with political issues, food shortages, social deprivation, racial intolerance, prison conditions and football. [1] No collective unrest or riot happens in isolation, conditions exist which create a common feeling amongst the participants which allow for action to be taken to alter the condition of contention. Often the

1. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1972.

conditions that create collective action recur, although in altered forms and over long periods of time. Thus an isolated incident may in fact be a reappearance of actions in response to ongoing conditions of social, political, physical, racial or religious stress. To study any collective action in isolation may and often will over look long standing traditions and conditions of stress in the community which may be the real reason for violence. These conditions of social stress may recur at various periods and then disappear only to appear at a later date in an altered form.

Football is no different from any other institution; it brings a history and tradition which contributes to the modern setting. Long standing social traditions may not be part of the official history of the sport but be part of the social traditions, passed on by word of mouth over hundreds of years of mass participation by players and spectators. These traditions are important to the modern game and the incidents of violence which plague it. Collective violence is not new to football; it has been a part of the sport since its inception and the violence has evolved along with the sport through hundreds of years of development. To isolate modern football hooliganism would overlook vital information related to the development of the contemporary problem and thus make any subsequent findings incomplete. Football crowd violence has evolved along side the sport and is has a important relationship to it; one that must be acknowledged in order to study the modern phenomena. As a result the history of football and the violence associated with it are vitally important to the analysis of modern football hooliganism and its subsequent reduction.

Early Development, 1100 To 1750

Football in medieval Scotland and England was a violent mass participation sport based

on folk traditions which varied from place to place. The origins of the sport are shrouded in mystery but have been claimed to be a development from kicking Danes heads on the battlefields after invasions and to have been brought in by the Romans during their occupation. Whatever the origin, folk-football was well established in the twelfth century as a leisure time activity for the masses. The sport had few if any rules and was evolving as a violent participant sport based on masculinity and physical ability which in turn created status amongst the players and observers.

> "After dinner, all the youth of the city go into the fields of the suburbs and address themselves to the famous game of foot-ball. The scholars of each school have their peculiar ball; and the particular trades have most of the them theirs. The elders of the city, the fathers of the parties, and the rich and wealthy, come to the field on horseback, in order to behold the exercises of youth, and in appearances are themselves as youthful as the youthest; their natural heat seeming to be revived by the fight of so much agility and in a participation of the diversions of their festive sons." [2]

As this was written in 1174 the game of football was not only played by the scholars and workers but watched by the older wealthier non-participants. The demarcation of participant and supporter was clearly beginning to develop along age and wealth differences even at this early stage, although the main emphasis for the youth and middle aged was that of participant.

The game itself was extremely violent in nature with up to one thousand participants on each side pursuing a ball through city streets in riotous style with little regard for life, limb or property. Many were injured in the games and property damage was extensive in many communities due to the style of play. The rough and tumble style of play by large unorganized teams meant that many of the injuries and property damage were the

2. William Fitz-Stephens, Description Of The City Of London, London 1174, Translation and reprint London; B. White 1772, pp. 45-46.

result of the sport and not intentional individual actions.

> ". . . as played in the streets and open spaces, the game was violent and dangerous, devoid of grace and skill.[3] Football was then a wild hurly-burly, played without proper teams, deplored by the serious, both for its rowdiness and for its dangers.[4] Poorer folk had only commons and open spaces at their disposal, but on these they managed to enjoy an astonishingly large number of pastimes . . . to wild and noisy football matches that ranged over over entire country parishes or hurtled devastatingly through narrow streets of towns.[5] During a game of ball, as he kicked the ball, a lay friend of his, . . . ran against him and wounded himself on a cannon so severely that he died within six days, (1321).[6] . . . in the wise foote balle, wherin is nothinge but beastly furie and extreme violence, wherof procedeth hurte, and consequently rancour and malice do remaine with them that he wounded; is is to put in perpetual silence." [7]

The violent folk sport of football was organized on a community level with various factions of the city representing a side or collectively playing for one of the sides in the match. The large semi unorganized sides meant that the game relied on mass collective participation with limited teamwork to accomplish the goal of the game. This semi unstructured participant sport relied on a limited form of collective action to win the match. The collective nature of folk-football meant that the sport had a natural tendency to become excessively violent and destructive toward both players and property. [8] The collective action style of play resulted in the descriptions of the aforementioned authors and their calls for abolition of the sport due to its destructive nature. The descriptions of folk-football's riotous style of play and modern football hooliganism with its destructiveness have a similar theme in that the violence associated with the

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3. Peter C. McIntosh, Sport In Society, London, 1963, pp. 39.
4. Christina Hole, English Sports And Pastimes, London, 1949, 4.
5. Christina Hole, Op. Cit., pp. 39.
6. G. G. Coulton, Social Life In Britain From The Conquest To The Reformation, Cambridge, 1918, pp. 400.
7. Sir Thomas Elyot, The Boke Named The Governour, London, 1546, pp. 82.
8. See chapters 4, 5 & 6 for a full analysis of collective behavior and its implications for folk football.

game through collective participation has always caused varying kinds of destruction either to the participants or to property and bystanders. [9] The riotous style of play in folk-football with its 'destructive social qualities' meant that official action was taken by successive kings and other authorities to try to ban the sport. Not only was the sport destructive to persons and property but it was recognized that many of the men who participated in sports did so at the neglect of military training. Much of the military training of the day took place on religious holidays and Sundays, the limited free time enjoyed by the workers. The competition for the leisure time of the masses meant that football was in direct competition with military training, and far more popular. As a result from Edward II in 1314 (on his way to battle with Robert the Bruce at Bannockburn) to James the Third in 1615 the Kings of England and Scotland banned the playing of football.[10,11,12,13]

Football continued to be played by the masses despite the threat of imprisonment from the edicts of their respective Kings. The game on Shrove Tuesday became a tradition before Lent and was often the biggest match played during the year. The game between Derby and Ashbourne on Shrove Tuesday became such a tradition that it lent its name to matches between local teams, "Local Derby". The following description indicates the problems associated with football and crowds concerning property damage, alcohol and rough play in pre-industrial times.

> ". . . On most places the ball was started from the market place, which from its central position, was naturally selected for the commencement

9. Also see, R. A. Knox and L. Leslie, The Miracles Of Henry VI, Cambridge, 1929, pp. 17.
10. see Terrance Delaney, The Footballers' Fireside Book, London, 1971, pp. 35, 36.
11. see Eric Dunning, "The Development Of Modern Football" in Eric Dunning ed., The Sociology Of Sport: A Selection Of Readings, London, 1971, pp. 118.
12. see Percy M. Young, A History Of British Football, London, 1896, pp. 58.
13. see Acts Of The Scottish Parliament, Volume II, ADMCCXXIV - ADMCDLXVII, James I, AD 1424, pp. 518.

> of the game; the sides were usually town against village or parish against parish, each township reinforced by its partisans from outlying villages. On Shrove Tuesday the town in which the the contest took place was usually placed as if in a state of siege - the windows were barricaded, the doors securely fastened, to prevent the ingress of unscrupulous spectators, and the inhabitants were compelled to join their respective parties on the pain of rough treatment, or even heavy fine. The goals were sometimes the church, the chief alehouse, the wheel of the watermill, or the gate of the nursery-ground. It was a universal holiday, the whole town was alive with expectations; men, women, and children perched on the housetops and thronged the windows to witness the contest. The fight was usually a long and protracted one, the combatants over the anon, overcome with thirst, creeping out of the struggle to refresh themselves with glasses of ale from the adjoining public houses. The ball sometimes mounted high into the air, and was carried over the walls of the gardens, or was lifted into the river, where it was immediately followed by the excited combatants, when a fierce struggle commenced, one player doubtless swimming away with the ball in his arms,pursued by a pack of hungry adversaries. . . After the goaling of the ball, the hero of the day was lifted on the shoulders of his brethren, and carried, with the ball in his hands, through the districts of the various parties, soliciting and receiving alms". [14]

The tradition of football on Shrove Tuesday and other religious holidays was well established by the twelfth century and widely practiced by the middle of the fourteenth century. [15] Even with the prohibition of football in Scotland and England, football was a deeply embedded local tradition. Governmental edicts had very little effect in controlling the game due to the lack of effective policing against crowd action. The previous quotation reflects the problems caused to the local community where the match was played. Spectators were separated from the participants both to avoid being caught up in the play but also to avoid injury from the players. The town shops and houses were shielded against damage from players who used the opportunity of crowd action to engage in illegal activities. Alcohol was already a vital ingredient in the activities and misbehavior of the participants. All these activities are similar to the modern conditions

14. C. W. Alcock, Football, Our Winter Game, London, 1874, pp. 16-18.
15. also see Sir John Sinclair, The Statistical Account Of Scotland, Vol. XVIII, Edinburgh, MDCCXCVI, pp. 88-89, for an account of Shrove Tuesday football in Scotland.

that surround football hooliganism.

Football was not the only cause of social unrest in pre-industrial society. Food prices, religious passions, military conscription, and hunger caused social unrest and riots. The participants in these riots were often the same persons who participated in football matches and the matches were used as a vehicle for unruly behavior. The participants, often over worked, generally economically exploited, and of radical inclination. The prohibition of football not only reflected the relationship between social stress and social disorder but indicates how social stress can be manifest in secondary activities which may not be directly related to the issue in question. [16] Football crowd action, was then and is now, a reflection of wider social stresses, which are expressed in a situation that is convenient to various segments of the community.

Along with government suppression of football, the church was active in attempting to control the sport. Football was played on religious holidays and Sundays which meant that it competed with the church for attendance. The Catholic and later the Protestant church had a major influence on the court systems in England and Scotland; they, for example brought prosecutions against football players, especially those playing when they should have been in church. Not only did the churches object to the playing of sport on religious days but they also saw football as a violent, often deadly, [17] sport with no redeeming qualities. In fact, the church saw most sport as an ". . . exercise which withdraweth us from godliness, either upon the sabbath or any other day els, is wicked and to be forbidden". [18] The church continued to suppress football actively

16. Gary T. Marx, "Issueless Riots", in James R. Short and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, New York, 1972.
17. F. G. Emmison, Elizabethan Life: Disorder, Chelmsford, 1970, pp. 226.
18. Philip Stubbles, Anatomy Of The Abuses In England, London, 1583, pp. 183-184.

until the late nineteenth century when it realized that football was deeply imbedded in the culture and was of benefit to the church in sponsoring teams as an effort to draw men back to the church. As with the government, the church had little effect in suppressing football as a mass folk sport because the game was popular, wide spread, and the church had little in the way of sanctioning ability in suppressing football.

Folk-football continued to be played throughout Scotland and England through the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The game changed little due to the traditions of the sport that were established and passed on from generation to generation. Many areas tried to suppress the sport but some cities like Glasgow openly encouraged the game by providing new leather covered footballs to local boroughs. The game was based on folk traditions, and thus differed from area to area ranging from a kicking game, a form of rugby, and sometimes incorporated forms of hurling. Most were combinations of the three. [19] Football, despite its agrarian class influences had transcended class distinctions and was openly played at Oxford and Cambridge Universities during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The game was still a riotous affair causing injury and property damage. In an effort to control the violent nature of the game the first formal rules were introduced at the colleges in an effort to protect the community, the colleges, and the students. As the sport continued to cause general mayhem and damage it was banned at Oxford in 1555 and at Cambridge in 1584. Despite the ban football continued to be played in open defiance of authority.[20,21,22]

Football continued to be a popular sport throughout the seventeenth and the first half of

19. F. P. Magoun Jr., "Scottish Popular Football 1424-1815", American Historical Review, October 1931, Number 1:1-13.
20. Peter C. McIntosh, Op. Cit., pp. 76.
21. Richard Mulcaster, Positions, London, 1581, pp. 104.
22. see Joseph Strutt, The Sport And Pastimes Of The People Of England, London, 1801, pp. 100, for a description of football after the influence of rules on the sport.

the eighteenth centuries. The increasing number of well organised police, better communication, and a more powerful central government meant that the government had greater ability to control riotous football matches and thus more arrests and prosecutions were brought against participants. [23] During this period football was used by various groups for political purposes, usually to challenge local authority's ability to make changes in long standing customs. Football matches with their notorious violent behavior and ability to inflict property damage were often started with the specific intent to destroy property or intimidate local officials into changing their course of action. The increased power of the police meant that many of these popular political football matches failed in their objective. [24]

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two major changes in the structure of British society began to have profound effects on football. First, a class of untitled land owners appeared who employed many former share croppers and peasants to work their land. As employees many of these people, with the encouragement of the land owners, held folk-football matches against other farms in the area. These matches continued to be violent in nature and played on Sundays and religious holidays.

The second and most profound change in British society was the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution saw vast segments of what had been the rural population move to new fast-growing urban centres in search of work. As a result folk-football began to decline as a mass popular sport with the shift of people from rural to urban areas where leisure time was highly controlled and the police were more effective in controlling crowd behavior.

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23. James Walvin, The Peoples Game, London, 1975, pp. 26.
24. James Walvin, Op.Cit., pp. 25.

> ". . . the days had gone when authorities stood by helplessly while their subjects took the law into their own hands with impunity; in the capital bands of footballers ceased to be able to create mayhem at will". [25]

Football survived in the rural areas but generally died in the towns and cities as the industrial revolution changed lifestyles and deprived people of the leisure time and open spaces necessary to conduct matches; also the police were better able to control unruly behavior. The industrial revolution had done in a relatively short period of time what Kings, Parliaments, Churches and local authorities had been unable to do for over five hundred years - suppress football. The traditions that had built up over the centuries were, if not forgotten, not used as the new urban industrial environment did not accept or want folk traditions to be continued, especially if they interfered with the labor force's ability to produce. [26]

Football In The Public Schools, 1750 To 1840

With the onset of the industrial revolution and the changing lifestyles in Britain, football died as a mass folk phenomenon in the urban setting. This brought on the second stage of football development, football in the public schools. [27] The public school system had a profound effect on football and its subsequent development. Seven public schools are generally recognized as the only true public schools of this time period. They were: Eton, Shrewsbury, Winchester, Westminster, Harrow, Charterhouse, and Rugby. These seven schools moulded the basis for the modern game of football and rugby.

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25. James Walvin, Op.Cit., pp. 26.
26. William J. Baker, "Making Of A Working Class Football Culture In Victorian England", Journal Of Social History, Winter 1979, pp. 242.
27. Public schools in the British educational system are private fee paying institutions in contrast to the American concept of public schools being free and open to anyone.

Originally, public schools were opened to provide educational opportunities for poor underprivileged youths of the lower classes. The young students brought folk-football into the public schools. The game was played in much the same style as it had been played in rural Britain, based on folk traditions but restricted by the physical facilities of each individual school. Since the public schools were spread out around England the traditions of football style varied and the games that developed in each school were distinctly different form one another and evolved to suit the physical facilities of each school.

As the cost of educating young people rose, public schools began to accept fee paying students to pay for the costs of operation. Over a period of years public schools [28] became predominantly fee-paying institutions catering for the upper classes. As upper class youth began to enter the public schools they found the existing students playing football, a game not unfamiliar to the upper classes who may have participated in or watched folk-football in the rural setting.[29,30,31]

The internal structure of the public schools played a large part in forcing everyone in the school to play football. The 'prefect - fagging' system gave power over nonclassroom activities to the older, stronger boys who forced young ones to do all kinds of jobs, including the playing of football. When upper class youth entered the public school he

28. Tony Mason, Association Football, Brighton, 1980, pp. 23-24. defines the upper class as being generally involved in the following professional occupations: school masters, manufacturers, managers and whole and retail businesses.
29. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 50-68.
30. also see William Fitz-Stephens, Op. Cit., pp. 45.
31. also see Charles L. Kingsford, A Survey Of London, (reprinted from the text of 1603 by John Stow) Oxford, 1971, pp. 2.

was confronted with older prefects who forced him to participate in football matches.

Football in the public schools was still a very violent sport. [32, 33] A match included every boy and thus followed the folk traditions of large-scale collective participation which resulted in the same problems of injury and damage to property. At Rugby, the violence took the form of wearing thick soled shoes for the purpose of hacking and kicking the shins of opposition players'. [34]

> "When running like this the enemy tripped, shinned, charged with the shoulder, got you down and sat upon you - in fact, might do anything short of murder to get the ball from you." [35]

Although the style and forms of violence adapted to the surroundings, football was still violent. The public school setting emphasised individual toughness and winning in order to establish a reputation.

In order to reduce the damage to property if not the physical injuries, the schools placed various limitations on the game, based on school sports areas, to reduce the problems of damage to the buildings. This, combined with differing folk traditions, meant that distinctive styles of play developed in each school. Small playing areas at Charterhouse, Eton and Westminster meant the game developed with dribbling and short passing skills being essential. At Harrow and Shrewsbury the grounds were large so a long passing game developed. All schools allowed handling of the ball before 1852 when Westminster banned the practice. At Rugby around 1800 a player caught the ball and ran with it in his hands. The style caught on and the distinctive

32. see Edward P. Eardley-Wilmot and Edward C. Streatfield, Charterhouse, Old And New, London, 1895, pp. 75-76, for a description of public school football.
33. see Thomas Hughes, Tom Brown's School Days, London, 1858, pp. 97-98, for a description of football at Rugby school.
34. Eric Dunning, Op. Cit., pp. 138.
35. F. Markham, Recollections Of A Town Boy At Westminster, London, 1903, pp. 95.

game of Rugby developed as a result. [36, 37]

The schools did not play against one another due to lack of communication and transportation. Therefore the rules of the game were still in a state of constant change since they were still based on folk traditions and not written down. Each school had its own rules and style of play based on traditions, the prefect - fagging system, and physical playing facilities. During the 1830s and 1840s public pressure grew to reform the harsh conditions in public schools, especially the prefect - fagging system. Thomas Arnold at Rugby was instrumental in reforming the system by making the prefects responsible to him and forcing them to write down rules for the school and for football. This reduced the arbitrary authority of the prefects and for the first time created a written set of rules for football players of all levels to follow. Thomas Arnold was so successful at Rugby in reforming the prefect - fagging system and the educational standards that the other public schools followed his example. [38]

The public schools kept football alive during a period of rapid social change in Britain. Folk-football had declined to a point where it was only played in remote and isolated agricultural areas but the traditions were carried on in the public schools in an evolving form for almost a century. Although the styles of play differed in each school the sport was still violent and based on a limited form of collective participation. New rules resulting from the necessity of physical playing fields and the control of the power structure in the schools only altered the form of collective participation and made it more formal, but no less violent.

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36. James Walvin, Op. Cit.
37. Eric Dunning, Op. Cit.
38. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 36.

New Rules For Football, 1840 To 1860

Economic changes brought on by the industrial revolution had many effects on British society, one of which was an expanding merchant or middle class. [39] The emerging middle classes with their economic power began to send their sons to public schools. The middle class youth entered the public schools to find football being played by upper class youth in the period of reform when headmasters were exercising more control over non-classroom activities. The middle class youth influenced the emerging rules for football in the public schools by reducing the amount of violence in the game. Rugby was the first school to publish formal rules for football in 1847. The rules prohibited the following rough play and violence.

> "1. No player being off his side shall hack, charge, turn in, touch down in goal or interrupt a catch.
> 2. A player standing up to another may hold one arm only but may hack or knock the ball out of his hand if he attempt to kick it or go beyond the line of touch.
> 3. No hacking with the heel or above the knee is fair.
> 4. No player may wear projecting nails or iron plates on thesoles or heels of his shoes or boots." [40]

These rules only eliminated some of the violent play associated with the game at Rugby. Hacking, intentional kicking of the shins, and various other physical assaults were still allowed. Even though the rules prohibited certain violent acts the tradition of hard physical play was carried on.

Advances in British society and economic structure brought pressure for changes in the public schools. The technical and social advances in Britain, which were reflected in

39. Tony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 43, defines the middle classes as being generally involved in the following job categories: banking, commercial and financial services, and shop keepers.

40. Cited in Eric Dunning, Op. Cit., pp. 144.

the public schools, also affected football. Communications systems were developed and improved which allowed for faster and cheaper communications for the public, and public schools. The railways also expanded and developed during this period and provided cheap transportation to all parts of the country. [41,42] The public schools all considered themselves to offer the best in education and openly competed for students. One way for the schools to gain recognition was to play sports, especially football and cricket, against one another. Communication systems allowed schools to arrange matches and agree on rules, which were still different in the various institutions. The expanding travel facilities meant that teams could travel easily from school to school.

During this period of rule formation, football began to move away from its traditions of mass participation, to emphasize individual skill with a disciplined team, ". . . a type of game structured in such a way that it is relatively spontaneous yet highly controlled."[43] The control of public school authorities over the evolving rules meant that the game still included the pleasures of the fight without the great risks and dangers to players and property. [44] The new rules reduced injuries, and placed new emphasis on skill, teamwork, inventiveness and individual expression. Despite the changing format of football, the game was still very violent when compared to modern standards. Football in the public schools had become a:

> ". . . socially constructive means of satisfying the need for excitement by providing in the form of an orderly, relatively harmless, spontaneous yet controlled type of 'mock-fight'." [45]

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41. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 39.
42. John Hutchinson, The Football Industry, Glasgow, 1981, pp. 17, 29, & 49.
43. Eric Dunning, Op. Cit., pp. 144.
44. Norbert Elias, "Dynamics Of Sports Groups With Special Reference To Football", in Eric Dunning, Op Cit., pp. 144.
45. Norbert Elias, in Eric Dunning, Op Cit., pp. 145.

Many graduates of public schools went on to university. Students at Oxford and Cambridge had continued to play football in one form or another despite its banning many years earlier. With the influx of public school graduates, all bringing various forms of football rules, including those established at Eton in 1849 prohibiting the use of hands, arguments developed about the style of play and rules to be followed in universities. [46] Students at Cambridge University were the first to codify a standardised set of rules of the game. Dominated by football style playing public school graduates the rules reflected their preference for a 'no hands' style of play. The Cambridge Rules as they became known, not only set out the size of the pitch, and style of play they eliminated more of the violence in the game. Rule XIV: "All charging is fair, but holding, pushing with the hands, tripping up, and shinning are forbidden."[47] The publication of the Cambridge Rules in 1853 with the resulting effect of graduates taking the rules with them after graduation meant the rules became widely known and used.

The influence of the public schools and universities also resulted in an improved image for the sport. Since the sport was mostly played by the middle and upper classes it became acceptable for 'young gentlemen' to participate in and become accomplished at the game. The old folk style of football had almost disappeared as a result of the industrial revolution and a new refined sport was emerging from the public schools and universities. Football, as sport emphasizing individuals skills and teamwork, without mass violence, became acceptable to all social classes. Graduates from the public schools took the sport with them as they entered the work force, many of them going into the expanding charitable field and the new emerging field of social work. [48] At the

46. Geoffery Green and A. H. Fabain (ed.), Association Football, (4 vols.) London, 1960, pp. 140.
47. J. C. Thring, The Winter Game: Rules Of Football, Uppingham, 1863, pp. 16-18.
48. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 45 and 49.

same time as the public school graduates began to take football back to the wider society sport and recreation were recognized as an important ingredient of the industrial society. [49] Football in its new form was inexpensive, allowed for many participants and thus was encouraged in many areas to combat some of the social ills of the day. [50]

The middle and upper class influence on football, included the concept of 'the game for the game's sake', This helped make the game socially acceptable during the Victorian era. Football helped promote physical fitness, courage, skill, moral benefit, proper temperament, hard work, and fitness, [51] all of which were desirable in Victorian society. As a result many teams of former public school and university students were established.

On 26 October 1863, a group of men from public school backgrounds got together in London to form the Football Association. The Football Association was formed to organize the sport and the various teams around the country under one set of rules, as many variations were still being used. The rules adopted included the prohibition on handling the ball and hacking. These two rules led to the eventual split in the sport and the formation of the Rugby Football Union in 1871.[52]

Football not only survived as a sport in the public schools but transcended the class structure to become acceptable to all classes. The rule formation period of football development changed the style of play from the collective mass participant sport to a

49. see the Clarendon Commission Report, 1864.
50. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 45 and 49.
51. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 233.
52. see James Walvin, Op. Cit., and Eric Dunning, Op. Cit., for a further discussion of the establishment of the Football Association and the formation of Rugby as a separate sport. Many of the previously cited texts also document the formation of the Football Association.

game of teamwork and individual skill. The new rules controlled the game, but did not eliminate the spontaneous nature of the sport which meant that violence was still common between players and involved spectators.

Football Grows In The Working Class, 1850 To 1890 [53]

The growth of modern football in England and Scotland ended the playing of the last vestiges of folk-football which had survived in rural areas and relegated it to celebrations of traditional sport on special occasions. The expansion of modern football in the latter half of the nineteenth century was greatly aided by legislation which increased the amount of leisure time workers enjoyed. By the 1850s most industrial employees were under legislation limiting the total hours worked and they were given Saturday afternoons off. [54, 55, 56, 57] This represented a major increase in leisure time and allowed many more people to engage in or watch football. In 1871 The Bank Holiday Act again increased leisure time and re-established many traditional religious holidays and established several three-day weekends which were used to play football. Many new teams formed all over the two countries and played each other on a friendly basis under varying rules until the formation of the Football Association in 1863 which set out a standard set of rules. In addition to increasing leisure time workers also enjoyed increased real spendable income. In the period between 1860 to 1914 the average worker's spendable income increased by one to two percent a year. [58] More

53. Tony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 43, identifies the working class as being in the skilled trades and as unskilled manual workers.
54. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 23.
55. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 13-14.
56. William J. Baker, Op. Cit., pp. 242.
57. W. G. Carson, "White Collar Crime And The Enforcement Of Factory Legislation" in W. G. Carson and Paul Wiles, ed., The Sociology Of Crime And Delinquency In Britain, Vol 1, Oxford, 1971.

spending money, along with more leisure time and increasing number of teams, meant that football prospered during the period.

The affluence of the Victorian era led to many reforms of the new industrial - urban society which had profound if unintended effects on football. The Education Act of 1870 provided extensive funding for state run schools and extended educational facilities to the working classes. Many public school graduates took teaching positions in the new schools and introduced football into the physical education programmes. Many schools formed teams and played within the school or played teams from other schools in the city or region. [59] New educational opportunities reduced the previously high illiteracy rate especially among the working class. A reduction in the illiteracy rate resulted in an increased interest in newspapers which enjoyed an increasing circulation during the period. Newspapers were just beginning to take an interest in covering sports and found a ready readership for football coverage amongst the newly educated youth in the state schools.

The church,[60] the emerging trade unions [61] and the long standing sport of cricket,[62]

58. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 15.
59. Many modern professional teams began as school teams and are today in League football, they include: Blackburn Rovers, Leicester City, Chester, Exeter, and Queens Park Rangers. Teachers in some of the schools formed teams that still exist including: Sunderland and Northampton.
60. Several modern football clubs originated through church sponsorship, these include: Queens Park, by the Y.M.C.A. Aston Villa, Birmingham City, Bolton Wanderers, Blackpool, Bournemouth, Watford, Everton, Liverpool, Fulham, Swindon, Wolverhampton Wanderers, Hibernian, Celtic, and Rangers.
61. Eleven trade union sponsored teams are still in the football league and include: Stoke City (railwaymen), Crewe Alexandra, Manchester United (railwaymen), Coventry City (cycle workers), Milwall, Arsenal (Royal Arsenal), West Ham United (iron workers), Crystal Palace (palace workmen), Sheffield United (cutters), Reading (biscuit workers) and Rotherham (steel workers).
62. Cricket club sponsored teams that survive in league football include: Derby County, Preston North End, Sheffield Wednesday, and Tottenham Hotspur.

each in an effort to maintain or expand their influence over members or attract new members, turned to football in order to accomplish their aims. Sponsored football clubs attracted players from their existing membership and recruited players from other clubs and professions. Several trade union clubs began actively to recruit workers for higher wages who in turn would play football for the factory - trade union sponsored team. Many workers were attracted from Scotland to England for the increased wages offered by English trade union sponsored teams. Great emphasis was placed on winning which led to increased recruiting of player employees. Successful teams brought prestige to the work place and thus the trade union teams provided the early basis for the modern transfer fee system of today.

The public school influence on football did not stop with the rule formation period. As former public school students took football back to the developing working class centres, a pattern that had been developed in the public schools became increasingly common, that of football being played in limited space, by fewer players, in a regulated form, and watched by spectators. Football had changed from a mass participation sport, to one for the relative few and watched by mass audiences. Crowded urban development had not provided ample open space for mass participation football, but space did exist for the new controlled modern game. Thus the emphasis shifted from participation through play, to participation through spectating. Increased police resources, an emphasis on winning, and the increasing circulation of newspapers also helped eliminate mass participation football. The inability of the very young and the older men to play at the highest level of the developing game also contributed to this development. The newspapers were able to communicate information about the success of teams to a mass readership and this increased general spectator interest in the

game. These changes led to football being an occasion on which the majority of people watched the best players play the game. With this shift, football clubs began to develop facilities to accommodate the audiences. The early facilities were usually only earthen banks for the spectators to stand on, these eventually giving way to wood and concrete terraces. The developing spectator interest and resulting need for facilities coupled with travel expenses led working class clubs to begin charging admissions in the 1870s. [63]

By the 1880s the expanding rail service had become accessible to the football clubs and their supporters. Teams began to travel extensively by train to play matches followed by their supporters. For example, Queens Park was able to travel to Manchester for a Saturday match by leaving on a Friday night and returning late Saturday night. [64] Aston Villa took 2,000 supporters to Glasgow for a match against Queens Park in 1887. [65]

Newspapers continued to expand their coverage of football during this period. Increased coverage helped generate increased awareness of football as newspaper circulation increased. Newspaper coverage, transportation, increased economic ability for the general public, organised teams, the codified format of play, better spectator facilities, and a high standard of play meant that football had become a socially acceptable game for the population in general.

On 20 July 1871 representatives of the Football Association met in London and established the Football Association Challenge Cup, a knock-out competition for all

63. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 148-150.
64. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 146.
65. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 147.

clubs who were members. This was the first nationally organized football competition under one set of rules. New rules adopted at this time further formalised football, removed violence from the style of play and eventually forced the rugby enthusiasts to form their own association in 1871. [66] Examples of the new rules adopted by the Football Association include:

> "9. No player shall run with the ball.
> 10. Neither tripping nor hacking shall be allowed, and no player shall use his hand to hold or push his adversary.
> 11. No player shall be allowed to wear projecting nails, iron plates or quttapercha on the soles of his boots." [67, 68]

The first F. A. Cup was won in 1872 by Wanderers of London.

As a result of the influence of the first Scottish club, Queens Park, the Scottish Football Association was established on 13 March 1873. Queens Park dominated Scottish football both as the administrative authority and on the playing field and as a result provided the entire Scottish team in response to the challenge of Mr. C. W. Alcock for a match between representative teams from each country. The first international football match in the world was played at the West of Scotland Cricket Ground (Partick) in Glasgow on 30 November 1872 and ended in a goalless draw. One commentator observed:

> "When the first match at Partick was over, the Scots gave three cheers for the English eleven, who at once raised their voices to return the good feelings, in the old fashioned way." [69]

66. John Rafferty, One Hundred Years Of Scottish Football, London, 1973, pp. 3.
67. C. W. Alcock, Football The Association Game, London, 1906, pp. 12.
68. Other rule changes at this time also influenced play on the pitch. Previous to the F. A. Cup competition three defensive men had to be between the goal and the player receiving the ball. The rule was changed to only require two defenders to be between the goal and the player receiving the ball. The rules were also changed to allow goals only where the ball passed the under the cross bar and between the goal posts.
    C. W. Alcock, 1874, Op.Cit., pp. 96-97.
69. Sir Frederick Wall, Fifty Years Of Football, London, 1935, pp. 78.

Attendance was steadily increasing over this period [70] with most working class clubs charging the set minimum of 6d [71] for admittance to matches. All players were amateur before 1885 but most clubs offered illegal payments for the best players. As a result of wide-spread illegal payments, The Football Association finally approved professionalism with a set maximum wage. The advent of professionalism split football between the middle class clubs and working class clubs, the former preferring to maintain traditional values of sport for sport's sake. The consequence of professionalisation was that the conflict between the middle class administration and the emerging working class power base became one in which the division became permanent with separate competitions being established for amateur clubs. Professionalisation placed working class clubs in firm financial control of football with professional clubs dominating competitions with paid players, many from Scotland moving to England for the money. Professional clubs were able to pay ever increasing transfer fees and also build facilities to accommodate increasing spectator interest.

The financial needs of professional clubs led William McGregor, the Scottish owner of Aston Villa, to organize the Football League in 1888. The league was established to promote a firm fixture list as opposed to the tradition of arranging friendly matches around the F.A. Cup competition. A set fixture list meant a more steady income for the working class professional dominated league clubs. This in turn financed transfer fees, higher salaries and stadium construction. This extended the split between professional and amateur factions. Different attitudes toward the style of play led many amateurs to

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70. See Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 139.
See Peter Dunk, ed., Rothmans Football Yearbook 1986-1987, London 1986.
See Geoffery Green, History Of The Football Association, London, 1953, pp. 592.

71. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 150.

refuse to play against professionals and thus amateur teams generally played in separate league and cup competitions. The difference between professional and amateur clubs was not only evident in the administrative and playing sides but also manifest itself in conflict between club supporters. Middle class supporters of Queen Park, an amateur club to this day, often had hostile encounters with the working class supporters of Glasgow Rangers and Celtic. [72, 73]

The struggle for power between the traditional middle class dominated Football Association and the emerging professional teams led to a long conflict which in many ways is still going on. Conflict between middle and working class values, both on and off the field, created a situation where football evolved based on financial needs and not as a result of alterations in the wider social situation. Once football had emerged form the public schools with its new rules, it changed only slightly as an amateur sport to adapt to the new industrial society. Advantage was taken of developments in transportation, communication, leisure time, economic conditions to develop and adapt as a mass spectator sport. Once football had become a mass spectator sport, space restrictions and economic considerations had become major issues. When enough people wanted to watch a match, clubs were compelled to accommodate them, first on earth slopes and later on terraces, as a means of keeping people off the pitch and giving them a good view of the match. Once spectator demands were placed on clubs and facilities built, then clubs began to charge entry fees to offset costs and the economic basis of football was established. Spectators demanded good players which led firstly to illegal payments and secondly to professionalisation, which in turn ended what little harmony had existed between working class and middle class teams. The traditional

72. Bill Murray, The Old Firm, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 168.
73. William J. Baker, Op. Cit., pp. 246-7.

middle class attitude of the 'game for the game's sake' was alien to working class traditions of working hard for the pay packet. The working class attitude of winning and winning at all costs, left the working class playing style in total control of football.[74, 75] No middle class club won any major competition after 1882. Even though the working class professional style of play dominated play on the field, the middle class still held the balance of power in team ownership and influence in the Football Association, the governing body in enforcing rules and providing penalties for infractions. Middle class values, expressed through the Football Association, have continually tried to reduce the violence in football while promoting skill on the field, values which are often in conflict with working class values but are enforced by middle class people in charge of the governing body. The conflict between the two continues to be a problem to this day.

The Modern Game Develops, 1890 To 1944

Football by the end of the nineteenth century was becoming a major employer as more and more teams became professional. With a predominantly working class work force, a players' union was established in 1898 but did not become well enough organised or have a large enough membership to take action until 1908. After a threatened strike the Football Association retaliated by threatening to use amateur players as replacements for the professionals. After negotiations, the Football Association recognised the players' union and the new Professional Football Players Association recognised the Football Association as the sole authority over the game.

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74. see Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 230, for a discussion of class values and conflict in the playing of football.
75. also see John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 45, for a further discussion of class differences in football and how the problem was blamed on the Scots.

Class divisions were evident, not only on the pitch but on the terraces as well. Economic necessity forced more and more teams to turn professional to remain competitive on the pitch and at the turnstyles. During this period both middle class and working class supporters often mixed on the terraces. Just as the style of play was different between the classes so was the style of support from the two groups. The middle class tradition of 'sport for the sport's sake' meant that both home and opposition teams received equal appreciation of their skills. The working class supporters on the other hand, saw the match as an expression of their identity and values and responded as partisan support. This was noted on the terraces prior to the turn of the century.[76]

> "First of all they (working class supporters) were so clearly partisan. They wanted their own side to win. They were supporters. They did not see the other side. They did not even applaud its skill and courage nor give it any credit at all. It was merely a sacrificial lamb on which the home team could practice ritual slaughter." [77] "The working class spectator identified with a team and through that team with a place. He liked to win and did not have much patience with honourable defeat."[78]

In the 1890s supporters' groups were organised and providing social events and travel arrangements to away matches. [79] Supporters' clubs or 'brake' clubs - as they were known in Glasgow - were organized to support a particular team, and thus the members reflected the same general class values as the players. This in turn manifested itself in a strong identity with the team and partisan support.

Football in Scotland developed on a slightly different basis than it did in England due to the dominance of one amateur club, Queens Park. Scotland maintained its amateur

76. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 231.
77. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 230.
78. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 238.
79. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 50-55.

players' status until 1893 and the development of the Scottish Football League. The Scottish Football Association did not place a cap on players' salaries as the English Football Association had done. As a result, Scottish football worked on a supply and demand pay system, but salaries were generally lower in Scotland than England. Scotland, due to the influence of Queens Park, and economic conditions, has to this day maintained a system where amateur, part-time and professional teams play in equal status with one another. With the banning of English clubs from European competition after the Heysel Stadium riot in 1985, the larger Scottish clubs have been able to reverse the trend of Scottish players moving to England for increased salaries and have themselves attracted many English players to Scotland with the lure of competitive salaries and European football.

Crowd violence in Scotland had existed prior to the turn of the century, especially in Glasgow.[80] After the Scottish Cup replay in April 1909 ended in a draw between Rangers and Celtic before a crowd of 60,000 at Hampden Park, the crowd expected extra time to be played but the rules called for another replay. Sections of the spectators began to fight with one another, and one of the largest incidents of 'football hooliganism' in this century took place.

> "There were some who jumped the barricade and crowded round the players' tunnel screaming 'play on'. A policeman probably provoked, was seen to be rough with a demonstrator and the crowd went berserk.
>
> The goal posts were torn up and paraded. There were ninety-seven policemen present, but the officer in charge held them to protect the stand, surrendering the field to the rioters. Wooden barricades were torn up and a bonfire made of them. Mounted police were brought into action but the crowd retreated to the terracing and stoned them. There were baton charges which were repelled with stones.
>
> The fire brigade were called out when the pay boxes were set on fire but their hoses were cut and there was a weird sight when police and firemen lined up to protect hoses and stoned rioters to keep them away.

80. Bill Murray, Op. Cit.

> Soon there were 300 police reinforcements called from all over the city.
>
> Twelve doctors and a squad of nurses tended the injured including forty-five policemen. As they did so the destruction spread to property outside the park and damage scarred the route into town. Peace at last settled on a shamed Hampden Park. On Monday morning one solitary rioter appeared in Govan Court and was fined £5.00." [81]

Although the description of the first Hampden Park riot does not provide a specific analysis of collective behavior, the evidence does indicate a similar pattern of events to those witnessed in the football hooliganism of today. The pattern of crowd activity building to sustained action against the police, with semi-organised attacks against the issue that incited the crowd and the agents of social control is the same pattern that is followed in all collective violence.[82]

Class differences in the administration, support, playing style and management of football continued to cause strife throughout the sport. Middle class clubs eventually set up competitions for amateur clubs and left the league structure almost totally dominated by professional clubs. Despite the conflict on the field between professional and amateur clubs, the terraces for the most part were occupied by a mixture of working and middle class supporters. Although the evidence is inconclusive football crowds before the first World War seem to have been predominantly working class with varying degrees of middle class support depending on the social make up of the area. Women also attended most matches and often made up a substantial percentage of the crowd, especially when given reduced admission charges. [83]

The outbreak of hostilities in World War I resulted in a massive public resentment when

81. John Rafferty, Op. Cit., pp. 113.
82. See chapters 4, 5, and 6 for a detailed analysis of collective behavior in football crowds.
83. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 151-158.

the Football Association and the League did not suspend play. Rugby and other major sports all suspended play with the onset of the war. Led by newspaper criticism, football - although contributing heavily to the war effort - was heavily criticised for continuing to play. Many football clubs resigned from the Football Association and changed over to playing rugby. This was especially true for clubs from public school and middle class backgrounds. As a result of the public - especially middle class resentment - most middle class spectators left football grounds and changed their allegiance to rugby, thus creating a definite class distinction between the sports. By the end of the war, only one amateur football team remained in the professional leagues, Queens Park.

Despite the loss of most middle class support football enjoyed an attendance increase after the war. Football benefited from an expanding leisure industry and was fueled by increased incomes and a prosperous economic situation. Old football stadiums were expanded and new ones built to accommodate the increasing number of spectators and teams that joined the professional leagues. [84] With the building of Hampden Park, Ibrox Stadium and Celtic Park, Glasgow had the finest football facilities in Europe, at the time. [85]

The inter-war years continued to see the best football talent in Scotland, Wales and Ireland go to England for the higher salaries on offer. Scottish players dominated many English teams and every league champion between 1920 and 1939 had at least one Scot in the side. As a result of the relatively large number of good Scottish players during this period, Scotland dominated the annual international fixture against England. Due to political considerations both by the government and by the Football Association,

84. See G. Green, Op. Cit., pp. 592.
85. John Rafferty, Op. Cit., pp. 46-47.

England played few international matches except where it could be seen as a form of political superiority over the opposition. Scotland continued to play all countries of the world on a regular basis, except those aligned with Nazi Germany.

The international match between Scotland and England continued to prosper after the first meeting in 1872. With the opening of Wembley Stadium in London in 1923, the semi-annual migration of Scots to London began, and by 1928 eleven fully loaded special trains ran from Glasgow to London for the match. In 1934 the number had increased to 52 trains transporting some 23,000 Scots south for the match with 'the auld enemy'.[86] Even at this early date the train loads of Scots were described as, ". . . their tartan cargos more bemused by the mile, soaking in drink that defeated the discomfort and fed their arrogance." [87] The 'Wembley Cult' continues, with upwards of 200,000 Scots travelling to London when the match is played on a Saturday.

With the outbreak of World War II, all football competitions were suspended. All football facilities were made available to the War Office. Despite the suspension of play, the government encouraged the Football Associations, both north and south of the border, to institute matches using available facilities and players for the entertainment of the population. Many local leagues were set up using footballers stationed near by to make up the teams. Despite severe crowd limitations three quarters of a million pounds was donated to the St. Johns' fund and the Red Cross from gate receipts. [88]

86. John Rafferty, Op. Cit., pp. 61 and 13.
87. John Rafferty, Op. Cit., pp. 47.
88. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp.142.

Football In Changing Times, 1945 To The 1980s

After the end of hostilities in World War II football league and cup competitions resumed both north and south of the border. In the decade after the war football enjoyed increasing attendance,[89] increased revenues, [90] which resulted in increasing transfer fees and higher salaries. [91] Although the professional teams enjoyed most of the publicity amateur clubs continued to prosper and increase in numbers after the war.[92]

By the middle 1950s general economic conditions had improved and society as a whole had more real disposable income. At the same time alternative leisure and entertainment industries were emerging to compete with football for revenue. People were no longer willing to go and stand on cold terraces in the rain to watch football when alternatives were available. The expanding television industry took advantage of the popularity of football and began showing recorded highlights of selected matches on a regular basis. As a result of changing social and economic conditions, football was forced to adapt to declining attendance by substituting entertainment and spectacle for supporter participation and rivalry, and by substituting expensive seats for terraces. [93] As a result playing styles changed and so did the make up of grounds as terrace capacities were reduced to be replaced by seating in an effort to maintain income levels from a steadily falling attendance.

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89. see Tony Williams, ed., Rothmans Football Year Book 1983-84, London, 1983, pp. 464.
90. see Maurice Golesworthy, Op. Cit., pp. 11.
91. see James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 145.
92. see James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 148.
93. Ian Taylor, "Hooligans: Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society, August 1969, pp. 205.

Falling attendance meant alternative sources of income were needed for clubs to maintain funds for salaries and transfer fees. Scottish clubs were first to enter European competition playing in all competitions consistently after the war. English clubs did not participate in European competitions for political reasons until 1957 when Manchester United played in the European Cup. European competitions provided additional revenue to clubs and thus an increased emphasis on qualifying for Europe through domestic competitions.

By the late 1950s The Professional Footballers' Association (players' union) was gaining strength. Through negotiations it was able to force the abandonment of the maximum wage limit in 1961 [94] and the binding contract was declared illegal by the courts in 1963. [95] As a result, players were free to move from club to club when their contracts expired and were also able to negotiate salaries. Although big clubs had always been able to attract the best playing talent, the existence of the salary cap plus the existence of restrictions on transfers, meant that small clubs could compete with large clubs by holding players under their contract. However, after the elimination of these restrictions the big clubs were now able to dominate the smaller ones through sheer economic strength. Salaries and transfer fees have steadily increased with smaller clubs becoming reliant on transfer fees for financial stability. As a result, a relatively small number of clubs have dominated domestic competitions over the past thirty years.

> "Today football remains as sensitive as ever to fluctuations in social patterns: to population and urban change, changes within the mass media, and the influences of educational change, and above all else, the re-direction of consumer spending." [96]

94. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 166.
95. Law Reports, 1964, pp. 413-454.
96. James Walvin, Op. Cit., pp. 163.

Crowd violence at football matches before the 1960s is not well documented because it was not seen as a major problem; there were fewer incidents and it was not identified as a focus of media coverage. Even though early crowd violence is not well documented there is no reason to believe that it was not a problem. As Tony Mason noted early football crowd trouble was divided into three categories.

> "The first, and almost certainly the largest number was the result of anger at the decisions of the referee or at the attitude of the opposing team or of individual players within it. Friction between rival groups of supporters, especially during local 'derby' matches seems to have almost always been sparked off by activity of this sort on the field although memories of past struggles cannot be ruled out as initiators of hostilities. The second most important cause of crowd disorder at football matches was the overcrowding of spectators in the ground. The third major cause was crowd dissatisfaction at some decision of the club or other authority about how to play the match or indeed whether to play the match at all." [97]

Documentation of football crowd violence prior to 1960 is difficult to establish in any sort of systematic or chronological order. [98] Most incidents were not recorded, or if recorded by the media, were part of match coverage and not the basis for articles about crowd violence. The general evidence does suggest that football crowd violence was widespread with recurring incidents of crowd action throughout England and Scotland. [99, 100] Incidents were recorded in Glasgow when over 300 police and army personnel were used to control the crowd at Parkhead in 1898. [101] A stampede by part of a crowd of 70,000, locked out of Hampden Park in 1935 when the turnstiles were closed to limit the crowd size, resulted in 320 injuries. [102]

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97. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 160.
98. The Scottish Football Association refused permission for access to their files to document incidents of crowd violence in Scotland both in a historical and contemporary reference.
99. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.
100. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.
101. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 54.
102. John Rafferty, Op. Cit., pp .65.

> "Football from the Middle Ages, had always had a reputation for lawlessness. The public school teams had gone some way to taming this but riots, spectator violence and crowd invasions were relatively common, especially in the 1880s, as rivalry between the newly developed local teams intensified. Many invasions occurred in crucial matches, particularly in the cup or in derby matches. So well timed were some of them that it is difficult to believe that they were spontaneous, but engineered deliberately to have a good draw replayed for the sake of the gate money or because the local team was losing. By the 1890s, crowd invasions were less common, more the result of overcrowding as the popularity of the game increased and clubs became more experienced in crowd control. Railings, turnstiles, fences and crush barriers became an accepted and necessary part of a football ground." [103]

Despite the ability of the police and football clubs to better control football crowds by the turn of the century, crowd violence remained common at matches, especially in Scotland. [104] Crowd violence was also present in Europe and England throughout the period before 1960. [105] As a result of recurrent patterns of collective behaviour football violence was identified by the media and specifically by the press in the early 1960s as a major social problem of the day and who launched extensive coverage campaigns with the subsequent demands for action to control "football hooliganism".

Media Influences

The mass media, through newspapers radio and television have had profound effects on football. Newspapers helped football develop as a spectator sport starting in the 1850s, a tradition that continued until the 1960s. The first truly sports newspapers, 'Bell's Life' and The 'Sporting Chronicle', first appeared in 1820 with many subsequent titles appearing in the second half of the nineteenth century. [106] Influenced

103. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 66-67.
104. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 163-190 for details of violence involving Glasgow Rangers and Glasgow Celtic.
105. John Williams, Eric Dunning and Patrick Murphy, Hooligans Abroad, The Behaviour And Control Of English Fans In Continental Europe, London, 1984.

by the expansion of a state school educated public, sports coverage by daily newspapers became the second most important selling point with enough demand from football supporters to justify special pre-and post-match editions in addition to regular coverage. In addition to supplying match coverage, newspapers served football clubs by providing official information about the clubs to the readers. Many papers filled columns with interviews and other information that supporters would not otherwise have access to. With developing communication technology newspapers were able to report on away fixtures and matches played by other teams which in turn created more demand from the football supporting public. For the first hundred years of organized football, newspapers and football clubs enjoyed a relationship which benefited both through increased attendance and readership numbers.

After the end of the second World War, competition from radio and television forced many national newspapers to go out of business or to merge for economic reasons. In an effort to gain increased readership reporting and presentation styles were altered. As competition increased between national newspapers, the tabloid press emerged as a form of popular entertainment intertwined with sensational news coverage.

Radio and television have had a long and difficult relationship with football. Recognizing the potential spectator interest the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) attempted to cover selected matches as early as 1927, and television followed by broadcasting its first game in 1937. Opposition to live transmission of football, due to its presumed effect on attendance, meant that regular radio coverage did not occur until 1951 and television programmes showing highlights did not follow until 1964. [107]

106. Anthony Mason, Op. Cit., pp. 187-188.
107. Maurice Golesworthy, Op. Cit., pp. 186.

The advent of live radio and television at matches meant that descriptions and pictures of not only football but other incidents in the ground, such as crowd violence, could be brought to the attention of the listening or viewing public. Such incidents which may not have interested newspaper reporters previously, could be described by announcers and caught on film for a far larger listening and viewing audience. As a result, an incident that might not have been seen or known about by anyone not at the match was broadcast through out the country. If an incident was broadcast on radio or television then newspaper coverage would also take place.

The publicity created by the media brought increased public and spectator awareness of football resulting in generally high attendance figures after the war. The media, through their ability to allow the spectator to gain first hand information about matches without attending matches, has had a direct effect on the changing social make up of the football terraces. With expanding disposable income levels, a general reduction in Saturday working and expanding media coverage older supporters were often drawn away from the terraces to other forms of the leisure industry. Football could be watched in highlight programmes or in live Sunday transmissions from the comfort of an arm chair. When the problem of crowd violence became an issue at football grounds more older supporters opted for alternative entertainment thus leaving the terraces to younger supporters. [108]

Just as the media was instrumental in helping influence older supporters to leave the terraces it brought younger supporters to football. Football provided the opportunity for youths to get on television. Most important matches attracted the cameras and young supporters had the opportunity to try to 'get on telly'. Without adult

108. see Anthony Mason, Op. Cit.,

supervision, young supporters had an afternoon of independence from parents, and other supervision, which allowed them to become involved in acts of violence which could attract the television cameras and make the individual 'famous' in his local area.

Although violence and football have been inseparable, it was not until the media began to identify this violence as a problem that most people became sensitive to it. The media coverage given to violence on the terraces, which had for example been going on consistently in Glasgow for eighty years,[109] identified a 'new' social menace where blame could be laid on the opposition team as an excuse for a poor performance on the pitch, or to prove the opposition's total lack of football and social skills.

> "If we consider the game at its widest, to include club clerks, mascots, fans and not only players and managers, newspaper reporters are integral and very important to it. The nature of their association with clubs is strongly reflected in the way they write about the sport. People are seldom objective about sport, least of all football; the appeal to aesthetic awareness, to emotion, to a man's sense of injustice, to his capacity for self-identification, results in complex responses, and the reporter is not excluded from these . . ." [110]

Not only is the reporter susceptible to the influence of football and to identification with a team, but the newspaper itself can reflect both the bias of a reporter and its own in the presentation of the news and sport. This bias and the 'creative reporting' of certain newspapers, can have a profound effect on the public, especially when associated with editorial opinion. When creative reporting and editorial opinion appear as news the the effect on the public can be dramatic.

Studies of the media, especially newspapers, have shown a relationship between the

109 Bill Murry, Op. Cit.

110. Arthur Hopcraft, The Football Man, People And Passions In Soccer, Harmondsworth, 1968, pp. 201

press and the readership which is greatly influenced by the process of newsworthy choice, presentation and effect. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young have argued:

> "There are, broadly speaking, four types of research which can be done on the mass media: the first deals with questions of ownership and control; the second with actual process of selection and manufacturing of news; the third, with the images and content eventually presented, and the fourth, with the effects of this presentation". [111]

It is the final three points which are important to analyse if we are to understand the relationship between football and football crowds. Although ownership of newspapers does play an important role in what each newspaper covers, how it is presented, and editorial comment, attention is better focused on how the news is interpreted. Analysis will point out that football violence reporting is similar to the reporting of a crime wave; the newspapers are somewhat alike in what they cover but differ in presentation and coverage styles. Ownership has the most dramatic effect on presentation and reporting styles, tabloid versus the highbrow press, but for this analysis the effect can be clearly demonstrated with the latter three points of Cohen and Youngs' guide for research on the mass media. In a narrow sense, this analysis will investigate the effects of the media on football crowd violence, without going into the broader issues of who owns the media.

Football crowd violence, like crime in general, has created a "moral panic". [112] The development of the national press in the eighteenth century meant that local and individual problems became national problems through increased national

111. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture Of News: Deviance Social Problems And The Mass Media (2nd. ed.), London, 1981, pp. 491.

112. Stuart Hall, et. al., Policing The Crisis: Mugging The State And Law And Order, London, 1978.

awareness.[113] As Malcolm Ramsey notes:

> "If there was no national reporting of crime news, there would not be any endemic panic over crime. Panic about crime has characterized the press as long as it has been in existence - which is precisely the time span of urban, industrial capitalist society. The more everyday reporting of crime by the press is the stuff of endemic panic. It is not the peaks or the troughs of crime reporting which are of importance, but the over arching continuity in the crisis - engendering presentation of crime news in the press".[114]

As with crime in general, the football hooligan has been identified by the media as a "folk devil".[115] Reporting has focused on 'football hooliganism' since its identification in the early 1960s and continues unabated today. As Stuart Hall has argued:

> "Media coverage of football hooliganism is worth singling out for special attention, for at least four reasons.
> (1) Since football hooliganism first began to attract public attention and concern in the mid-1960s it has received very extensive press coverage. The nature and pattern of the coverage is a phenomenon worth analysis in its own right.
> (2) Despite appearances, only a very small proportion of the population has any direct experience of 'football hooliganism'. Most people have never seen, been close to or involved in a 'football riot', either at, or on the way to or from a football ground. The media provide the principal source of information about this problem for the vast majority of the public. It is therefore worth asking what the nature of the information is - how it is constructed, what it highlights, what it leaves out". [116]

He goes on to argue two other points. He maintains; (3) the public definition of football hooliganism is based on "impressions, definitions and explanations" provided by the press; and that (4) the press is in a unique position, in comparison to radio and television, through its private commercial ownership with limited control, to articulate public opinion. The press can mobilize public concern and opinion about many social

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113. Malcolm Ramsey, The Development Of Prison In Modern British Society As A Response To Endemic Panic About Crime 1750-1950, Ph.D. University of Edinburgh 1980, pp. 131.
114. Malcolm Ramsey, Op. Cit., pp. 123.
115. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics, Oxford, 1972.
116. Stuart Hall "The Treatment Of 'Football Hooliganism' In The Press", in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Football Hooliganism, The Wider Context, London, 1978, pp. 15.

occurrences, like football hooliganism, and orchestrate public opinion to call for corrective steps to be taken in an effort to control the situation. The effect of the press campaign can flow over into radio and television as the problem develops into a situation of national interest and concern. [117]

The newspaper business as it exists today is based on the capitalist economic system which requires newspapers to be sold in large enough quantities to attract advertisers, who provide most of a newspaper's revenue, which in turn provides for facilities, publication staff, and reporters. Within that system, two distinctive styles of journalism have evolved in the British isles. The market theories represent the quality media based on objective portraits of reality, of which the Times and Guardian are examples. The second style is manipulative and based on the interest of the owners:

> ". . . whose interests in turn are quite opposed to the public at large and to any true presentation of events in the world." [118]

Newspapers including the Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Record, Express and The News Of The World, have developed the manipulative style of reporting which has led to sensationalism and distortion with the main aim not to inform the public but to sell newspapers. Shock value and giant headlines sell newspapers for the modern tabloid press and football violence has made the move from the sports page because of its shock value and ability to attract readers. The resulting wider public awareness of crowd violence through sensationalism and distortion has created the basis for a moral panic about football hooliganism. [119]

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117. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 16.
118. Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, The Manufacture Of News, Deviance Social Problems And The Mass Media, London, 1973, pp. 17.
119. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 18.

It is not known who first used the term football hooligan in the press, but it was in use by the turn of the century in Glasgow. [120] The changing social make-up on the terraces and crowd violence was creating press notice in match reports in Scotland since the turn of the century. The Glasgow Herald often mentioned violence at matches in the match reports, but seldom covered incidents outside this context. [121] It is the modern identification and labelling [122] of football violence by the popular press, through banner headlines and front page coverage of football crowd violence, that has created contemporary public concern. 'Football hooligan' as a label is applied to terrace dwellers who engage in various forms of activities in and around football grounds by the press and other forms of the media. Once the label has been applied to violence associated with supporters, it has been used to describe all supporters, violent and non-violent, and of all types for normal terrace activity. With the development of the popular press, further identification, sensationalising of an existing social issue and the publicising of football hooliganism newspapers actually promoted increased violence through publicising a relatively few incidents. [123]

The selection of news by the press is based on a concept of "the newsman's sense of news values". [124] "Newsworthiness is still regarded as an independent quality of autonomous events",[125] which allows the press to select and report on events which it feels that the public want to read about. Although the press may claim to report events as a result of the reader's right or desire to know about events the actual selection of one piece of news over another is based on its extraordinary aspects in comparison to

120. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 169-170.
121. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 180-183.
122. see Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit., pp. 16-19.
123. This is what Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit., calls the deviancy amplification spiral.
124. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 53.
125. Paul Rock, "News As Eternal Recurrence", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.) Op. Cit., pp. 65.

normal everyday life. [126] Along with traditional subjects always covered (Parliament, fashion, business etc.) extraordinary events help gain public attention and sell newspapers through public interest in the unusual.

> "Two things follow from this: first is that journalists will tend to play up the extraordinary, dramatic, tragic, etc., elements in a story in order to enhance its newsworthiness; the second is that events which score high on a number of these news values (unexpected, dramatic, negative, human tragedies, elite persons, etc.) will have created news potential over ones that do not." .[127]

Football violence before the 1960s was not directly identified by the press as a major point of concern since the violence had in many cases been going on in the terraces for many years. The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald had been reporting incidents in and around football grounds involving supporters for many years with little or no public outcry. With the advent of the popular tabloid press in the 1960s with its news reporting and selection process that concentrated on controversy and sensational reporting styles to attract readers football violence was seen as an extraordinary event of newsworthy quality. Previous reporting of crowd violence had often been confined to the match report but now appeared as an individual story which often overshadowed the match report.

The problem violence in the wider society [128] and football crowd violence as a phenomenon cannot be singled out and blamed on media coverage. The problem itself has a long history but was on the increase in the early 1960s. The major reason for the increase in terrace violence lay in the slowly changing social make-up of football crowds. For those newspapers like the Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman who regularly reported the odd violent incident on the terraces the slight increase in the

126. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 53.
127. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 53-54.
128. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Of Violence, London, 1963, pp. 10.

number of incidents was reported but not exaggerated. [129] The problem had always been there, deplorable as it might be, but it was not a major newsworthy story capable of altering traditional journalistic reporting patterns. For the most part, incidents of crowd violence were reported in match reports as a sideline to the real importance of the day: the match.

The introduction of the first modern tabloid newspaper, The Sun, in 1965 and the subsequent change of other titles to the tabloid form established a platform for the identification of football crowd violence as an issue of social concern. [130] The tabloid press was not tied to older reporting traditions, and in an effort to attract readers sought new stories and different angles on old ones. The break with traditional styles of football reporting resulted in the separation of crowd violence from the match in the popular press.

Stories had appeared in leading newspapers about football crowd violence prior to the advent of the tabloid press. Newspapers read each others' stories and report in response to them, so as not to miss an important issue. Football crowd violence became a newsworthy story for the new tabloid press as a response to traditional newspapers' reporting of incidents at matches. The tabloid press identified crowd violence as newsworthy in its own right and the issue was reported as an independent article on a consistent basis for the first time. [131] Once football violence had been separated from the coverage of the match by the tabloid press the same process that brought the tabloid

129. see Bill Murry, Op. Cit., for a historical review of newspaper coverage of football crowd violence in Scotland.
130. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior", Social Problems, 18:197.
131. see Mark Fishman, "Crime Waves As Ideology", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.) Op. Cit., pp. 102.

press to report on football crowd violence was reversed and the traditional press began to identify and report on crowd violence as an independent issue. This had the effect of separating historical traditions of football violence from the perception developed by the media.

As a result of independent reporting of football crowd violence in both the tabloid and traditional press the first "moral panic" [132] about football hooliganism occurred in 1967. Every major newspaper in the country carried stories about terrace violence, but the tabloid press tended to have:

> " . . . a noticeable tendency to dramatize the seriousness and the extensiveness of these problems and to publicize 'get tough' statements. In the case of football hooliganism this was achieved through various techniques such as grouping together a large number of separate (often trivial) offences in a wide variety of places into one report with a joint heading, '40 arrested in football riots', and also by publicizing statements from magistrates and football managers saying how serious the problem was and how something needed to be done about it. This was not to suggest that there would be no football hooliganism problem without the press. It is suggesting, however, that the press does use the considerable power at its disposal to keep alive, direct, and to some extent exaggerate the problem as it is portrayed to the public." [133]

The newly identified if not newly labelled problem of football hooliganism gave the tabloid press a prime opportunity to define a problem to the readership, orchestrate their own and the public outcry, and demand along with the readership that something be done to solve the problem. As a result activities that had gone on in some cases for almost a century became an issue of great public concern through the orchestration of the tabloid press.

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132. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers, London, 1972.

133. Bob Roshier "The Selection Of Crime News By The Press", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, eds. Op. Cit., pp. 47-48.

The changing social make-up of the terrace supporters resulted in the emergence of the clamjamfry [134] amongst most football support groups. The behaviour patterns of the emerging clamjamfry was different to the traditional patterns of support and thus could be and often was labeled as hooliganism by the tabloid press. It was not until the departure of the older supporters when the terraces were left to younger supporters, now unsupervised by older supporters, that their behaviour could be singled out. The emergence of the clamjamfry provided a necessary ingredient in the increase of football violence. Coupled with the clamjamfry and inter-support group contact which included singing and threatening activities the newspapers identified and labelled much of the new terrace activities as hooliganism. As a result many non-violent activities on the terraces were labeled as hooliganism simply because the activities were different to traditional terrace behaviour.

The newspapers were able to create an image of football matches being predominantly violent in nature when in fact violence was not common. Due to a national distribution the tabloid press was able to report on one violent incident, however minor, at one match and overshadow normal behaviour patterns at every other match. For many tabloid newspapers the violence at matches became more important than the match on the pitch. Football hooliganism became the central issue, one that attracted readers and was built on a seemingly endless amount of violence.

> "These self-generated paradigms may, in time, become virtually autonomous. They may become progressively detached from their base and then unfold in accord with an internal logic of their own. In this fashion, the press can create 'pseudo-disasters' which may have no discernible relation with the events as they are known by outsiders. Pseudo-disasters, crime waves, and panics create a reality which is organized by the structure of the newspaper office alone. Most probably these autonomous news cycles are more conveniently constructed than any other to meet the space and timetable demands of

134. See Chapter One for a definition of Clamjamfry.

> newspaper organization. The are likely to be discrete, brief, well-structured, and pregnant with intelligible consistent development." [135]

The result of the growing media campaign in 1967 against football hooliganism not only defined hooliganism to the public as a whole, it used terms which polarised the readership reaction into clear cut symbols of right and wrong. By taking sides in the issue the press was able to increase public awareness and indignation through the process of story selection and headline usage. Terms like riot, thugs, brawl, louts, mayhem, slash, cut, vicious etc., in both the headlines and in the columns themselves helped create an image of wrong-doing by those involved, without ever asking why or how.

> "Communication, and especially the mass communication of stereotypes depends on the symbolic power of words and images; . . . unambiguously unfavourable symbols". [136]

Often terms used to describe hooligans' activities were the same as those used to describe play on the pitch. Toughness was a desirable personal quality on the pitch, but when transferred to the activities on the terraces the descriptive terms took on a negative value and thus all terms associated with toughness and violence associated with football took on a negative concept to the newspaper reader. This was especially true if a headline story in a newspaper described a violent incident at one match before reporting on other non-violent matches, thus giving an impression of violence at all matches from the process of:

> ". . . choosing which sort of headline, language, imagery, photograph, typography to use in translating what happened on Saturday afternoon into a story in Sunday's paper". [137] "Through symbolisation, plus other types of exaggeration and distortion images are made much

135. Paul Rock, in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.), Op. Cit., pp. 69.
136. Stanley Cohen, "Mods And Rockers", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, (eds.) Op. Cit., pp. 272.
137. Sturat Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 19.

sharper than reality". [138]

Over a period of time the dramatisation, exaggeration and distortion of the actual realities of football crowd violence can leave the most ardent supporter questioning the reality of press reporting. In a tape recorded interview one Celtic supporter, when asked about the newspaper portrayal of supporters said,

> "They don't know, they nay been in the Jungle, they don't know what goes on here". [139]

Other Celtic supporters supported the first statement. When asked "when you read about Celtic supporters in the newspapers, do they portray an accurate account of what happens"?

> "No, they've nay been here, they don't know what's going on. They watch from up there (pointing at the press box), tell 'em to come down here". [140]

Views like these support the contention that the newspapers are on the outside looking in, and not on the terraces learning, understanding and reporting on the realities of the terrace situation. The distortion is clear-cut between the the reality of terrace activities, including violent and non-violent behaviour, and what is reported in the popular press. The distortion of headlines, lead stories, placement and the stories' own account can serve to produce a total distortion of the reality of terrace activities. Many of the activities of the clamjamfry are loud and animated but normally non-violent, yet often Sunday newspapers have a lead story about the one violent incident between a few boys at a third division match while over one hundred thousand other supporters were well behaved. The bad behaviour of a few has often resulted in most well behaved

138. Stanley Cohen in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young, eds., Op. Cit., pp. 275.
139. Personal interview, Celtic supporters, Celtic Park, 15 May 1982.
140. Personal interview, Celtic supporters, Celtic Park, 15 May 1982.

supporters being labelled as hooligans just because the wear a scarf and go to matches. Although the press have a right and even an obligation to report crowd violence the style in which the tabloid press has presented the issue has produced a false impression of football as a violent undesirable place to be, when in reality the opposite is true. [141]

Conclusions

Crowd violence and control of the violence have always been problems associated with football. The inability of the police to control crowds of unorganized folk-footballers led to a riotous style of play that often damaged property and injured players and spectators. Only the industrial revolution and the change in society from rural agrarian to urban industrial and the expanding power of the state with its increasing police power was able to control folk-football. The emergent football structure after the public school influences continued to use the traditions of crowd action in football but through an altered form, adapted to the new rules of the game which required mass spectator participation instead of mass player participation. Despite the popular media perception that football crowd violence is a relatively new social disease football crowd violence has existed throughout the history of the sport and has been prevalent to varying degrees in the modern game since the founding of the Football Association in 1863. Although not well documented football crowd violence in the form of pitch invasions, fighting between rival support groups, fighting with the police, stadium invasions, destruction of property including public transportation, projectile throwing and attacks on players or the referee have gone on in cycles throughout the history of organised football. It is only through one particular increase in the number of incidents that was identified by the media as a major social problem that football hooliganism was brought

141. A further development of the relationship between media coverage and football crowd violence appears in Chapter Five.

to the attention of the public and thus became a major social problem. Once identified by the media demands for action to control the problem were made thus focusing the attention of the public and successive governments on the issue. Once this happened efforts were made to control a problem that subsequent chapters will show may be a problem with no real solution, just remedies to reduce the likelihood of future outbreaks of violence.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EXPLANATION OF DISRUPTIVE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

Football violence has attracted a considerable amount of attention, not only historically as discussed in Chapter two, but in contemporary terms as well. As football crowd violence seemed to increase from the early 1960s onwards the media, governments and academics have devoted large amounts of time and energy to dealing with this social problem. Although many ideas have been put forward as to the causes and solutions for football crowd violence, Ian Taylor has identified five major perspectives.

> ". . . (i) subcultural theories of youthful fashion or style; (ii) theories of changes in the structure of the game; (iii) social anthropological theories of ritual violence; (iv) labelling theories and (v) more or less empiricist amalgams of the above." [1]

Taylor however, sees his own work as falling outwith his typology and according to him belongs to the radical tradition. While Taylor dismisses all of these perspectives in preference to his own theory, the contention here is that all of the identified categories have a contribution to make in the analysis of football crowd behaviour but no perspective is adequate by itself for the analysis of the problem. Through Neil Smelser's value added approach to collective behaviour a more adequate analysis of football crowd action can be made. [2] One of the great strengths of Smelser's theory

1. Ian Taylor, "On The Sport Violence Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in Jennifer Hargreaves ed., Sport Culture And Ideology, London, 1982, pp. 165.

is its ability to accept and incorporate elements of differing explanations of football crowd violence within his framework without affecting the structure of the approach. This chapter will review the explanations of football crowd violence following the outline of Ian Taylor. This is done to indicate the scope of previous work, point out its strengths and weaknesses, and to show why each has not provided an adequate explanation of the problem. Although not an exhaustive and complete review of possible approaches to the analysis of football crowd violence, all make a contribution to the body of knowledge on football crowd violence, and lead to the adoption of the value-added theory of collective behaviour. Smelser's theory, at a general level, can incorporate the insights of the following contentions without disrupting the framework he sets out for the analysis of collective behaviour. This chapter then uses the 'imminent critique' approach put forward by Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young in The New Criminology. [3] By first analyzing the deficiencies in other approaches to the study of football crowd violence and then reviewing the theoretical concepts within collective behaviour an argument for the adoption of Smelser's theory can be made.

Contemporary Theoretical Perspectives On Football Crowd Violence

Subcultural Perspectives

Subculture theories of violence and problems of personal identity are seen by John Clarke's early work as the primary basis for crowd violence. Through tracing other subcultural styles such as; teddy boys, mods and rockers, skinheads, and punks, [4]

2. This argument will be expanded after reviewing the major contributions to the understanding of football crowd violence.
3. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, The New Criminology, London, 1973.

Clark found that youth cultures are a reflection of the dislocation of working class youth from traditional working class society through changes in "education housing and the distribution of income". [5] As a result of "professionalisation and spectacularisation" the game of football has become a multi-class sport in which "the working class young have become physically and socially separated in the football crowd". [6] As a consequence, the younger supporter is effectively isolated from older supporters who in turn do not exercise the educational or informal social control mechanism previously present in the crowd. Clarke argues that young supporters have established old working class values on the terraces which involve toughness and masculinity which in turn leads to violence. The terraces provide a place for the youth subcultures to meet and participate in a traditional working class activity, collective participation, to test out and prove old traditional values, and create excitement on the terraces through identifying with their team. As a result of social and economic changes in the wider society, working class youth have been isolated on the terraces which has created a subculture that tries to maintain old working class values which manifests itself in violence. [7]

Subcultural theories make many valid points relating to the football terraces and Clarke makes several contentions which are confirmed in this research. Subcultural approaches do not however, offer a framework which allows for the analysis of football crowds as a normal crowd or as a violent collective unit. The subcultural concept may in the light of arrests in England of organized gangs amongst football

4. John Clarke, John Critcher and Richard Johnson, Working Class Youth Culture: Studies In History And Theory, London, 1979.
5. John Clarke, "Football And Working Class Fans: Tradition And Change", in Rodger Ingram et. al., 'Football Hooliganism' In The Wider Context, London, 1978, pp. 51.
6. John Clarke, Op. Cit, pp. 51-52.
7. John Clark in Rodger Ingram et. al., Op. Cit.

crowds, be a viable explanation but when applied in Scotland the concept is found to have little empirical evidence to support it. [8] The football crowd, as correctly observed by Clark is divided by age and social status, but not to the extent of totally isolating working class youth from the wider society. The terraces are occupied by a multi class audience. Fred Coulter's research on the social make up of the Scottish terraces concludes,

> "Although predominantly male, . . . the supporters were predominantly in the younger age groups, (under 30) in the skilled occupational groups, whether white- or blue-collar, but with a significant proportion from the professional and intermediate white-collar occupations".[9]

Clarke's contention that hooliganism is an attempt by working class youth to reestablish old traditional working class values on the terraces must be questioned, since the values of toughness and masculinity have never left the terraces and can not be isolated as only a working class trait. [10] The inclination toward violence is related more to age than to class associations. [11] Violence is an on-going terrace tradition that has never ended and thus has no need to be reestablished, the violence simply appears in cycles based mostly on outside influences.

The fact that control of younger supporters by adults has diminished can not be questioned. [12] The general trend for older supporters to occupy the seats does influence the terrace behaviour by reducing informal control over younger fans. The changes in the make up of football crowds dose not warrant an analysis based on

8. also see, H. F. Moorhouse, "Professional Football And Working Class Culture: English Theories And Scottish Evidence", Sociological Review, 261: 1984, pp. 285-315.
9. Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 144.
10. John Clark in Rodger Ingram et. al., Op. Cit. pp. 54.
11. Larry J. Siegal, Criminology, St. Paul, 1986, pp. 86.
12. John Clark in Rodger Ingram et. al., Op. Cit. pp. 51.

working class youth creating a subculture on the terraces, since youth of all classes have tended to stand in isolation from direct parental control throughout football history and are not a subculture as Clark contends.

Changes In The Structure Of The Game

In early work, Ian Taylor based his analysis on the changing nature of class relationships between football crowds, ownership, and management. It was changes in these relationships that led to football crowd violence. For Taylor, football is part of the general class struggle for equality and reestablishment of working class values and control of football clubs. The game of football represented many of the traditional working class values such as, " masculinity, active and collective participation, and victory" in which the supporter was part of a "football subculture" where he was part of a "participatory democracy". [13] With the professionalisation of football and the advancement of the institutionalisation and internationalisation of the game, the clubs' relationship with the "football subculture", or the clamjamfry as defined here, became distant. This left the "rump", a group with a subculture identity with a total dedication to the club on the terraces, believing they were the only true paying customers. The "rump" [14] was the remaining working class support with traditional values who began the struggle to regain their traditional position within football, that of participatory democracy, to regain a sense of control over "the game that was theirs". From this point, re-assertion of authority over football has been through violence. Along with John Clark's later work, Taylor tried to show how changes in the structure

13. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness An Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen, ed., Images Of Deviance, Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 141.
14. Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology Of Football Hooliganism", in Eric Dunning, ed., Readings In The Sociology Of Sport, London, 1971, pp. 352-378.

of the game, by emphasising the entertainment and spectator side of the sport, were alien to the traditional supporter who was not interested in seats, bars, restaurants and modern social amenities. The gulf between the club and the traditional supporters led to the rump trying to re-establish their old relationship with football, that of participatory democracy. [15]

In his 1982 work Taylor takes his analysis of football crowds more clearly into class issues, contending that the "under-class" traditions and values are in conflict with those of the middle and upper classes and that football violence is a reflection of a changing "capital-labour" relationship in the wider society. Taylor contends that the British government has become more authoritarian since the late 1960s with more emphasis on "law and order" which has created a 'moral panic' in the mass media over the 'threshold of violence' amongst working class youth. As a result of the "struggle of hegemony", a reduction in the economic expectations of the "under-classes" together with increasing ruling class authoritarianism has created a "crisis in working class experience which is manifested in many forms, one of which is football violence". [16]

Ian Taylor's work makes assumptions about football crowds that are based on Marxist traditions of class struggle combined with notions of subcultural theory. The problem with his work is that it lacks the careful scrutiny of empirical evidence necessary to substantiate these assumptions. For example, Taylor makes a careful analysis of many social and structural changes both in football and in the wider society, but the historical assumptions he makes about football traditions must be questioned and the results of his analysis as well. As pointed out in Chapter Two, football has had a long history of

15. Ian Taylor, 1982, Op. Cit.
16. Ian Taylor, 1982, Op. Cit.

multi-class participation at all levels. The relationship between football and class participation has been in a state of constant flux since the industrial revolution, but at no time has any one class had a total domination of football. [17] Working and middle class influences have co-existed on the terraces and in the stands since the emergence of football from the public schools, although in many cases one social class may be more prevalent on the terraces than another. Today the terraces are still a multi-class institution with the main identifiable segregation being based on age. [18]

Taylor assumes that crowd violence at matches is a new phenomenon, which it is not. He also claims that football crowds had some kind of influence on management and ownership decisions through a participatory democracy. Football crowds have always had an influence on management and ownership decisions, in an indirect sense through vocal support, for or against decisions and in a more direct sense by simply not attending matches and hurting the club financially. To assume that supporters on the terraces had or have any greater influence than this must be questioned. Professional football is influenced by economic considerations over which spectators have only a partial influence through their admission fees. Revenues have always been generated from other sources unrelated to spectator attendance. The buying and selling of players is also a management decision over which the spectator has never had any direct influence. Player transfers are often based on the availability of funds and contract agreements, not on supporter demands.

The most obvious spectator influence on the football club is through vocal support for players, playing styles and performance or attacks on the same. Supporters may show approval or disapproval for the activities which may in turn influence player selection,

17. The one exception to this statement is in ownership, where the wealthy own most of the clubs.
18. also see, Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 38-39.

playing style, and player performance. To assume that spectator participation from the terraces ever has or will expand beyond this point is questionable. The only direct influence and direct contact supporters' have with most clubs is through official supporters clubs who do communicate supporters' attitudes to club officials.

The changes in football through professionalisation, institutionalisation, and internationalisation with football becoming a spectacle and part of the entertainment industry are pertinent observations of the structural changes in football since the 1950s. These changes often represent changes in the wider society which football responded to, but did not create. The development of international club football in England and Scotland was the result of economic needs that developed with declining attendance and whose financial viability was facilitated by the advent of relatively cheap air travel around Europe. Competition for spectators developed due to an expanding economy which saw the end of Saturday working, a steady rise in spendable income, and increasing competition from new leisure industries resulting in general reductions in football attendance. In order to attract traditional spectators and new ones most clubs began to offer spectators modern facilities including seats and modern social amenities, facilities and amenities which most supporters actually want. [19]

The "rump", as Taylor labelled the young segment of vocal supporters most identified with violence is, like the Clamjamfry, a Saturday subculture. It is not, as Taylor contends, the remnants of working class disillusioned youth, but a multi-class group of participants who, as a result of their age, are more prone to collective violence than their

19. see, Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 69, for a statistical analysis of surveys carried out at Scottish football grounds indicating that terrace supporters were infavour of clubs providing better facilities.

older counterparts. If the rump were actively engaged in trying to reestablish traditional working class values and participatory democracy on the terraces their violence would be aimed at the club and management and not at opposition supporters. Every true supporter knows that violence and bad publicity hurts the club and seldom if ever brings about any positive changes.

Taylor's later work is open to historical questions also, most of which concern his analysis of governmental changes in relation to the rise of football crowd violence. Football crowd violence did not emerge in the 1960s, it was simply on the increase, and the popular press did - as Taylor claims - create a moral panic about football hooliganism. The major insight offered in Taylor's 1982 work is in the economic conditions which developed slowly in the late 1960s and accelerated into the 1980s and which have created an unemployed class or "under-class". Historical research done in the area of collective behaviour has shown that in times of falling economic expectations the incidence of collective crowd violence increases. [20]

Social Anthropological Theories Of Ritual Violence

The third type of investigation into football crowds is based on social anthropological theories of ritual behaviour. The most notable work in this tradition has been done by Peter Marsh with a further study through photographs by Desmond Morris. Peter Marsh viewed crowd behaviour as ritual violence in a tribal setting, where insults are made to one's masculinity which in turn can lead directly to violence. [21] The rituals of the modern terraces are directly related to the rituals of folk football, territoriality and

20. Gary Marx, "Issueless Riots" in James F. Short and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, New York, 1972.

21. Peter Marsh, Elizabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder, London, 1978, pp. 121-134.

ritualistic behaviour patterns, like chanting. [22] Football terraces have become isolated and shunned by the wider society, thus denying social dignity and a place of responsibility in the wider social order to the adolescent participants. The young supporters have established their own structure on the terraces. Reputations are built with hierarchies arranged around physical toughness, often based on age, which results in a social structure strictly for adolescents which avoids the status and structures of the wider society. [23] Symbolic battles are fought with the opposition through chanting and singing with the occasional physical confrontation in which solid rules of conduct are followed and very few people are injured, since few blows are exchanged between the combatants. [24, 25]

Peter Marsh studied supporters at the Manor Ground in Oxford and concluded that most of the activities on the terraces are ritualised in nature, and based on masculinity and territoriality. Marsh's general conclusions about ritual behaviour patterns are substantiated in this analysis since personal observations of matches show that even the smallest grounds with only a few hundred spectators become involved in singing and chanting between support groups. Home supporters have always had an identity with their club's ground and speak of it in possessive terms just as they speak about their team. Territoriality on the terraces did not exist on the terraces until barriers were erected in the 1960s to stop supporters changing ends at half time. Before barriers supporters of the two teams often intermingled without major violent incidents. When barriers were erected sections of the terraces became the sole possession of a group of

22. Peter Marsh, Aggro, The Illusion Of Violence, London, 1978, pp. 66-94.
23. Peter Marsh, "Careers For Boys, Nutters, Hooligans And Hard Cases", New Society, 36, 1976, (710) pp. 348-49.
24. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.
25. Peter Marsh, Op. Cit.

supporters and thus an identity was established with that section of terrace, a place to be protected and defended against invaders. As a result much of the territoriality associated with the terraces is the result of barriers erected to separate supporters and force them to stay in one place.

Marsh's concept of symbolic violence must be seriously examined. Ritual chanting and singing may represent a form of symbolic violence in which the opposing support is always sent away having been out- vocalized on the day. This may satisfy masculine and territorial needs of the supporters and in this context is symbolic "aggro" since no real physical violence takes place. The findings of this research support this concept since the supporters take pride in their singing and chanting and often see this action as a moral victory if the match is a draw. If the match is won the supporters take pride in their achievement of having helped the team to victory. If the team loses the supporters lose and no amount of vocal support can vindicate a loss.

In the context of actual physical violence in the form of pitch invasions, street battles, or missile throwing the general intent of the combatants is to do damage to the opposition support. The violence is not symbolic but real, with injuries inflicted on many participants and innocent bystanders. The Hampden Park riot of 1980 and the Heysel Stadium riot of 1985 are prime examples of crowd violence which resulted in death and injury. Collective violence by its very nature is open to fits of extreme violence in which the perpetrator has little or no regard for the victim's well-being. [26] In most instances of football crowd violence the unknown identity of the potential victim, his identity by scarf or other garment of opposition team colours, anonymity of

26. see P. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason And Order Versus Deindividuation Impulse And Chaos", in W. J. Arnold and M. M. Page, Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, Lincoln, 1970.

the perpetrator, general dislike of the opposition and opportunity through crowd action means that the amount of violence used is only governed by the physical power of the perpetrator, weapons used, crowd support, and the influences of the police or stewards to stop the act. Often fatal injuries are avoided in collective violence because the victim is not able to defend himself or the conditions change and the perpetrator then looks for another victim.

Desmond Morris based most of his conclusions about football violence on Peter Marsh's work, while maintaining a more traditional anthropological approach. The theme again is one of ritual behaviour, but as Morris notes, major attempts must be made to understand the social conditions and changes that are the root of violent outbursts. [27] The elements of terrace violence as Morris see them are anthropological applications of:

> "assembly taunting, terrace taunting, terrace jostling, terrace charges, pitch invasions, player assaults, referee and linesman assaults, missile attacks, supporter sieges, property destruction, street battles, seeing off displays." [28]

Labelling Theories

The fourth approach to the analysis of football hooliganism has been through labelling theory or deviancy amplification theories. Based on the concepts of Howard Becker and Edward Lemert, Stanley Cohen described football hooliganism as a youth culture based on rule breaking, social reaction, association with defining agencies, labelling and ostracism from the normal social relationships due to the expectation of deviant

27. Desmond Morris, The Soccer Tribe, London, 1981, pp. 268.
28. Desmond Morris, Op. Cit., pp. 262-266.

behaviour. This left the individual as a labelled deviant who is then expected, by defining agencies such as schools and the police, to continue the same type of behaviour, thus amplifying the deviant behaviour patterns because the police and other defining agencies, like the press, expect and react quickly to even the most trivial actions. Cohen saw youth as always trying to establish an independent identity and authority on the terraces which in turn creates moral indignation and the response of control agents, thus beginning the labelling process. Within the framework of labelling theory Cohen noted how the general terrace activity based on youth identity with its escalating violent activity leads to and creates reactions from the police, and later the press, who take actions to control violent activity. The subsequent arrests and court appearances label the 'hooligan' who is then excluded from mainstream society due to the wider indignation to hooliganism caused by media coverage and condemnation. As a result the labelled deviant is placed in a position where the terraces are the place where his activities are not only socially acceptable but are treated with admiration by others in the terrace culture. [29, 30]

Deviancy amplification theories like Stanley Cohen's look at football hooliganism in the context of labelling theory, which views supporters as a group of individuals who go to football to break rules, as a result of the labels placed on them by the media and public perception. This assumption is questionable since most people who go to matches do so without breaking any rules. Those that do breake rules only break minor ones. The rules that are broken are often not enforced outside the ground and never have existed on the terraces. Despite the symbolic label placed on the football crowd, that of being violent, the average match is non-violent.

29. see Ian Taylor, 1982, Op. Cit., pp. 175.
30. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers, London, 1972.

Labeling theory looks at actors' perception of themselves after they have been labelled by defining agencies; schools, police and the courts, and its relationship to future actions. This may be helpful in explaining post violence perceptions of the participants and the public but does nothing to explain the process which the supporters go through in becoming violent. If individuals are not arrested or defined as violent the future perception will continue to be non-violent. If the crowd is violent, despite a low arrest rate for those involved, the media can label football crowds as violent and thus create a situation where the symbolic label of all football crowds is that of being a violent "folk devil". Labelling theory may point toward issues in controlling football crowd violence[31] but it is not a theoretical perspective which analyses how the activity takes place for the label to be applied.

Although this concept relies heavily on the individual, football terrace activity is collective in nature. It is the symbolic realities of labels which add emphasis to the collective identity of football hooliganism. Crowds are expected to behave in a violent manner. Seldom do individual acts of violence take place in the terraces. Like singing and chanting, large scale violence relies on mass participation, not individual actions. In addition to assumptions about individual activity, Cohen assumes that participants in violence are arrested which then results in labels being placed on the individual which excludes the individual from mainstream society. Most violence in and around football grounds goes undetected, and relatively few arrests are made in relation to the proportion of participants. [32, 33] When arrests are made many offenders are released

31. See Chapter Five for a furter discussion of public perceptions about football crowds.
32. see Scottish Education Department, Report Of The Working Group On Football Crowd Behaviour, (McElhone Report) Edinburgh, 1977.
33. Personal observation of crowd actions at Hampden Park, Ibrox, and Tynecastle indicate that very few individuals involved in collective violence were arrested. An estimate of the arrests compared to participants in the Hampden Park riot works out to .025 percent.

without charge after the match. [34] Few are actually forced through the courts and convicted, and even if conviction does occur the penalties are often in the form of a fine or other noncustodial sentence. [35] The lack of arrest and noncustodial sentences for offenders does not carry major social labels outside the football arena. Football supporters simply evaporate back into the wider society after leaving the football ground and removing their identifying clothing. The labels that are applied to the individuals on the terraces after arrest and conviction are often positive ones which bring the individual status on the terraces.

The labels that are applied to football supporters are often, as Cohen indicates, a result of the press reports of football crowd violence. This gives the reading public the indication that all football supporters are violent and thus 'folk devils'. In this way the kind of labelling and exclusion from society that is initiated by the arrest and subsequent labelling process is created. The media is far more responsible for mass labelling of supporters than individual arrests are for the public awareness and general exclusion of 'football hooligans' from main stream of public acceptability. Despite the label, supporters can by simply not wearing club colours or other identification, escape the label and the expectation of further violent acts. Since the individual is often not labeled, personal perception is that of non-violence and so is that of the collective crowd. It is only the public that expects the football crowd to be violent.

Empiricist Amalgams

The final classification of football crowd research in Taylor's analysis is empiricist amalgams of the previous four approaches. This category is not helpful to the analysis

34. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983.
35. see John White, A Social-Legal Approach To 'Football Hooliganism', Edinburgh, 1985.

of football crowds except for the data collected. Two studies have been carried out using this research style and incorporate most of the information covered in the previously mentioned approaches. [36, 37] Since amalgamation approaches tend to repeat existing contentions in a slightly different format or using different data no attempt will be made to look into this theoretical approach. As Ian Taylor noted, the major problem with amalgamations is that the simplified parts of each analysis are removed from the theoretical background on which they rely. [38]

The above approaches are all deficient in one common factor, they do not provide a framework for the analysis of how the crowd moves from supporting two opposing teams to participation in mass violence against one another and against the police. As a result the aforementioned concepts can not be used for the analysis of football crowd violence. Despite the lack of ability to analyze the structure of crowd violence the concepts do offer considerable insight and their strong points can be used as a basis for further analysis. Collective behaviour offers the opportunity to go beyond the analysis already offered and analyze the specific elements necessary for everyday football supporters to become involved in mass participation crowd violence. This is not to imply that the aforementioned perspectives do not have a contribution to make to the analysis of football crowd behaviour, but the contribution of each is flawed in various ways due to their assumptions about crowd behaviour. The theory of collective behaviour is a flexible framework for the analysis of crowd behaviour which allows for the inclusion of many of the valid points previously mentioned. From this point a structure for the analysis of football crowds through the field of collective behaviour

36. Social Science Research Council and The Sports Council, Public Disorder And Sporting Events, London, 1987.
37. John Williams, Eric Dunning and Patric Murphy, Hooligans Abroad, London, 1984.
38. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit., 1982, pp. 180.

must be selected.

Perspectives Within Collective Behaviour

The concept of collective behaviour is a relatively new one, only becoming widely discussed in this century. Despite its relatively modern development as a framework for analysis, crowd behaviour interested many European writers during the renaissance of social thought in the nineteenth century. The influence of the crowd on the political and social spectrum is reflected in the writings of Karl Marx, [39] Gabriel Tarde, [40] Emile Durkheim, [41] Max Weber [42], Scipio Sighele, [43] Sigmund Freud [44] and George Simmel, [45, 46, 47 & 48] but it was not until the pioneering work of Gustave LeBon in his book, The Crowd: A Study Of The Popular Mind, in 1896, that collective behaviour was isolated as area for specific analysis. It is from these beginnings that the modern contentions develop within the field of collective behaviour.

Since LeBon's 1896 text and the work of Freud in 1904, collective behaviour has been heavily influenced by psychological traditions, many of which are at the forefront of

39. see David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford, 1977.
40. see Gabriel Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, translated by E. C. Parsons, New York 1903.
41. see Stephen Lukes, Emile Durkheim His Life And Work: A Historical And Critical Study, Harmondsworth, 1973.
42. see W. G. Runciman, ed., Weber Selections In Translation, London, 1978.
43. see Robert Park, The Crowd And The Public, London, 1972, pp. 52-53.
44. see Siegmond Freud, Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego, translated by James Strachey, London, 1892.
45. see Robert Park, The Crowd And The Public, London, 1972, pp. 52-53.
46. see Robert Park and ernest Burgess, ed., Introduction To The Science Of Sociology, 2nd. ed., Chicago, 1930, pp. 353.
47. see George Simmel, "Social Interaction As The Definition Of The Group In Time And Space", in Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, ed., Introduction To The Science Of Sociology, 2nd. ed., Chicago, 1930, pp. 348-56.
48. see David Frisby, George Simmel, London, 1984.

modern collective behaviour research. Despite the influence of LeBon and Freud in Europe, Robert Park, beginning in 1904, suggested, in a series of works, that collective behaviour is a field of social investigation. The division created by Park has meant that the field of collective behaviour has been divided into social and psychological approaches with the majority of subsequent research being done from one of the two perspectives.

The field of collective behaviour is a broad area of study. The diverse approaches within the field, creates a situation where no general theory can be specifically applied to any one crowd situation with out modification due to the specific social setting from which the crowd emerges, and the setting in which the crowd action takes place. Therefore, to look at football crowds, special modifications must be made to the existing general theory so that a more specific theoretical concept can be evolved which relates directly to the specific situation. These modifications may only be viable in the social and cultural setting in which the violence takes place and are not transferable to other similar crowd situations. Each and every crowd situation, or series of crowd situations, must be studied independently in order to determine the relationships and social stresses that result in crowd action. The analysis of football crowd activity in Scotland is unique and the findings not directly applicable to football crowd situations in other countries without first investigating the social context in which subsequent crowd activity is set.

With this proviso, collective behaviour is a diverse study, that explain man's actions in group or crowd situations. Despite this diversity, collective behaviour theory does however rely on a specific structure for analysis. In order for any investigation to be

complete, the structure of the investigation and presentation must be systematic and allow for input that does not alter the overall framework of the theory. Alteration of major components of the various perspectives would call into question the premise upon which each approach is based. Since this study is not trying to develop a new concept of collective behaviour, the theoretical perspective used must be structured in such a way that the components are elastic enough to allow for constructive evidence without negating the entire approach. For this reason Neil Smelser's Value Added approach to collective behaviour has been chosen as a framework for this analysis. The approach is very systematic, using a building block system to guide analysis. Although highly structured and systematic in its approach the theory is able to accommodate diverse empirical data, within the existing framework, without creating the necessity for a complete restructuring, a facility that no other approach to collective behaviour offers.

Despite the general acceptance of Smelser's framework for analysis of collective behaviour other traditions have made valuable contributions to the study of crowds. As Smelser admits [49] his earlier work overlooked these contributions and it is the intent in this thesis to overcome this confessed problem by incorporating these other traditions where applicable.

Working from the traditions established by LeBon, Tarde and others Herbert Blumer developed a theory of crowd behaviour, Social Contagion. Highly psychological in nature the approach emphasized three major points; one, people from any background could form a crowd, two, once a crowd formed they take on a "collective mind" [50]

49. Neil Smelser, "Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, Chicago, 1972.

50. Gustive LeBon, The Crowd: A Study Of The Popular Mind, London, 1896, pp. 27. The collective mind defined by LeBon was a mystic phenomenon, but the concept used by Blumer is empirically observable and measurable concept.

which altered normal behaviour, and three, participants tend to imitate [51] each other's behaviour. To form the collective mind necessary for crowd action, Blumer set out three requirements:

> "First 'milling' occurs: pure circular reaction in which individuals move amongst one another randomly and become increasingly sensitized and inclined to respond to one another 'quickly, directly and unwittingly'. Second, 'collective excitement' - essentially a speeding up of the 'milling' process - increasingly 'catches and rivets' the attention of others. Under the influence of 'collective excitement' people become emotionally aroused and susceptible to being carried away by impulses and feelings. Finally, a stage of 'social contagion' is reached in which there is 'relatively rapid unwitting and non-rational dissemination of a mood, impulse, or form of conduct' and a lowering of 'social resistance' resulting from 'some loss of self-consciousness' and . . . ability to interpret the activity of others. [52]

Circular reaction refers to a type of interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces the stimulation that has come from another individual, and in being reflected back to this individual reinforces the stimulation. Thus, the interstimulation forms a circular form which individuals reflect one another's states of feelings and in doing so, intensify this feeling. [53]

Blumer's theory of collective behaviour has distinct problems resulting primarily from its structure and use of concepts borrowed from anthropology which are applied to psychological analysis of human behaviour. The milling process Blumer describes indicates that crowds are somewhat spontaneous and not recurring like football crowds. Football crowds are made up of individuals from varying backgrounds who may or may not attend every game and who stand in the same general location on the terraces.

51. see Gabriel Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, translated by E. C. Parsons, New York, 1903.
52. Michael Smith, "Sport And Collective Behaviour" in Donald Ball and John Loy, eds., Sport And The Social Order, London, 1975, pp. 295.
53. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behaviour", in A. M. Lee, ed., New Outline Of The Principles Of Sociology, New York, 1968, pp. 170.

As a result much of the terrace activity is, as Marsh contends, "ritualized behaviour", [54] where preconceived behaviour patterns eliminate the circular reaction process. Although ritualised behaviour patterns may preempt the circular reaction process, Blumer's definition of social contagion cannot be totally dismissed since the crowd does influence individual behaviour on the terraces through imitation.

A second development of the LeBon, Freud psychological tradition is Convergence theory. Convergence theory differs from Contagion theory in that Convergence writers assume that crowds are made up of people with similar backgrounds and predispositions, 'like minds', thus assembling for a specific reason and purpose. Developed over an extended period of time the Convergence approach is a simplistic view of collective behaviour which has never developed a framework of analysis. It relies on psychological assumptions, one of which is that, man is inherently evil and the crowd situation provides the ideal setting for natural violent action, which individuals are prohibited from doing in the wider society. [55] Convergence writers analyze individuals and crowds along pathological lines relating to frustration aggression theory [56, 57] and the "highly individualistic learning theory". [58]

The approach has little structure and relies on assumptions about leadership within the crowd which indicate that the leader is vital to collective action, rejection of the concept of the crowd having a group psychology, while assuming that "individuals in the crowd behaves just as he would alone, only more so". [59] Leaders are vital to crowd

54. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.
55. F. H. Alport, Social Psychology, Boston, 1924, pp. 295.
56. John Dollard, et. al., Fustration Aggression, London, 1944.
57. Leonard Berkowitz, Roots Of Aggression, New York, 1969.
58. Michael Smith, Op. Cit,. pp. 297.
59. F. H. Alport, Op. Cit., pp. 295.

action since members of the crowd compete with each other for leadership positions but only few succeed, leaving others with "frustration relationships" where the crowd reverts to identifying with leaders' suggestions and actions. As a result the individuals in the crowd follow the leader in a stimuli, reaction process. Individuals react to the leader only and not to other crowd members thus becoming "group individuals" and participating in leader-incited action. [60]

'Reversion' to an altered state of mind where the individual willingly accepts and follows the leaders' actions or de-individualisation as it is termed by Dollard is a process where the individual in the crowd incurs the following symptoms: a reduction of feelings of personal distinctiveness, identifiablity, responsibility, inhibitions and restraint. [61] When these reductions in normal human control factors emerge in the crowd, feelings of selfishness, greed, hostility, lust, cruelty and destruction develop and the crowd is more likely to engage in violent activity: man at his most basic and barbaric self. [62, 63] The effect of de-individualisation due to high states of arousal brought on by crowd excitement reduces the individual's ability to differentiate between conflicting stimuli resulting in the loss of self control and personal awareness. [64] This results in a lack of awareness to the plight of the victim and increases the probability that the victim of individuals involved in crowd action will be severely injured or killed.[65]

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60. Siegmond Freud, Op. Cit., pp. 49.
61. P. Zimbardo, Op. Cit.
62. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Criminal Behaviour: A Psychosocial Approach, Englewood Cliffs, 1986, pp. 195.
63. John Dollard, et. al., Op. Cit.,.
64. P. Zimbardo, Op. Cit.
65. P. Zimbardo, Op. Cit.

Within the wider traditions relating to collective behaviour, 'frustration aggression' concepts, based on the work of Freud, have been applied to crowd psychology. Frustration aggression writers, such as Albert Bandura and Leon Berkowitz, have applied specific areas of this concept to crowd activity without indicating why some parts of the Contagion and Convergence theory, on which it is based, are not used. While not accepting all the parameters of either Contagion or Convergence approaches, no attempt has been made to distinguish between individuals from a common background or crowds based on random selection or to distinguish the difference between the individualistic crowd member or common crowd mind. As a result, frustration aggression within the crowd setting is an individual reaction to aggressive stimuli which is simply multiple people reacting in a similar manner. Simply expressed, frustration increases the probability that an individual will react in an aggressive, physical, verbal, or with implicit aggression, especially to aggressive stimuli, but aggression is one of many possible responses to frustration stimuli. [66]

> "The person is blocked from obtaining an expected goal. Frustration results generating anger. Anger predisposes or readies the person to behave aggressively. Whether the person actually engages in aggressive actions will depend in part on his or her learning history and individual ways of responding to frustration. It will also depend, however, upon presence of aggressive-eliciting stimuli in the environment." [67]

Much of the frustration generated and aggressive response is controlled through social learning which influences the interpretation and response to aggressive stimuli. [68] The family unit and symbolic models are the most powerful influences on an individual's control system. [69] People who gain rewards from being physically aggressive in the

66. Leon Berkowitz, "Words And Symbols As Stimuli To Aggressive Responses", in J. F. Knutson, ed., The Control Of Aggression, Chicago, 1973.
67. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Op. Cit., pp. 157.
68. Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, 1973.
69. Albert Bandura, "Psychological Mechanisms Of Aggresssion', in R. G. Geen and E. I.

wider society will also react aggressively in response to frustrations. [70] Many aggressive responses are learned from observation of others who are seen to be gaining rewards from aggression which provides a role model for future aggression by the observer. [71] Aggressive responses are further reinforced by the successful use of aggression to gain desired rewards. [72] Aggression may not be adopted as a reaction to stimulation due to the lack of motivation, punishment, the observed aggressor being punished for his actions or poor memory of the observer. Reactive aggression needs to be maintained through occasional use thus reinforcing the knowledge that aggressive behaviour will gain the desired goals, especially if aggressive behaviour will gain desired goals quicker than conventional non-violent behaviour. [73, 74]

Kirk and Gladys Lang used a separate terminology for collective behaviour, "Collective Dynamics". Their concept is based on a psychological format, developed from the work of LeBon, Dollard and other aforementioned authors, and developed it into a theoretical approach capable of empirical testing. The concept of Collective Dynamics is based on the following elements:

> "Collective Dynamics . . . refers to those patterns of social action that are spontaneous and unstructured in as much as they are not organized, and are not reducible to social structure". [75] "Social structure, then consists of a set of statutes defined by relatively stable relationships that people in various positions have with each other". [76]

Donnertein, eds., Aggression: Theoretical And Empirical Reviews, (Vol. 1) New York, 1983

70. Albert Bandura, 1973, Op. Cit.
71. also see Gabrial Tarde, Op. Cit.
72. R. L. Akers, Deviant Behaviour: A Social Learning Approach, 3rd. ed., Belmont, 1985.
73. Albert Bandura, 1973, Op. Cit.
74. R. L. Akers, Op. Cit.
75. Kirk Lang and Gladys Lang, Collective Dynamics, New York, 1961, pp. 4.
76. Kirk Lang and Gladys Lang, Op. Cit., pp. 6.

The Langs' concept places collective behaviour in a position where all crowd actions must be psychological in nature and therefore cannot be the result of social conditions, organised, or structured and therefore cannot be considered anything more than simple social action. As pointed out in chapters four, five and six, football crowds are structured, organised and cannot be simply explained as part of the normal social structure until they become violent.

Psychological approaches have valuable insights to offer in the analysis of crowd violence but lack a precise structure for empirical research to determine the specific cause of crowd violence. Psychological approaches do not take into account social phenomena, such as stress in the community, which influence crowd action but rely totally on the interactions of crowd participants to determine the possibility and structure of collective violence. Since social stress is a major influence in terrace violence this aspect of hooliganism can not be overlooked. Psychological approaches do not offer a structure for the analysis of crowd violence and the assumptions made require a general belief that individuals are susceptible to de-individualisation, like-mindedness or circular reaction. None of these concepts provide any framework for determining why a crowd becomes violent or why a similar crowd does not become violent. The insights of psychological approaches into how the crowd becomes violent are important to any analysis of collective behaviour, a point not thoroughly analyzed by Neil Smelser.

Even though sociological writers had been interested in collective behaviour since Robert Park first approached the subject, it was not until Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian wrote Collective Behaviour that a true sociological analysis of collective

behaviour was undertaken. Expanding on concepts first put forward by Herbert Blumer and using an interactionist approach Turner and Killian's "emergent norm" concept stands in opposition to the basic concepts of the psychological approaches and is based on the following outline.

> ". . . the crowd is characterized not by unanimity but by differential expression, with different individuals in the crowd feeling differently, participating because of diverse motives, and even acting differently. The illusion of unanimity arises because the behaviour of part of the crowd is perceived both by observers and by crowd members as being the sentiment of the whole crowd. [77]

It is from this basis that Turner and Killian evolve a system that is based on the assumption that there is a:

> "continuity between ordinary social behaviour and collective behaviour in which they recognize 'there are times when ordinary norms do not apply and that a special norm must be imposed on some situations to justify action or overcome the impact of contradictory norms', the emergent norm. [78]

The emergent norm is the development of new behaviour patterns by the crowd, which are seen as legitimate, as a way of solving 'cultural conflict' or 'normative integration'.[79] Turner and Killian separate the crowd from the public [80] by setting out a series of elements which every crowd must posses to be considered anything more than a group of individuals. Once the six basic elements are achieved then a group of individuals become a crowd and move on into the second phase of crowd activity.

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77. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 22.
78. Joseph Perry and Meridith Pugh, Collective Befhaviour: Response To Social Stress, St. Paul, 1978, pp. 34.
79. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 80.
80. also see Robert Park, Op. Cit.

> "These elements, then, are common to all crowds: (1) uncertainty; (2) a sense of urgency; (3) communication of mood and urgency; (4) constraint; (5) selective individual suggestibility; and (6) permissiveness". [81]

After these six requirements have been met, the crowd then becomes an individualistic crowd eventually progressing to a solidaristic crowd, expressive crowd and finally to an acting crowd. Any of these crowd situations can turn into a panic where individuals act in the same manner as the rest of the crowd, but with personal motivation as the driving force, resulting in mass crowd-like actions by individuals, often resulting in death due to the individuals inability to perceive and reason normally.

Communication plays a very important part in the collective behaviour process. Rumours within the crowd situation, associated with differential responses which influence the suggestibility of the individual, add to the uncertain situation, this increasing the possibility of a common objective arising and uniting the crowd. [82] The communication of rumours in an uncertain situation where people are moving around together is called milling, and leads directly to a process called sensitisation which brings the individual into the common situation with those around him. This creates the common objective for the crowd and limits the self-awareness in favour of the collective direction of the crowd. [83]

The individualistic crowd is, in simple terms, a crowd doing together what could be accomplished by individuals acting alone. The crowd has the same goals and objectives as individual actors but acts together in order to obtain the desired result.

81. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 80.
82. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 30-37.
83. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 38-39.

The individualistic crowd is still competitive in nature and the only delineation between crowd and individual actions is the appearance of working toward a common goal.

The second crowd type is the solidaristic crowd. The major difference between the solidaristic and individualistic crowd is that the solidaristic crowd members must act together, with co-operation, to obtain the common objective. The solidaristic crowd develops a division of labour that enables crowd members to perform various required tasks to accomplish crowd ambitions. The crowd members have a unity based on common objective, a righteousness of purpose, leadership, and differential participation. [84] The solidaristic crowd is not violent, but acts together to achieve a common goal.

The expressive crowd incorporates many of the aspects of the individualistic and solidaristic crowds but moves on to; "change the mood, the imagery and the behaviour of the members themselves". [85] The main objective of the expressive crowd is to bring all its members into step with its goals and objectives, and to get everyone participating in the actions being taken. This crowd type is generally inward looking and is not trying to change its external environment. It is generally non-violent, but can take action against individuals who threaten or oppose the general sentiment of the crowd.

The final, and most important, stage in Turner and Killian's emergent norm process is the 'acting crowd'. The acting crowd has a specific objective which requires a collective force to accomplish. The acting crowd takes action;

84. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 88-90.
85. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 102.

". . . when the circumstances and the emergent definition of the situation suggest that manipulation of the external environment may be both effective and legitimate." [86]

The acting crowd incorporates all the elements of the aforementioned crowd types and progresses to a point of taking action as an emerging form of legitimate activity to alter the existing situation. [87] The acting crowd justifies violence as a legitimate, and sometimes the only way of altering an unjust situation. The type of action, of which violence is only one form, emerges from the collective sentiment of the crowd in each new crowd situation.

The emergent norm theory has been criticised by several authors. [88, 89, 90] Much of the criticism has arisen as a result of the interactionist perspective, the crowd influence on the individual, and the use of a framework which is difficult to empirically test. Although the emergent norm theory has a lot to offer to the study of collective behaviour, it does suffer from reliance on Blumer's work in accepting concepts of milling which does not adequately account for human tendencies to become involved in collective actions. The major problem in relating Turner and Killian's approach to football crowds is not structural, although the structure is not as strong as other concepts of collective behaviour, but is in relating the basic premises of the theory to sports crowds. Turner and Killian contend that each new crowd develops its own new norms of legitimate behaviour. The sports crowd is a crowd situation which occurs on

86. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 98.
87. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 80-115.
88. Joseph Perry and Meriedith Pugh, Op. Cit., pp. 35-36.
89. Michael Smith, Op. Cit., pp. 298.
90. Kathleen Tierney, "Emergent Norm Theory As 'Theory': An Analysis And Critique Of Turner's Formulation", in Merideth Pugh, ed. Colective Behaviour: A Scource Book, New York, 1980, pp. 48-53.

a regular basis with predetermined forms of behaviour which are not new and thus the emergent norm concept would not stand up to rigorous analysis in relation to football crowds.

Neil Smelser's value-added concept is based on the work of Talcott Parsons, interlacing economic concepts with those of social action.

> "The four basic components of social action, then, are: (1) the generalized ends, of values which provide the broadest guide to pruposive social behaviour; (2) the regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these goals, rules which are to be found in norms; (3) the mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the normative framework. . . . (4) the available situational facilities which the actor utilizes as means; these include knowledge of the environment, predictability of consequences of action, and tools and skills." [91]

Values within the social action system are the desirable forms of human endeavour towards a legitimate goal. From the generalised beginning of values the individual has within the social framework, norms develop which regulate behaviour to legitimately maintain the positive values of the state and society through the control of individual actions. When the values and norms of the individuals within a society become organised into families, churches, business, governments and corporations etc., the values and norms take on an increased meaning which allows for more positive action in the pursuit of the established goals. Once organisation is established between individuals to obtain and maintain values, norms and goals, they become easier to obtain within the the established framework where they can use the facilities available to gain their goals. [92]

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91. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour, New York, 1962, pp. 24-5.
92. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 24-280.

From this basis of individual action and organised action Smelser goes on to build his concept of collective behaviour.

> ". . . any instance of collective behaviour must contain the following: (a) uninstitutionalised; (b) collective action: (c) taken to modify a condition of strain; (d) on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a component of action." [93]

Thus collective behaviour is crowd activity designed to modify normal social action at a level of engagement, whether it be a revolution against the government or action against an unjust situation. Whatever the collective behaviour, it must contradict all of the four basic components of social action in an attempt to redefine or re-establish an existing situation to the benefit of those involved. As a result of the four parameters within social action collective behaviour has four types of activity aimed at altering those parameters.

> ". . . (a) the value-oriented movement is collective action mobilized in the name of a generalized belief envisioning a re-construction of values; (b) the norm-oriented movement is action mobilized in the name of a generalized belief envisioning a re-construction of norms; (c) the hostile outburst is action mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief assigning responsibility for an undesirable state of affairs to some agent; and (d) and the craze and the panic are forms of behaviour based on a generalized redefinition of situational facilities." [94]

All four types of collective behaviour are built on some form of generalised belief. The generalised belief is different in each category of collective action, requiring separate analysis for the four types of collective action. Value and norm oriented movements do not generally result in collective violence because their aim is change within the existing social framework. Generalised beliefs which lead to hostile outbursts will be

93. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 73.
94. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 124.

analysed because the violence at football matches is not aimed at long-term social change but instead at quick short-term redress against those held responsible for a unsatisfactory situation.

Despite the general acceptance of the hostile outburst as a structure for the analysis of football crowd behaviour the value and norm oriented movements cannot be totally discounted because certain aspects of football organisations can and often do attempt to effect social change through the existing framework. Football clubs and supporters' clubs have often lobbied Parliament in an effort to have the law changed. Supporters clubs have made demands on clubs for changes in the facilities and on players and managers but these situations rarely result in violence. When violence does arise wider social implications may be present but the violence is generally aimed at a more immediate short-term goal.

The panic is one situation that can have a cross-over effect in to terrace violence. Panics that caused many deaths and injuries at Bolton in 1946 and Ibrox in 1972 were not caused by collective violence but by overcrowding of supporters in a restricted area, resulting in a crush where people were crushed or suffocated. The Heysel Stadium riot between Liverpool and Juventus supporters resulting in 39 deaths was a combination of the result of a collective outburst by Liverpool supporters and a resulting panic by Juventus supporters. Those who died panicked when chased by Liverpool supporters and tried to move through an area with a low retaining wall. The resulting crush of bodies caused the wall to collapse resulting in the 39 deaths.

The hostile outburst is built on a series of components which build upon one another in order, then short circuit to create violent action. The first two steps towards collective

action take place in the wider community setting and are reflected by the crowd. The first step leading to collective action is structural conduciveness, which examines:

> "(a) the structure of responsibility in situations of strain; (b) the presence of channels for expressing grievances; (c) the possibility of communication among the aggrieved." [95]

Built on strain in the community, structural conduciveness looks at divisions within the community in general terms before re-examining them in more detail in successive steps in the theory.

Strain in the community is the second stage towards collective action. Building on the conduciveness already established, strain involves each of the four basic determinants of social action: facilities, organisation, norms and values. It is social strain which creates real or threatened deprivation which causes most of the hostile outbursts from crowds. Perceived deprivation takes place in many forms, but the most obvious are the most relevant, since they are open to observation by all those concerned. Perceived deprivation creates anxiety and a desire to alter existing social organisation, in this case through collectivity.

The build-up of conduciveness, strain and anxiety furthered by rumours creates a generalised belief that something or someone is responsible for the deprivation, either real or threatened. At this point Smelser uses a system called "short circuiting" to accommodate the crowd moving from being non-active to violence. Generalised beliefs and anxiety produce aggression, the desire to attack those responsible, and the omnipotence to do so. Before the crowd can take action short circuiting must take place

95. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 277.

so that there is a clear identification of those responsible, a channelling of aggression to those responsible, exaggerated ability to remove those responsible, and exaggerated results of action taken. [96]

Even after a crowd situation has progressed to a point where short circuiting has occurred, Smelser requires a "precipitating factor" to occur before any hostile activity can take place.

> "The precipitating factor confirms the existence, sharpens the definition, or exaggerates the effect of one of these conditions". [97] (conduciveness, strain and generalized beliefs)

The precipitating factor, just as it implies, is some overt act which starts the mass participation of the crowd in anti-social or violent behaviour.

The final escalation stage of the value-added process is the actual hostile outburst or " mobilization for action". This final stage, like all the previous stages, requires the successful completions of the previous elements of escalation. Mobilisation for action includes:

> ". . . (a) leadership; (b) organization of the hostile outburst; (c) the shape of the hostility curve". [98]

The final, and what Smelser considers to be an over-riding aspect of every element within the value-added process is social control.

> "Once an episode of collective behaviour has appeared, its duration and severity are determined by the response of agencies of social

96. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 101-103.
97. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 249.
98. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 253.

control."[99]

The activities of the police in response to the crowd action will affect the duration and severity of crowd activity. Police presence often preempts crowd activity since most people seek to avoid arrest and stay within tolerable behaviour limits.

Conclusions

The review of the major theoretical perspectives of football crowd behaviour indicates that collective behaviour offers a major, relatively unexamined, avenue of analysis of 'football hooliganism'. The field of collective behaviour is a field of broad analysis of man acting together, with the interaction between the crowd and the individual of paramount importance. The diverse approaches within the discipline; including those of anthropology, psychology, natural history and sociology, all add to the large number of variables and few agreed upon specific facts relating to the study of crowd behaviour. This has created a situation where no specific theory is adequate to analyse a specific crowd situation, or series of crowd situations, without modifications due to the specific social setting from where the crowd emerges. Since all the aforementioned perspectives on collective behaviour were written to explain a certain series of crowd actions at some point in history, they necessarily reflect the social, psychological and physical conditions in which those collective actions took place. Therefore, to analyse football crowds, alternative structures for analysis need to be developed in addition to the traditional approaches to collective behaviour. The alternatives or modifications to the traditional concepts of collective behaviour may only be viable for the setting in which the collective action takes place and not automatically transferable to other crowd

99. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 384.

situations without first reverting to the original framework. Each and every crowd situation, or series of crowd situations, must be studied within the social setting and physical structure of the collective action. Otherwise important variables which contribute to the cause, structure and goals of the crowd action may not be evident, and thus any attempts at control may not be effective. For these reasons the analysis of football crowds in Scotland is unique, since Scotland has its own social setting, social stresses, physical structure, and goals associated with football crowd activity. As a result the findings of this study may not be directly applicable to football crowd situations in other countries or societies, like England, without first looking into the social context in which the violence takes place. [100]

Since it is the contention that no theoretical approach to collective behaviour is totally adequate for the complete analysis of football crowds, a framework for study is still required. Even though all the approaches to collective behaviour have a framework for analysis, the Theory Of Collective Behaviour by Neil Smelser is by far the most structured and precise. [101] The building block system developed by Smelser is elastic enough to allow for modifications, which must be made for the analysis of football crowds, without destroying the framework or concept itself. The other approaches to collective behaviour all have major faults which make them unacceptable. The emergent norm is reliant on a concept which is not proven by research, [102] which results in the entire structure of the concept being brought into question. [103] Both the contagion and convergence approaches suffer from a lack of a strong systematic framework and a reliance on psychological concepts which are not substantiated by

100. also see H. F. Morehouse, Op. Cit., pp. 285-315.
101. see Michael Smith, Op.Cit., pp. 299-300.
102. See Chapter Four.
103. aslo see Kathleen Tierney, Op. Cit., pp. 48-53.

research. [104] Since the structure for analysis, in this case, is more important than the underlying theoretical concept, Smelser's value-added approach will be used as an outline for the analysis of football crowd violence.

The value-added concept has been used by other authors to study crowd behaviour [105] and by Michael Smith in one of the few attempts to probe football crowd behaviour through collective behaviour theory. As Smith notes, Smelser's theory is "the most elaborate, comprehensive and certainly the most sociological" [106] approach to collective behaviour, but it does suffer from being very broad in concept, "the breadth of many of the concepts makes disconfirmation difficult". [107] Even with notable criticisms of the value-added concept, [108, 109 , 110] it still has the best overall structure for the analysis of football hooliganism. The problems of broad general categories for analysis are in fact necessary for the analysis of football crowd violence. The underlying problems associated with the violence are multi-faceted and the flexibility of the value-added approach accommodates these broad-based social and psychological issues; when other approaches may by specific design eliminate important avenues of investigation.

The structural framework of the value-added approach is elastic enough to accommodate additions of psychological concepts of crowd behaviour which Smelser,

104. See chapter four.
105. Jerry Lewis, "A Study Of The Kent State Incident Using Smelser's Theory Of Collective Behaviour", in Meredith Pugh, ed., Collective Behaviour: A Source Book, New York, 1980.
106. Michael Smith, Op.Cit., pp. 299.
107. Michael Smith, Op.Cit., pp. 300.
108. see E. Currie and J. H. Sckolnick, "A Critical Note On The Conception Of Collective Behaviour", in J. F. Short and M. E. Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, Chicago, 1972.
109. see R. Manning, "A Critical Analysis Of Contemporary Collective Behaviour Theory", Sociological Focus, 4:1971, pp. 99-106.
110. see Gary Marx, "Issueless Riots", Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Sciences, 391:1970, pp. 21-30.

after criticism, [111] admitted needed to be accounted for. [112, 113] Through its elasticity, Smelser's framework can accommodate the 'imminent critique' [114] method of analysis, then using information from other explanations in relation to the value-added theory.

In addition to being elastic enough to accommodate additions, the framework is elastic enough to accommodate several contradictions. Smelser's work investigated violent crowds and their relationship with the police, whereas football crowds are triangular in nature, two support groups and the police. Other contradictions arise in the form of leadership in the crowd, precipitating factors, the effect of the media, and the concept of short-circuiting. In addition, the structure itself suffers from being repetitive in the analysis of structural conduciveness and structural strain. Despite these noted problems, Smelser's value-added concept is elastic enough to accept modification without destroying the framework itself. These identifiable alternatives and modifications to the value-added approach, as a result of research within Scottish football crowds, make the analysis of the crowd situation unique to Scotland, and thus these modifications must be further examined before being applied to other crowd situations.

111. See notes 96, 97, & 98.
112. Neil Smelser, "Some Additional Thoughts On Collective Behaviour", in Merideth Pugh, ed., Collective Behaviour: A Source Book, New York 1980.
113. Neil Smelser, "Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, Chicago 1972.
114. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, Op. Cit.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTBALL CROWDS ANALYSED BY THE VALUE-ADDED APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR: THE NON-VIOLENT CONDITIONS

Introduction

As has been noted in the previous three chapters football has always been a crowd activity. From the earliest form of unorganised folk sport to the modern game people, and lots of them, have been the focal point of football. The modern game is based on the spectator, who is supposed to attend matches in large numbers and thus maintain the modern economic structure of professional football. Although the circumstances have changed the overriding concept of people gathering together for the common purpose of sport has not. Professional football depends on public interest and public participation, just as folk football depended on large scale public participation.

The history of violence at football matches indicates that violence was not widespread before 1960 except in Glasgow and to a lesser extent in other Scottish cities. This is not to discount the historical contention that crowd violence has always been associated with football, but between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s a period of relative calm existed on the terraces where few notable violent events took place. When football crowd violence was first noted in England in the 1960s it was labelled the 'Scottish disease'. As far as Scottish football, and especially football crowds in Glasgow, were cpncerned Moorhouse noted:

> "Riots, unruly behaviour, violence, assault and vandalism appear to have been a well-established, but necessarily dominant, pattern of crowd behaviour at football matches at least from the 1870s. [1]

The traditions of violence were centred in Glasgow with Rangers and Celtic supporters the predominant offenders. [2] Supporters' clubs were known as 'brake clubs' [3] [4] before the 1930s and in Glasgow had a long history of confrontation which is similar in pattern to the problems that exist today. The process that brought the terraces of other clubs to the level of violence that persisted in Glasgow required some basic changes in the make-up of the terrace supporters to allow 'football hooliganism' to expand and become the social issue that it is today.

The public, [5] when gathered into a specific area for a specific purpose such as watching football or participating in it, can take on a new role which can be defined as a crowd.

> "The crowd is a collectivity involving essentially a considerable number of individuals responding within a limited space to some common object of attention." [6]

In this case the playing or watching of football has been the common purpose of the football crowd throughout history. Folk football depended on collective crowd activity, just as the modern club depends on crowds for financial stability. Although

1. H. F. Morehouse, "Professional Football And Working Class Culture: English Theories And Scottish Evidence", Sociological Review, 261: 1984, pp. 294.
2. also see John Hutchinson, The Football Industry, Glasgow,1981, pp. 57.
3. Kevin McCarra, Scottish Football: A Pictorial History From 1867 To The Present Day, Edinburgh, 1984.
4. Bill Murray, The Old Firm: Sectariansism, Sport And Scociety In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 67-74 & 169-75.
5. Robert Park, The Crowd And The Public, London, 1972, pp. 128.
6. Kimball Young, Handbook Of Social Psychology, London, 1950, pp. 286.

the circumstances surrounding crowd structure related to football have changed drastically for the crowd, from participant to spectator, the violence associated with football has been continuous. The frequency and duration of football crowd violence episodes have fluctuated throughout history and continue to do so in the modern setting. The historical structure of football and crowd violence has evolved into the contemporary setting, - not as some suggest developed as a new phenomena in the 1960s. "Collective violence is normal," [7] not only in the wider society, but particularly at football matches because of the structure of the game and its facilities.

> "Sports fans and violence have seemingly always been entwined with one another. Fans are supposed to be spectators, passive viewers, removed from the ferocity of the combat. But they are also urged to root, to form allegiances, to identify, to scream and shout and pray for the good guys. Somewhere along the line the demarcation point gets blurred". [8]

As a result of the historical relationship between football and crowd violence, the question becomes one of, why has there been an increase in the number of incidents of collective violence since 1960 rather than, why does it exist in the first place.

It is the objective of this chapter to look at the crowd situation as it exists on the terraces today, and from the perspective of a participant observer describe and analyse what is found in the terraces along the lines of the value added approach to collective behaviour as outlined in chapter three. From this perspective evidence will emerge to indicate why there has been an increase in collective violence at football matches since 1960. Before any analysis can be made of violence at football matches a detailed account of

7. Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr eds., The History Of Violence In America: Historical And Comparative Perspectives, London, 1969, pp. 5.
8. Neil Offen, God Save The Players: The Funny Crazy Sometimes Violent World Of Sports Fans, Chicago, 1974, pp. 131.

the actual social and physical structure of football is needed as a basis for further discussion. Since collective violence is the result of social stress in the community it is also important to investigate the relationship those stresses have on the terrace. As Gladys and Kurt Lang contend:

> "The main task for such analysis is to find links between the specific content of the impulses, fears, grievances, and demands that characterize the participants in any crowd episode and the conditions under which the crowd comes from and the goals it pursues. The conceptualization of crowd episodes in terms of the collective process emphasizes the relationship of such apparently irrational outbursts to inadequacies and strains in the social structure. Crowd behaviour needs to be studied within the larger context of social and organizational breakdown and change." [9]

Within the value added approach to collective behaviour, Smelser examines the crowd progressing through non-violent stages toward the possibility of collective action. Following Smelser's structure, this chapter lookes at the social elements which appear within the football crowd; structural conduciveness, social strain, and the generalized belief, which forms the basis for discussions in the following chapters. Since this study uses Smelser's frame work as a basis for analysis but is not an empirical test of the value-added approach to collective behaviour it is often necessary to make modifications to the frame work to incorporate important conditions found in football crowds which are not accounted for within the frame work. One such modification to Smelser's frame work is the setting in which the violence takes place. It is important to examine the setting in which football and football crowds exist since the physical facilities influence crowd action.

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9. Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, "Collective Behaviour", in D. L. Sills ed., International Encyclopedia Of Social Sciences, Vol. 2, New York, 1968, pp. 564.

The Setting

Football crowds gather at a predesignated ground on a set day at a set time; all clubs' schedules are published well in advance. The spectators go to support one of the two participating football clubs. Very few people go to games as impartial observers. The supporters enter and remain in the grounds for varying amounts of time before and after the match, depending on activities in the stadium. [10] They usually go to a predesignated part of the ground to stand or sit to watch the game. [11] These simple points set sports crowds and football crowds in particular apart from spontaneous crowds, [12] ". . . which are not due to pre-established understanding or traditions".[13] Football crowds go to a match with a predesignated common purpose, have a common goal, to support their team through vocal enthusiasm, while occupying a specific space on the terraces.[14]

One of the major points noted about the homogeneous crowd is the role of the individual within the crowd situation. [15, 16, 17] The role of the individual can be illustrated by returning to the classification system of football supporters defined in chapter one. From personal observation and those of other authors, [18, 19] football

10. also see Peter Marsh Elisabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder, London, 1978, for a similar description of the football crowd setting.
11. see The Safety At Sports Grounds Act 1975, London, 1975, which sets out the legal requirements for crowd segregation and stadium safety standards.
12. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1957, pp. 142.
13. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behaviour", in A. M. Lee ed., Principles Of Sociology, New York, 1953, pp. 170.
14. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 58-59.
15. see Gabral Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, New York, 1903.
16. see Robert Park, Op. Cit., pp. 7-9.
17. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 22.
18. Peter Marsh, Aggro: The Illusion Of Violence, London, 1978.
19. Chris Wood, The Behaviour Of The Football Fan Group, unpublished paper, University of Birmingham, 1968.

crowds can be broken down into these categories: supporters in the stand, ordinary football supporters on the terraces, the clamjamfry, and violent supporters. [20] Each individual who enters a football ground enters into one of the four categories, however unknowingly this may be to the individual at the time. The divisions within the spectators are obvious to any observer at matches with a fairly large attendance. The clamjamfry stand out in any large partisan crowd. They always go to a predesignated section of the ground in which they occupy a well known area during each home game. The ordinary Celtic support, always occupy the Northwest terracing at Parkhead, and the clamjamfry always go to the covered North terrace affectionately known as "The Jungle". Visiting supporters occupy the West terracing. These traditions are maintained without enforced segregation by the police or 'all ticket matches' as the supporters want to stand with their mates and support their team in unison. Even in grounds where no artificial segregation exists, supporters will naturally segregate themselves, although this situation may tend to lead to confrontations between the support groups. The enclosure at Ibrox is an obvious example of an area without barriers to segregate supporters. When Rangers play Celtic supporters from both teams enter the enclosure and naturally segregate them selves, with the police providing a human barrier between the two groups. Individuals quickly find their respective group for safety and to join in the singing. Once the division is complete the clamjamfry in both support groups becomes evident as they are dressed in team colors, they sing and chant in support of their team, are animated in their actions, and hurl abuse at the opposition team and their supporters. The clamjamfry's actions are amplified by the tight packing of individuals into a relatively small area of terracing. [21]

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20. See pages 23-24 in chapter one for definations of these terms.
21. Also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit., for a description of the terrace crowd structure at the Manor Ground in Oxford.

The ordinary supporters are not as easy to identify as the clamjamfry. They both dress in some type of club colours, but ordinary supporters usually wear only a scarf to show team loyalty. The ordinary supporter stands at varying distances from the clamjamfry depending on his identification with the clamjamfry, viewing position, and age. As supporters get older they begin to identify less with the clamjamfry and distance themselves from it. The clamjamfry as a result is made up of generally younger supporters, usually between the ages of twelve and twenty.[22, 23]

The violent supporter is the hardest to identify. He is usually associated with the clamjamfry and only emerges to instigate or participate in violence. The violent supporter can be of two distinct types. The first is easily influenced by the crowd and acts quickly to join collective violence, while the second is a naturally violent individual or group of individuals who use football crowds as a staging ground for violence with little risk of being arrested for violent acts. [24] From observation, the Scottish football terraces are dominated by the first type of violent individual while the violence on English terraces is caused primarily by the second type.

From this general description of the terrace structure it becomes important to look outside the confines of a stadium and investigate the social setting of the supporters. Supporters do not leave the stresses of daily life behind when entering the turn stiles, in fact they bring them on to the terraces and use the collective setting as a arena to express frustrations and demand changes. The social background of the participants has a great

22. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 66, for age group research in England.
23. also see Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 35, for specific age group statistics on Scottish football crowds.
24. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Committee Of Inquiry Into Crowd Safety And Control At Sports Grounds, Final Report, London, pp. 60. Mr. Justice Popplewell found evidence of organized groups using football as a front for violence.

effect on the actual behaviour of the crowd.

There are certain aspects of working class life that lend emphasis to the position that football occupies within the cultural and social context. This relationship has undergone major changes since the end of World War Two [25, 26] and for this reason it is important to look at the situation as it exists today so that analysis can be made in a historical and contemporary context and provide a basis for the reduction of football crowd violence.

As has already been noted in the previous two chapters, professional football has developed as a working class sport, especially since the end of the Great War when middle class supporters left the football terraces in favor of Rugby and amateur football because professional football continued to be played during the first year of the conflict. Scotland is a prime example of distinct class differences in sport. [27, 28, 29] A general survey of the location of football grounds in Scotland will show that most exist in traditional working class areas. Only Hampden Park can be excluded from this statement, and it is an amateur club.

> "In England . . . the world of the working class boy has been much more totally dominated by the playing of one sport: the game of soccer. All kinds of reasons may be responsible for this: the basic simplicity of the soccer game . . . the long history of group games in the folklore of the English (don't forget the Scots) working classes; the game as a route to success and 'fame' for the working class adolescent in England; (and

25. see Charles Critcher, "Football Since The War: A Study Of Popular Cultural Change", in John Clark, Charles Critcher and Richard Johnson eds. Working Class Youth Culture, London, 1979.
26. Also refer to Chapter Two for concepts relating to changes in football during this time period.
27. Charles Critcher, Op. Cit.
28. H. F. Moorhouse, Op. Cit.
29. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness And Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen ed., Images Of Deviance, Hardmondworth, 1971.

> Scotland) the lack of alternative sports in a society that is culturally and ethnically less diverse than most; and the relevance of the values of soccer (masculinity, victory, and group participation) to the historical experience of the English (and Scottish) work classes." (brackets added by the author) [30]

The early groundings of football in the working class has generally been maintained in Scotland. Rugby continues to be a predominantly middle class sport although there is an increasing crossover in the support groups, especially in cities with increasing middle class populations, like Aberdeen. The working class setting of football, combined with working class values have helped build football and generally keep it as a class function. [31]

Almost any volume that traces Scottish social development in the twentieth century will describe the conditions in which the working class lived and in some cases still live. Even with the general improvement in housing, working conditions, recreation, and general social conditions there are still certain aspects of the working class life style that are important to football. [32] To begin with, one of the basic facts of the average working class life is that it is routine, routine to the point of being monotonous or even boring. [33] People tend to work all week at dull jobs and live at close quarters. Leisure time was and still is limited, not only through time but through economic restrictions and limited recreation facilities. Football provides excitement, recreation and entertainment in the traditional working class life style. Although increased leisure time, recreation facilities, and disposable income have reduced the influence of football

30. Ian Taylor, Op. Cit., pp. 136.
31. This is a generalization based on observing both football and rugby crowds. There is an increasing amount of crossover support between the sports both for players and spectators as class boundries are being eroded.
32. Charles Critcher, in John Clark et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 4.
33. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, "The Quest For Excitement In Unexciting Socities", in Gunther Luscher ed., The Cross-Cultural Analysis Of Sport And Games, Champpaign, 1970.

since the 1950s, it still provides entertainment, tension, winning and losing, a team to identify with, all valued commodities in the working class community. [34]

> "Even more than ancient Shrove Tuesday games, professional football provided a touch of colour and excitement for an otherwise drab monotonous existence."[35]

Once a person has a job he is often tied to the job for the rest of his working life. He often feels that he has little or no say in what goes on in the society around him. Unemployment often exacerbates the situation. In order to vent frustration about the general lack of excitement in society an outlet is sought that provides the opportunity to have a say in the outcome of the situation. Sport often provides that outlet, either as a participant or as a spectator.

> ". . . in the more advanced industrial societies of our time, compared with societies at an earlier stages of development, occasions for strong excitement openly expressed have become rarer". [36]

Even if sport does not change the daily routine it does allow the person to escape for a short period on Saturday afternoon and have a direct influence on winning and losing by vocal support for his team. As the noted sport sociologist Harry Edwards has commented:

> ". . . particular patterns and values are expressed through certain intrinsic features of sport activities; in combination the two aspects explain not only fan enthusiasm but sports' predominant male following. Sports events are unrehearsed, they involve exceptional performances in a situation characterized by a degree of uncertainty and a lack of total control, and they epitomize competition for scarce values - prestige, status, self-adequacy and other socially relevant rewards". [37]

34. John Foster, Focus On Sport, London, 1974.
35. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, in Gunther Luscher , ed., Op. Cit., pp. 30.
36. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, in Gunther Luscher , ed., Op. Cit., pp. 31.
37. Harry Edwards, Sociology Of Sport, Homewood, 1973, pp. 243.

The football supporter can escape from all the problems and routine of the outside world by entering the turn stiles and becoming a member of a crowd that root for their and his team. The team is spoken about in possessive terms, except when the team loses; "we won, they lost". By supporting their team with vocal ferocity the individual feels that he can help his team to a level of performance required to win. Thus in this way the person feels he has a direct influence on the outcome of the game. This can be observed by levels of spectator involvement at various points in the match. If the team is playing poorly the supporters may grumble amongst themselves, boo and whistle at the players, or intensify their vocal support in order to have a positive effect on the play of the team. If the team responds to the criticism and encouragement from the terraces then the positive play is met with loud cheering in return. The opposition team often comes in for abuse from the supporters as well. Opposition goal keepers are often whistled at during goal kicks and if the kick is a poor one the supporters claim responsibility and take credit for having helped their team. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning see football as have two distinct effects on the crowd.

> "If this tension, if the 'tonus' of the game becomes too low, its value as a leisure event declines. The game will be dull and boring. If the tension becomes great, it can provide a lot of excitement for the spectators, but it will also entail grave dangers for players and spectators alike." [38]

Directly related to excitement, football also provides the experience of winning and losing in the working class environment. Once a person is well entrenched in a routine life style there is little direct winning and losing in the social structure. Sport of all kinds and football especially, because of its mass entertainment value, provides winning and losing within an otherwise stale environment. Since the supporters feel

38. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, Op. Cit., pp.49.

that they have a direct effect on their team's winning, identification with the result increases. If the team wins they have had a direct part to play in the victory and feel a sense of achievement: "we won". If the team loses despite the best efforts of the supporters then a feeling of personal loss and frustration may develop. [39] If the feeling of personal loss is great enough it may result in 'frustration aggression' - violent action against the winning supporters to vindicate the team and personal pride. This is especially true if the game has been exciting with last minute goals scored to decide the winning team.

> "Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of violence." [40] [41]

The effect of uncertainty, tension, excitement and winning and losing not only affects the supporters but affects the players as well. Players feel the same anxieties as the supporters about a match in a general sense, although the players have job related pressures that may not be evident on the terraces. Most players acknowledge the effect the crowd can have on their performance even if the effect is more economic than performance related. This is reflected in most teams' home and away records. Most teams win at home but only the best teams win consistently on the road. Teams that win consistently away from home often have large travelling support to cheer them where ever they play.

The 1960s brought widespread social change to Britain as a whole and some of these

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39. also see Lloyd Slone, "The Function And Impact Of Sports Fans", in Jeffery Goldstein, Sports Games And Play, Social Psychological Viewpoints, Hillsdale, 1979, pp. 236.
40. Neal Miller et. al., "The Fustration Aggression Hypothesis", in Leon Berkowitz ed., Roots Of Aggression, New York, 1969, pp.30.
41. Fustration Aggression theory and its effect on football crowds will be analised in Chapter Six.

changes have had a direct effect on football and football crowds. Government spending on improving inner city environments including housing redevelopment, new recreation facilities, and new social amenities helped improve the quality of life. Many old tenements were torn down and modern high-rise tower blocks were built to replace them. For most people, spendable income continually rose through the decade of the sixties and well into the seventies. [42] This, combined with union won reductions in working hours and a general end to Saturday morning work began to change the leisure industry in Britain in which football played a vital role. Expanded leisure hours and more spendable income meant the football became less important and less of a Saturday institution as other leisure activities expanded and attracted people away from the terraces. Football attendances steadily declined from the 1960s as alternative activities drew men away from the terraces. This left the terraces for the most part to younger supporters, who, without their fathers' supervision, tended to get into trouble. [43]

Despite the odd major crowd disorder and occasional minor violent incident, behaviour on the terraces before the 1960s was fairly straight forward. Men went to see a football match after work on Saturday morning and stop in the pub. Sons met their fathers and went to the match. Men and boys supporting both clubs stood together talking and supporting their team and appreciating the skill of the opposition because they supported football as much as their own team. Boys stood with their fathers until an age when they were allowed to join their friends in the front of the terraces. Boys who went on their own to matches were aware of the father's keeping an eye on their behaviour and thus direct or indirect control was exercised on young supporters. In what the Economist call the "embourgeoisment" of traditional football supporters, the

42. John Hutchinson, Op. Cit., pp. 15-16.
43. see Charles Critcher, Op. Cit.

ending of Saturday working, expanding leisure activities, and poor football facilities have helped drive away these traditional supporters. [44]

Today, men generally work a five-day week, may own their own home, own a car, and find alternative leisure activities for Saturday afternoon.

> " . . . the gradual departure of the working class family man for the TV in his own lounge, has left the terraces with no sobering influences."[45]

As the aforementioned changes took place and the younger supporters took over the terraces, the older supporters left with their values and norms of behaviour. When young supporters found themselves the dominant force on the terraces they had new values and norms of behaviour. New problems began to develop in the 1960s as the young supporters found that their emerging values and norms were in conflict with the traditional norms and values. [46] The emerging values and norms of young supporters created a direct conflict on the terraces. The changing crowd pattern brought with it what Turner and Killian called the "emergent norm"; a new style of behaviour vastly different from what had preceded it. [47] The structure of football grounds with the changing crowd make-up provided the opportunity for a new and changing form of crowd activity to take place. Although the now departing older supporter had the necessary elements to create collective action their norms and values preempted numerous incidents of violence. The younger supporters who took up the terrace positions vacated by the older supporters did not have the same values and norms of the older generation and in fact disliked the old values and were eager to put their own forward.

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43. Economist, 9 May 1981, pp. 18.
45. Economist, 9 May 1981, pp. 16.
46. Paul Harrison, "Soccer's Tribal Wars", in New Society, 5 september 1974, pp. 602.
47. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.

The new values and norms of behaviour that the younger supporter began to establish on the terraces, resulting in what the media labelled as football hooliganism, could be argued in collective behaviour terms as an emergent norm. In the emergent norm approach to collective behaviour a new norm of behaviour is established by each individual crowd and thus each football crowd would have to establish its own behavioural norm. This could explain why football crowds often engage in animated behaviour including singing and chanting without actually becoming violent, as this is the norm of football crowd behaviour. This long-standing tradition of behaviour is generally threatening, loud and poised just below the point of collective action. It is contended that football crowds do not establish new patterns of behaviour at each match, but simply repeat long-standing traditional activities that may or may not lead to collective action; what Peter Marsh rightly call ritualised behaviour. [48]

Many new young supporters enter the turn stiles for the first time every year. Once they have entered the terraces, especially if they are not under parental supervision, the youth often goes to or near to the clamjamfry where he goes through a semi-structured career. [49] The youngsters look up to the older supporters, older but still under twenty in most cases, whom they try to imitate in their style of dress and actions. As the supporter goes through his career in the clamjamfry certain things are expected of him, one of these elements is masculinity in the form of violent behaviour when it is needed to defend against or attack the opposition team or support group. The young supporter, in order to gain acceptance in the clamjamfry, imitates [50] the actions that are seen to bring the best peer group acceptance. Once the youth has learned the accepted

48. Peter Marsh, 1978, Op. Cit.
49. Peter Marsh, "Life And Careers On The Soccer Terraces", in Rodger Ingram et. al., Football Hooliganism The Wider Context, London, 1978.
50. Gabriel Tarde, Op. Cit.

behaviour patterns of the clamjamfry, which expresses the social values of working class youth, he can express these values throughout his clamjamfry life. He is in turn expected to participate in all actions in which the clamjamfry engage, from singing and chanting to collective violence. The imitative behaviour of new young supporters bolsters crowd action by reinforcing the continued perception of the clamjamfry who in turn produce the needed elements for collective violence. [51]

Many young people in today's society are looking for something to identify with.[52,53,54] In some cases youth turn to youth cultures: skinheads, punks, mods, rockers, football gangs, or some other group. [55, 56] In many cases all of these youth cultures carry over into the football terraces, especially the skinheads and the National Front. [57]

The inner cities of Scotland's larger communities, like those of their English counterparts, have many innate problems which often culminate in youth crime. Working class deprivation, unemployment, family problems, and lack of recreational facilities all add to problems of youth and their use of free time. With all the problems created for youth in modern inner-city society personal identity becomes a major issue. [58] Many young supporters associated with football crowd violence identify with the

51. Neil Miller and John Dollard, Social Learning And Imitation, New Haven, 1941.
52. Lloyd Slone, Op. Cit., pp. 235.
53. Segmund Freud, Group Psychology And The Analysis Of The Ego, London, 1922, pp. 1.
54. Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture Of Violence, London, 1967.
55. see Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics, London, 1972.
56. see Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds., Resistance Through Rituals, Youth Subcultures In Post-War Britain, London, 1975.
57. The National Front sold their newspaper Bulldog outside Tynecastle and Ibrox stadiums consistently during the course of the study and their influence on the terraces is evident through fascist salutes during chants, especially those related to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.
58. Sigmund Freud, Op. Cit., pp. 60-70.

club, its colours and its very being as a focal point in the social activities of the week, just as any other youth culture member might.

> "We already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature and identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional common quality; and we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader." [59]

Identification with youth cultures or when members of the crowd form emotional attachments to a common cause and its leaders is crucial for the mobilisation for action in collective behaviour. [60] Football does not represent an identity point for all youth, many identify with youth cultures; punks, skinheads, mods, rockers, and lesser known movements like street gangs and then participate in football crowds as a second interest. The identity crisis that most youth go through and the problems it creates are fuelled by long-running deterioration of the family unit, poor social and economic conditions and large amounts of unsupervised free time to spend with friends of the same age. The resulting peer group pressure or youth culture identity results in many adolescents getting into various types of trouble, of which football violence is only one, yet inter-related to other forms of youth culture. [61, 62, 63 & 64]

Although youth cultures are easy to find on the terraces they are generally not a focal point of terrace troubles in Scotland. The terraces tend to be a mixture of many youth cultures united under the banner and cause of the team they support. Any direct

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59. Sigmund Freud, Op. Cit., pp. 66.
60. Both leaders and mobilisation for action will be discussed fully later in this chapter.
61. John Clark, Football Hooliganism And The Skinheads, Birmingham, 1973.
62. also see Mike Brake, The Sociology Of Youth Culture And Youth Subcultures, London, 1980
63. also see Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, eds., Resistance Through Rituals, Youth Subcultures In Post-War Britain, London, 1976.
64. also see David Downs and Paul Rock, Understanding Deviance, A Guide To The Sociology Of Crime And Rule Breaking, Oxford, 1982.

reference to a youth culture is often not tolerated by the clamjamfry because the identity is so strongly associated with the team. In England, youth cultures are far more active on the terraces and often are very active in starting violent activities. Movements such as the National Front and the skinheads have used football crowds as convenient cover for violent incidents not related to the game; violence for the sake of violence.

Observations indicate many young people in Scotland identify with a football club and not a recognised youth subculture, contrary to the situation in England. A young supporter or group of young supporters may identify so strongly with a team that they wear team colours every day to show their support for the team and their identity with the cause just as any other youth culture member would. [65] In identifying with the club and the clamjamfry, the supporter gains a sense of belonging to a collective unit. Supporters seek a sense of belonging and feel they have an impact on team success, which has a direct effect on the cohesiveness of the crowd. [66] The supporter thus becomes an important part of the football structure; he is needed. The supporter is needed by the club for his money at the turn stiles and his voice on the terraces. Through being totally involved in the football structure the importance of winning is re-emphasised. Everyone wants to identify with and support a winner. Attendance figures show that the fortunes of the team on the pitch have a direct relation to the numbers of supporters on the terraces. At a point when the identity with the club and winning becomes so strong, so emotional that a loss by the team becomes a personal loss, then there is a strong possibility that action may be taken to avenge the team's loss by individual or collective action. [67]

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65. also see Lloyd Slone, Op. Cit., pp. 325.
66. Lloyd Slone, Op. Cit., pp. 328.
67. J. A. Harrington, Soccer Hooliganism: A Preliminary Report, Bristol, 1968, pp. 21.

Many individual supporters go to matches to seek comradeship with others in their support group. Supporters often go to the same place on the terraces match after match to meet friends and discuss the week's and especially the afternoon's activities. Supporters meet and build the collective excitement necessary for football to provide the entertainment needed in the working class setting. As a result of the comradeship on the terraces peer pressure is a major factor in drawing supporters to the terraces and controlling their behaviour while there. For many young persons the terraces are the only place to be on a Saturday afternoon. As Harry Edwards notes:

> ". . . involvement seems to be regarded as serving two personal functions for the fan: (1) it engenders in him a feeling of belonging, and (2) it provides a socially approved outlet by which behavior and attitudes otherwise socially unacceptable can be expressed." [68]

Peer group pressure can bring uninterested youths into the terraces and greatly affect their behaviour while there. The influence of the crowd on the individual is generally toward behaviour patterns that are generally unacceptable outside the terrace setting. The individual and the peer group are very loyal to the team and use the football terraces as a staging area for displays of that loyalty which create or add to the comradeship, tension, excitement, entertainment and winning or losing. At certain times the game may not provide enough excitement or entertainment or provide much tension and with peer group pressure help produce acts of individual bravado.

Acts of individual bravado result for two reasons. The first is the individual seeking recognition from other supporters, and the second is the peer group's pressure on individuals to prove themselves or repeat a past act. Individual actions often go undetected by the police because they take place within the crowd which makes

68. Harry Edwards, Op. Cit., pp. 238.

identifying the individual difficult, and often the police have no real desire to attempt an individual arrest and create a confrontation with the supporters. Individual, yet crowd influenced, acts of bravado include the throwing of toilet rolls on to the pitch, throwing coins at opposing supporters if they are close enough, running on to the pitch, and throwing missiles at opposition players or the police. The most noteworthy individual act of violence witnessed was at Celtic Park when someone from the Jungle jumped the restraining fence and ran out on the pitch and attacked Gordon Strachan, then of Aberdeen, with an empty whisky bottle. After being chased and caught by the police the individual was taken bodily from the pitch. Most supporters booed the individual when he gestured for support from the terraces. These actions, although serious, are not viewed by most observers as a group or crowd action, but strictly as individual actions. This concept must be questioned. An individual may throw a missile or do some other act on his own but these acts of bravado are the result of peer group pressure, crowd action, and the individual desire for recognition from the crowd. If the individual were not in the crowd the probability of similar actions would be greatly reduced.

Any observer at a Scottish football match will see that the vast majority of the terrace supporters are male. Women are accepted in the crowd but generally make up less than five to fourteen per-cent of the average crowd, [69] although the percentage of female supporters is slowly increasing.[70] One of the reasons for the lack of female supporters [71] is that football has traditionally been a male dominated sport and despite many

69. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit. pp. 59.

70. Many clubs, of which Hearts are one of the most active, encourage women to stand in the enclosures or sit in the stand and thus aviod the anti-social behaviour of the main male dominated terraces. As a result few women are found on the main terreces while a much higher percentage are fornd in the enclosures and in the stand.

71. Clubs with a traditional mixed class support have a much higher percentage of female supporters, while those from traditional working class areas are still predominately male

social changes continues to be so. What Charles Critcher states in a historical sense for English football is still accurate for Scottish football today, especially in Glasgow.

> "Pre-war football was an integral part of working class culture which, whatever its regional variations and inconsistencies, had maintained broadly similar contours across the country for over half a century. The core values of the game as a professional sport - masculinity, aggression, physical emphasis, victory, and regional identity - meshed firmly with this relatively homogeneous working class culture with its network of small-scale working men's clubs, mutual insurance schemes, cooperatives, public houses, trade unions, and a myriad of smaller leisure time groupings." [72]

Historical traditions are still carried on and masculinity or toughness is still rewarded in play on the pitch by today's young supporters. The tough masculine tradition represented by play on the pitch has carried over on to the terraces. One of the major reasons for the increase in the use of the terraces as a proving ground for masculine toughness is the departure of older supporters. The younger supporters have become the dominant age group on the terraces and are in the process of proving their masculinity. Being tough in the working class community is of paramount importance, and the football match offers an ideal opportunity to prove one's toughness while being fairly well protected by the crowd from police detection.

While the crowd is entering the ground through the turn stiles and taking up their respective positions on the terraces and in the stand, real crowd activity begins to take place. This is not to overlook the activity of supporters on their way to the match, but since this activity is somewhat different from the activity on the terraces it will be left for the moment and examined in conjunction with crowd activity after the match. The

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supported. Ipswich Town is a good exmple of a club with a mixed class support, as they have an estimated female attendence of thirty percent at most home matches.

72. Charles Critcher, Op. Cit., pp. 1.

many variables associated with each game dictate much of the response of the terrace supporter. The size of the crowd, importance of the match, reputation of the opposing team and their support, temperament of the match, past scores to settle, religious affiliation of the team and supporters, inter-city rivalry, police action, and perpetrating factors both on and off the pitch are all directly related to crowd activity and the possibility of violence. As has been previously mentioned the crowd is self-segregated, and that segregation results in four categories of spectators for each team.[73] In addition to self imposed divisions in the crowd artificial divisions are created in every ground. These include the separation of visiting and home supporters by barriers in the form of steel fences, separations between the stand and the terraces and barriers separating the supporters from the pitch. Each of the aforementioned factors directly affect various sections of the crowd in different ways dedepending on the stimulus toward violent activity.

Since this thesis is most concerned with the element of the crowd that causes the most trouble to the police, public, and property most of the discussion will be directed toward the clamjamfry. Since the clamjamfry and the violent supporter are the most active segment of the crowd much of the focus will be on them, with comparisons made to the majority of football fans who are ordinary non-violent supporters. The terrace supporter has been, and will continue to be, used as the basis for discussion, but it must be noted that two Premier League stadiums are structurally different from the normal ground. Pittodrie Stadium in Aberdeen is an all-seated ground, the first in the United Kingdom, and Ibrox Stadium in Glasgow is seventy-five percent seated. Seating facilities do have an affect on crowd activities and these changes will be noted after the situation on the terraces is fully analysed.

73. Theses four catigories of supporters are defined on pages 24 and 25.

An Integrated Approach To Collective Behaviour

Within the general framework of the value-added approach to collective behaviour Neil Smelser starts with the most general concepts and proceeds to the most detailed through a set structure of required steps which can result in collective action. The first step towards collective violence starts in the wider society and moves on to the specific analysis of events leading to violent collective behaviour. Even though in this case much of the evidence is looked at from a retrospective position, these or similar circumstances can lead to collective crowd action; the past can provide evidence for anticipation of similar action in the future even though the location and culture may be different from that of Scotland.

Within the value added approach to collective behaviour Smelser set out four basic components of social action which provide the basis for his explanation of collective behaviour. They are to recapitulate:

> ". . . (1) the generalized ends, or *values*, which provide the broadest guides to purposive social behavior; (2) the regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these goals, rules which are to be found in *norms*; (3) the mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the normative framework. If we consider the individual person as an actor, we ask how he is *motivated*; if we move to the social-system level, we ask how motivated individuals are *organized* into roles and organizations; (4) the available *situational facilities* which the actor utilizes as means; these include knowledge of the environment, predictability of consequences of actions, and tools and skills". [74]

As a result of the definition of social action used by Smelser social movements are normal within the organised structure. The detailed structure of social action allows for changes in society based on alterations of norms, values, mobilisation of motivation

74. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behavior, London, 1962, pp. 24-25.

into organised actions and situational facilities within the normal framework. [75] When the framework does not provide for legitimate social change or does not change fast enough as a result of social strain then; "any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior". [76] Strain affects all four levels of social action and when the structure does not accommodate change collective behaviour can result (an issue can fail to become collective action due to a lack of interest) and is defined as:

> ". . . uninstitutionalised mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a component of action". [77]

As a result collective behaviour is based on strain and generalised beliefs which lead to five types of collective action, the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-oriented movement and, the value oriented-movement. Although it can be argued that football crowd violence could be approached as a norm or value-oriented movement, it is the contention here that these arguments do not analyze the relationship between these movements and the structure of violence, which in the case of football is paramount. Smelser indicates that these movements are restricted to generally non-violent attempts at social change. As a result, values and norms will be analysed as part of the social strain context within the hostile outburst structure for the analysis of collective behaviour. The craze is a structure for analysis of social changes such as fads, psychosomatic illnesses and style. The panic offers a structure for the analysis of spontaneous crowd action, usually associated with actions taken in fear of injury. Both formats for the investigation of collective action are aimed at specific types of behaviour which are not generally found on the football terrace. The panic does play a part in football crowd violence, but only in the sense that several disasters have happened at

75. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 25-46.
76. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 49.
77. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 71.

matches resulting in large numbers of supporters being killed. The analysis of the hostile outburst is the only part of Smelser's work which looks directly at the structure of violence and accounts for the social strains which creates it. For these reasons football crowds will be analysed as a "hostile outburst" within the general framework of the value-added approach. Factors relating to norms, values, crazes and panics will be incorporated into the structure of the hostile outburst where they apply.

Within the hostile outburst concept of collective behaviour Smelser set out six steps for the analysis of this type of collective action.

> "(1) structural conduciveness, (2) structural strain, (3) growth and spread of generalized beliefs, (4) precipitating factors, (5) mobilization of participants for action, and (6) the operation of social control". [78]

These six steps for the analysis of collective behaviour will be used throughout the remainder of this and the following two chapters as a framework to investigate football crowd activities. Although Smelser's value added approach has been chosen as a framework for this analysis because of its superior analytical strength, it does not mean that other accounts of collective behaviour are irrelevant. Many of the works cited in Chapter Three have valuable insights to contribute to this analysis, and for this reason an integrated theoretical concept will be developed where the context set by Smelser needs alteration.

The aim of this research is not to undertake an empirical test of Smelser's approach to collective behaviour. Rather, it is the aim to use his work as a basis to develop, through modifications, where necessary a more adequate explanation and analysis of

78. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 15-17.

football crowd violence. Within this framework the previous section has been added since the setting in which collective violence occurs is important to scope, nature, duration and structure of it.

The next major point of modification in Smelser's account arises, not from any empirical disagreement with it, but from a practical analytical problem. The first two elements of structural conduciveness and structural strain are similar in content and are very general in their level of analysis. Consequently, much of the data recorded can be included under both headings. In an effort to avoid unnecessary repetition areas of common information will be included under one heading, structural conduciveness and structural strain.

Structural Conduciveness And Structural Strain

Since almost any major social problem or division within the wider society [79] can be considered an element in building the stress necessary to create hostile crowd action, identifying the particular divisions that are present within an outburst or series of outbursts is the first step in the analysis of crowd violence. Even though every society has natural divisions which separate individuals and groups of people from one another, many of these divisions are not divisive and do not create stress within the larger society. Rather, certain divisions within the wider society create tension and stress among individual and groups. It is these divisions which must be identified and investigated, especially in the case of hostile outbursts at football matches, as a basis for the violence.

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79. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior", Social Problems, 18:197, pp. 300 - 302. See Chapter One for the context which Blumers definition is being used.

As has been noted, Scotland has a history of divisions within its society that has separated people into opposing groups with many of these groups living within the same community. In the case of football the most obvious of these divisions is religious. Religious divisions have led to the greatest cleavage in Scottish society which manifests itself on the terraces. Its sheer magnitude overshadows many other social problems that are evident in the community and on the terraces. Problems such as class identity, national pride, social deprivation, the purported breakdown of the family unit, and youth culture all exist on the terraces to varying degrees but are often masked over by the overriding problem of religious intolerance, even though religious identity is often not as obvious as the other social divisions within the wider community.

Divisions within society are the first part of a series of general components which Smelser set out as one of the required steps for collective action. [80] Divisions on the terraces are a reflection of their presence in the wider society as a whole and are based on firstly, the structure of responsibility in situations of strain. Football terrace crowds provide the perfect situation to reflect strain within the wider society because the supporters are homogeneous in nature and reflect what Emile Durkheim called a "collective effervescence" [81] or common purpose. Secondly, opposing crowd groups divided over a social differences, religious persuasion, rooting for their team to be victorious while holding the opposition and their support responsible for the many ills of society as a whole, again provide the perfect setting for action to be taken to alter perceived deprivations. As a result of the historical animosity built up over the years of stereotypes, prejudice and generalised attitudes towards the supposed opposition,

80. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 227.
81. Stephen Lukes, Emile Durkheim, His Life And Work: A Historical And Critical Study, Harmondsworth, 1973, pp. 462.

group hatred can be manifested in many forms, only one of which is at football matches. In the case of football crowds the structure of the crowd provides the opportunity to vent hostile feelings that would otherwise not be tolerated in the community as a whole, even though the feelings expressed by the crowd may be a reflection of the general attitudes of the community. In this case the actions of Rangers, Hearts, Hibs, Celtic and to a much lesser extent, Dundee and Dundee United supporters may reflect the underlying current of religious intolerance of their communities. In many cases football terraces are the place that vocal members of society go to vent their frustrations and hatred towards other members of society who hold opposing views. The clamjamfry is the representation of this section of the younger society while often those with more tolerant views stay away from the clamjamfry or away from football altogether.

Responsibility

Within the wider society, when avenues of change are blocked within the normal framework for change, alternative avenues of conduciveness open to those seeking change. Finding and using avenues of conduciveness is the first step toward the possibility of collective crowd action. Within structural conduciveness there are three main elements which those seeking change must find and exploit:

> "(a) the structure of responsibility in situations of strain, (b) the presence of channels for expressing grievances, and (c) the possibility of communication among the aggrieved." [82]

Following on from structural conduciveness is structural strain which focuses general

82. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 227.

problems into specific grievances. [83] This stage is vital to the collective behaviour process. If general social issues remain general in nature then the collective process is abridged and no collective can take place.

> "It is such cleavages accompanied by stereotypes that assign responsibility for evils to other groups, strains are built into the social situation and ready to be combined with other conditions that might permit hostile outbursts. Thus strain, like many other determinants of collective outbursts is often an established feature of social life".[84]

From these points it is possible to investigate social problems within the community and nation which create the general conditions of social strain that is reflected on the terraces. From the analysis of strain in the community it is possible to identify the specific points which create the condition of strain on the terraces which can result in violence being the only avenue to social change open to the opposing support groups.

Scotland as part of the United Kingdom has many common links with England yet enjoys an independent history and cultural identity, and many hope for an independent future. Any historical text about Scotland can set out the past relationship with England and provide a basis for understanding the the fierce pride Scots have in their country.[85, 86, 87] Not only did the Scots fight the English but they fought amongst themselves in clan wars and religious battles as well. In many ways two of these historical disputes are still alive in Scotland today. Although the clans no longer fight one another, the tradition of national pride and religious intolerance continues to this day.

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83. see Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 241.
84. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 11.
85. see Ronald McNair Scott, Robert The Bruce King Of Scots, London, 1982.
86. see Gordon Donaldson ed., The Edinburgh History Of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1985.
87. Jenny Wormald ed., The New History Of Scotland, London, 1984.

Much of the rivalry between various factions have that influenced Scotland's past have been maintained in inter-city rivalries of today. Not unlike the old clan wars, Scotland's cities compete for social, economic and cultural acclaim while many residents like to view their city as being better than other competing towns and cities. The inter- city rivalry is often evident on the terraces, especially when there are two teams with the same religious background playing one another. When Hibs and Celtic play, the religious identity is the same, so the differences between Glasgow and Edinburgh will be brought out in the chanting by the supporters. Common references are made to Glasgow slums and eating dead rats by Edinburgh club supporters in an effort to put down the city and the football teams. The inter-city rivalry is one of the main issues that allows teams with the same religious background to have notable problems with terrace violence.

On a structural conduciveness level, religious intolerance in Scotland goes back to the reign of Queen Mary and before. During the reformation, battles were fought over the question of how Scotland and the monarchy should interpret the question of religious persuasion. Even after the eventual triumph of the Reformation there was still a small Catholic population in Scotland. [88] Immigration brought a vast number of Catholic and a limited number of Protestant Irish to Scotland, especially during the Irish potato famine of the 1840s and 1850s. Many of these immigrants settled in the West of Scotland. [89] As a latter result of the Irish-Catholic influence in Scotland two of the most prominent football clubs were formed: Hibernian in 1875 and Celtic in 1888, [90] both of which were originally founded in Catholic-Irish areas in Edinburgh and

88. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 93.
89. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 94.
90. John Rafferty, One Hundred Years Of Scottish Football, London, 1973, pp. 7.

Glasgow. [91] Originally both teams were for Catholic players only, but that policy was abandoned in 1895. [92] On the opposing side Rangers were formed in 1872 [93] in a Protestant section of Glasgow, mainly for Protestant players, although a few Catholic players have played for Rangers. The no-Catholic policy by implication applies today, as no Catholic players have played for Rangers since 1952. [94] [95] The religious prejudices that were created during the Reformation, Irish immigration, and economic conflicts have, for the most part, been fairly subdued within the society as a whole, and only surface in special circumstances such as football matches, gang fights, religious holidays, or Orange marches. However they remain an underlying current in many large Scottish communities. Overt hostility rarely occurs except on special occasions due to each group's relative physical isolation in each community. This is evidenced by the housing arrangements in Glasgow and Edinburgh which keep Catholic and Protestant populations somewhat isolated within certain districts. [96]

The underlying social stress created by religious intolerance is directly linked to the historical development of the Irish revolution and the continuing political and social problems in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Not only did immigration of Irish of both faiths bring added emphasis to a long existing problem in Scotland, it created a distinct Irish minority group that could be identified by dress,

91. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 19.
92. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 60-63.
93. John Rafferty, Op. Cit., pp 7.
94. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 81-87.
95. Rangers public policy is that players of all colours and religions are welcome at Ibrox, if they are good enough to play for Rangers. At the point of writing one Black player, one Jewish player and several English players, but not one Catholic player, are on the staff at Ibrox. The no-Catholic policy is effectively enforced by demands of official supporters clubs who have told the Rangers management that they will boycott the turnstiles if a Catholic player puts on the Ranger blue strip.
96. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp. 93-94, for a statistical break down of the concentration of the Catholic population in certain communities.

name and accent. As a result of many economic upheavals levels of unemployment have risen from time to time resulting in open discrimination in hiring practices with each side protecting their own. Glasgow in particular and Scotland as a whole had:

> ". . . a period of spectacular growth from 1875 (to) 1914 (and) a period of almost spectacular decline from 1945 and especially from 1960". [97]

Celtic, especially identified with the problems of the east end of Glasgow - social deprivation and unemployment of many Irish immigrants - and through their success on the field helped establish the tradition of religious identity even though they hired Protestant players. Rangers did not identify with the Protestant cause directly in the early years but slowly established a 'no-Catholic' policy in response to the playing success of Celtic and their predominantly Catholic support.

> ". . . the real origin of sectarianism in Scottish football lay in the very formation of the Celtic Football Club and their unprecedented success. The success of Celtic at this time coincided with a resurgence of Catholic militancy both in local matters and in Irish national affairs. Every country with a large immigrant population went through these same problems, but in Scotland there was a combination of features that made them more volatile than in any other country outside Ireland. [98]

Religious intolerance on a structural strain level is evidenced by overt antagonism between various organisations with church connections. Despite active church participation in trying to ease tensions religious identification has remained a point of identification for young football supporters over the past fifty years. The stereotypes that have been built up by young people as a result of parental misguidance and peer pressure has created hostility which in some ways does not reflect wider community opinion. Each religious identity has its fanatical groups which encourage strong

97. H. F. Morehouse, Op. Cit., pp. 294.
98. Bill Murray, Op. Cit., pp.

sectarian feelings, the Orange Order being the most noteworthy. This strong stereotype attitude is reflected in the following reflection on Ranger versus Celtic matches.

> "The religious bigotry is expressed in serious crowd rioting at virtually every meeting between the two clubs both inside and outside the ground." [99]

Despite the previous commentary on Ranger versus Celtic matches only two serious incidents were witnessed and several minor scuffles seen in the course of twenty five matches. Most matches between the two clubs are generally peaceful with one hundred arrest viewed as a quiet day by the police. [100] [101]

The Catholic community is not totally to blame for the religious divisions in Scotland as Bill Murray suggests. To have any social division there must be conflict with an opposition and the majority Protestant community can be just as fanatical as the Catholic community. The historical build-up in the Protestant community parallels that of the Catholic community in that a victory for one was a loss for the other. From the Reformation to the ascension of William of Orange to the throne, the Protestant community has generally had the upper hand in the struggle for religious superiority. With the development of the troubles in Northern Ireland some of the Protestant community began to identify with the threat posed by the possible takeover in the North by The Republic of Ireland, a Catholic state. Although the influence of the Protestant Northern Irish community in Scotland is far less direct than that of the Irish-Catholic community, the identity with the Protestant Northern Ireland cause has still developed in opposition to the Irish Republican Army's campaign to drive the British out of

99. Dennin Lehane, in New Society, 28-11-80, pp. 13.
100. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, Celtic Park, 1 January 1983.
101. See Appendix A for a detailed discription of the violence in the Scottish Cup final of 1980 and the League match between the tow clubs on 1 January 1982.

Ireland. If one side identifies with an issue then the other takes up the opposite side,[102] and as a result both sides are deeply entrenched in their views on the issues in Northern Ireland. This is not to infer that the entire Scottish community is divided by religious identity and the issues in Northern Ireland, merely that the football supporters on the terraces are.

This is particularly evident when observing the support groups from Rangers versus Celtic, or Hearts versus Hibs matches. The support groups will sing religious songs at each other for the entire match if necessary. Underlying the the religious differences on the terraces can be friendship on an individual or group basis. At one Ranger - Celtic match amidst the din of the support groups chanting at each other , a Ranger fan and a Celtic fan were overheard making plans to meet in the city centre after the match for a pint, before returning their attention to the support group and rejoining the verbal jousting match between the support groups. Even though the support groups may outwardly sing songs about religious identity and beliefs few of the Protestant supporters questioned attended church regularly or understood the basics of Protestant religious beliefs. However Catholics claimed they attended church on a more regular basis and showed a far better awareness of Catholic religious beliefs. [103]

The trouble in Northern Ireland is only one of the factors that divides the churches in Scotland. The Northern Ireland problem receives wide publicity while other problems get passed over. Mistrust between the religious factions goes much deeper than the open hostility in Northern Ireland. Different governing structures between the two

102. During the Falklands War, Celtic fans supported Argentina because the country is predominately Catholic and Rangers fans supported Britain.

103. These interviews were conducted as part of a pilot study of a questionnaire which was later discarded as impractical. See appendix B.

churches leads to ambiguity and mistrust of the others' worship and structural process. These factors, combined with conflicting policies on the way one should conduct one's personal life which are espoused by the two churches, provide an obvious division about how the church members view each other and their policies. With the ambiguity and mistrust about each other's church both Catholics and Protestants fear the other's ability to impose their beliefs on their own church. This fear is reflected in the open hostility to Northern Ireland on the terrace of many Scottish football matches. In Scotland the acting out of religious intolerance is limited in scope and is nowadays centred around football, gang fights, discrimination in hiring, and marches by fanatical organisations. The fear of Protestant supporters in Scotland is obvious when events such as the Pope's visit are imminent and Rangers supporters continually sang "no Pope from Rome" in an attempt to reduce the effect of the Pope's visit. On the other side Catholic supporters sang "the Pope is coming over" to taunt Protestant supporters and show their superiority in the situation.

Although Scotland and Glasgow in particular is supposed to be a divided country on religious grounds when the Pope visited Scotland he was greeted by large crowds, and very few people outside Pastor Jack Glass and Reverend Ian Paisley openly participated in defiance of the Pope's visit. On the day of the Pope's open air mass in Glasgow's Bellahouston Park, which was observed by the author, there was no observed Protestant protest. From observing the crowd of an estimated 300,000, a large number did not participate in Holy Communion and from those interviewed as to their reasons for not taking Communion the overwhelming reason given was that they were Protestant. Most of those spoken to went to the mass out of a sense of religious occasion and did not care if the service was Catholic or not. This indicates that a lot of liberal Protestants attended the Papal Mass or that religious intolerance may have one of

its few places of public display on the Scottish football terraces.

The sense of threat that the opposition church wishes to impose its beliefs on the members of one group or another is fed by the belief that the opposition represents the threat of deprivation or is in some way to blame for one's own deprivation. [104] Deprivation, whether real or perceived, is a genuine source of hatred in the community. The deprivation can be in the form of discrimination in hiring, housing, distribution of social benefits, and social status. Scotland has a unique position within Great Britain in that it has educational segregation that provides for separate education for Catholics. The Act of Union between England and Scotland provided for separate education for Catholics throughout Scotland, but it is mainly found in Glasgow and other big cities. Just by saying the name of one's school a prospective employer will know an applicant's religious persuasion, and thus be able to discriminate against one group or another without open questions about faith. Not only do separate educational facilities provide a basis for social and job discrimination they reinforce the differences between the religious groups and in other ways foster and breed increased religious hatred. For many people the difference in religious distinction is not an important issue until formal education begins.

> "Many children do not understand why they are told they cannot play with their friends anymore, just because they now go to separate schools, but they soon learn." [105]

The social and economic disadvantages that each community blames on the other are built through the educational system where most students gain most of their formal religious training. [106] Although the churches claim to provide religious training in this

104. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 245-246.
105. Interview with a thirty-five year old native of Glasgow.

case the evidence does not concur. From interviews conducted on the terraces and in private with football supporters of every Premier Division club in Scotland it was noted that church attendance of the supporters is very low. Most supporters on the terraces at Ibrox do not attend church or if they do it is on an infrequent basis, yet many supporters on the Ibrox terrace are extremely religiously bigoted. This may reflect a higher proportion of Rangers supporters being involved in the Orange Order than in the various Protestant churches, many of those interviewed were active in a Orange Lodge but did not go to church. On the other side the supporters at Parkhead attend church on a much more regular basis and are not as bigoted as their Ibrox counterparts. From all the interviews that were conducted on the terraces some additional noticeable differences between the supporters of Rangers and Celtic became apparent. Protestants will support Celtic, but Catholics will not support Rangers. This is basically due to the policy of the clubs in employing playing staff. One one occasion over twenty-five percent of those asked on the Parkhead terraces were Protestant while not one Catholic was found one week later in the enclosure at Ibrox; at least not one willing to admit to being Catholic. Of the Protestants who support Celtic most do so because they do not like what Rangers stand for and prefer Celtic's style of play. Rangers are a Protestant team through and through, and that is the way the supporters want it. Even when Rangers' opposition is non-sectarian the shouts from the terraces can be heard, "come on you Prody boys", and "we are the Prody team". Rangers supporters identify so closely with the Protestant cause, even though they seldom go to church, that they do not let outsiders in and would abandon the club if a Catholic were to play for them. At Parkhead the situation is slightly different. The supporters identify with the Catholic Church and the unification of Ireland to a limited extent. Even though this is a definite

106. Interviews with supporters indicate that they do not attend church or chapel on a regular basis but obtain most of their religious education in school where approximately twenty minutes of instruction is given each day.

religious and political connection it seems to be a problem that non-Catholic supporters can tolerate in exchange for watching a mixed team play good exciting football. The crowd structure at Parkhead is far more friendly and receptive to outsiders and the only requirement is to support Celtic.

Intolerance extends - at Ibrox in particular and at other grounds to a lesser extent - to racial minorities. Few if any people of identifiable racially different backgrounds attend matches in Scotland, but when they do they are often made unwelcome, especially at Ibrox. The first Black player in Scotland plays for Rangers and supporters of all clubs have given verbal abuse and thrown banana skins on the pitch in an effort to affect the player's performance. Although racism is not a focal point of any match individuals of non-European descent have been attacked by supporters. This has been witnessed by the author at Ibrox and Tynecastle.

Channels For Expressing Grievances

Football again provides the ideal setting for the second component within structural conduciveness, 'channels for expressing grievances'. [107] As previously noted, football stadiums as they have evolved are ideal for venting the common opinion of one crowd section to another, which they do frequently. When there is a game, matching teams with supporters who represent opposing religious factions, then the situation is ideal for each support group to vent their opposition to one another. In situations where religious persuasion is not a factor the crowd must take up another cause, which is generally related to inter-city rivalry, the playing sides, or outside issues. In some

107. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 227.

cases a religiously-oriented support group will label the opposition as having the opposing religious identity or the opposition will assume the opposing religious identity to taunt the others and have something to shout about.

The implication is not that support groups focus only on outside social issues - they do not. The major focus at every game is the play on the pitch, but to listen to the support groups the observer would assume that religious intolerance is the major focus of the supporters. The support groups react vociferously to play on the pitch and follow the action intently but are always willing to turn their attention to the opposition support and issues not being contested on the pitch. When religious differences are not the overriding issue between the rival support groups the singing and chanting is usually directed at supporting one's own team and hurling abuse at the opposing team and their support, much of which is based on inter-city rivalry. Games between Dundee United and Aberdeen are classic examples of this situation. Both teams have Catholic and Protestant supporters, so support for intolerant religious views is limited, and as a result the chanting is directed at insulting the opposition and building up one's own team and personal image.

Occasionally, other outside influences can creep into the terraces, but this generally has not been the case in Scotland. The focus of the terrace dwellers is on the game and the opposition support with religious intolerance as the overriding outside influence. In England many other outside influences can be found on the terraces which directly influence crowd behaviour. Youth cultures, political interests, gratuitous violence seekers and smaller local issues have a great influence on English football crowds. [108]

108. Mr Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit., pp. 60.

In allowing singing and chanting plus more animated activity on the terraces, Smelser contends that formal and informal social control in the society as a whole, and on the terraces, must be adequate to prevent willful violent behaviour. Adequate policing and community standards, are not enough to prohibit collective action if the police or political authorities do not use the force they have against the crowd. [109] In some ways this contention is correct in relation to football in that there is not an adequate social control mechanism to deal with religious intolerance within Scottish society, despite laws outlawing open forms of discrimination. Religious divisions are deeply rooted in all parts of Scottish society and extend into the police and government, resulting in supporters on both sides seeing most official bodies as being biased against them. Less formal control factors such as the various churches, news media, and the collective conscience have been totally inadequate up to this point in controlling religious intolerance and its manifestations on the terraces.

Once religious intolerance has manifested itself in the form of collective violence on the terraces the control agents become much more formal. Official stewards and the police present a very high profile in reaction to crowd violence. Smelser claims that adequate police presence is not enough to stop collective action, and that their permissiveness only adds to the problem, but in this case the evidence does not support this suggestion. [110] The question of police permissiveness adding to to problem of collective action as Smelser claims is totally reversed in the terrace situation. The police permit a certain amount of activity on the terraces that would be dealt with more severely outside the football arena. As one Glasgow Police Inspector noted:

> "If we tried to stop this (referring to a Celtic versus Ranger match with the normal singing and chanting going on) we would have a riot on our

109. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 234-235.
110. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 234.

hands." [111]

Another Inspector stated:

> "We would rather have them (referring to the two groups of supporters) in here doing this (referring to the singing, chanting and general rowdy behaviour) and blowing off steam where we can control them, than out out on the streets where we cannot. This allows them to come in and let off steam, and we would rather have them here than have to deal with the problem on the streets." [112]

In the case of football crowds the evidence indicates that police permissiveness helps solve a problem rather than adding to a later one. [113] If the police tried to stop the singing, chanting and rowdy behaviour that accompanies almost every football match there would be unacceptable police and supporter confrontations. Trying to subdue or arrest those engaged in singing, chanting or animated behaviour would create an impossible logistical problem. Added to this police action could cause adverse reaction from the entire crowd and facilitate the exact situation the police are trying to control, that is collective violence. Police permissiveness in this case solves what could be a massive problem trying to arrest thousands of supporters for a breach of the peace or threatening behaviour, and allows the support groups to vent their anger and frustration towards one another in a controlled environment which allows for relatively easy police supervision. As a result, the football terrace situation serves as a social pressure valve, or a way of draining off social tensions for the supporters. In this way social pressure can be expressed without causing undue concern or damage, even though the behaviour is not generally acceptable except in the football crowd situation. [114] Football terraces

111. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, at Celtic Park during a match between Celtic and Rangers.

112. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, at Celtic Park during a match between Celtic and Rangers.

113. also see Alan Grimshaw, "Intrepreting Collective Violence", in James Short and Marvin Wolfgang eds., Collective Violence, New York, 1972.

serve as a social escape and pressure release because there are no other institutional means of acceptable redress adequate to fill the needs of those involved.[115]

When the football crowd is singing and chanting most collective behaviouralists would agree that the crowd is well on the way to becoming hostile. Most analyses of collective behaviour would indicate that all crowds pass through a stage similar to a football crowds singing and chanting on their way to collective action. Football crowds are somewhat unique in this situation because they always reach this level of activity, but very rarely exceed it. As a result, adequate police are usually enough to control this type of crowd action, but if collective violence is going to occur then no number of police are adequate for control, no matter what the situation or location.

Singing and chanting has been labelled 'ritual behaviour' by Peter Marsh and his colleagues. [116, 117] This is a generally correct analysis in that most football crowds do sing and chant which creates a very important part of the atmosphere at every match. For most supporters, singing and chanting is a vital part of terrace life and is actively participated in by both the clamjamfry and ordinary supporters. Even though this type of activity can be viewed as ritual behaviour it is still vital to the collective behaviour process. In football, the crowd's singing and chanting is an important step toward the possibility of collective action, and although ritualised at most matches provides a basis for the further development of the required steps towards collective action.

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114. see Jesse R. Pitts, "Social Control, The Concept", in David Sills ed., International Encyclopedia Of The Social Sciences, New York, 1968.
115. Kurt Lang and Glaydis Lang, "Collective Behaviour Theory And The Escalated Riots Of The Sixties", in Tumotsu Shibutani ed., Human Nature And Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1970.
116. Peter Marsh, Op. Cit.
117. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.

Formal Communication

> " . . . Audience . . . facilitates the formation of crowds because it permits the rapid communication, common definition of the situation and face-to-face interaction." [118]

The third and most important part of structural conduciveness is communication. Communication takes various forms within collective behaviour, [119] [120] but when limited to football crowds is found in six forms; the written word found in newspapers and club programmes, rumours, face-to-face interaction, visual perceptions, television, and the public address system in all grounds.

For any terrace crowd to take collective action, communication in some form must exist. For most supporters newspapers provide an ongoing source of information and speculation. Newspapers provide inside information about the club management and players that is otherwise unavailable to the ordinary fan. The clubs use the newspapers to pass on information important to the supporters and to encourage their attendance at all matches. The print media can also have an adverse affect on the terrace supporter and can create an increased probability of collective action. [121]

The most formal type of communication used by football clubs to inform their supporters is the official programme. The official programme is sold by each club at each home match. The programme is filled with information about the club and the

118. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp, 270.
119. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp, 11.
120. F. H. Allport, Social Psycholog, Boston, 1924, pp. 295.
121. A detailed analysis of the affects of the news media on football crowds appears in Chapter Three and more specifically in Chapter Five.

day's match. The programme is often used by the clubs to pass on information about all ticket matches, travel information to away matches, and to ask for assistance from supporters in controlling activities on the terraces. The effect of the programme is somewhat limited due to the varying percentage of the crowd who actually buy and read them. Programme commentaries on crowd behaviour become more effective when combined with other forms of communication.

The second type of formal communication used directly by the clubs to communicate with the supporters is the public address system. Clubs and the police can use the system to pass on information to the crowd throughout the ground. The public address system has its greatest effect in telling the support the names of the players playing in the match and providing half and full time scores from other matches. The system is also used to play music before each game in an attempt to break up the singing and chanting of the support groups by drowning out the combined support group voices. The attempt works to a point. When there are small support groups the sound system can drown out the singing and chanting. If there is a large sectarian support, no volume of music will drown out the singing and chanting. When the public address system is used to ask supporters for cooperation in controlling behaviour the supporters will generally respond positively depending on whether the request goes for or against crowd sentiment. When a request is made that goes against crowd sentiment, the supporters will often comply with the request while voicing their displeasure with the request.

The newest type of formal club-sponsored communication is the electronic scoreboard. Hibs were the first Scottish club to install an electronic scoreboard. This form of communication is very effective in passing information to the support groups. When

electronic scoreboards are used to pass on important information, it often disrupts the singing and chanting between the support groups by forcing the supporters to focus on the scoreboard and not on each other. Electronic scoreboards may develop into the most important form of club - spectator communication because of their ability to divert attention away from support group rivalry and onto a neutral object.

Rumour and Informal Communication

Informal communication appears most often in the form of rumour. "Rumour is the characteristic mode of communication in collective behaviour." [122] Rumour appears in several forms within the spectator group. Before the match many rumours can be spread through verbal communication about speculated activities surrounding the match. Verbal communication continues throughout the match and can lead directly to collective action by spreading information about confrontations between supporters, whether real, false, or exaggerated. Rumours can be about past incidents, anticipated actions on the day, atrocities by the opposition support, and many other subjects important to the support group. Within the football crowd rumours generally take place on a one-to-one or group basis, and as a result the information can spread rapidly and at the same time become greatly distorted.

> " . . . a rumour is an unconfirmed message passed from one person to another in face-to-face interaction that refers to an object, person, situation, rather than an idea or theory".[123]

Rumours take place both in the wider society and in crowd situations where they serve

122. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 32
123. H. Taylor Buckner, "A Theory Of Rumour Transmission" in Robert Evans, Readings In Collective Behaviour, Chicago, 1975, pp. 87.

as a barometer of increasing tension. [124] Rumours within society as a whole directly influence crowd action on the terraces. Any issue in the wider society, whether or not covered in the media, can be reflected in the activity on the terraces if that issue is in any way related to football crowd conflicts. This situation often facilitates the formation of the spontaneous crowd but is only one of many factors influencing the recurring football crowd. The recurrent football crowd with its loyal weekly participants and occasional participants creates a situation where they cannot be considered spontaneous in nature. Many early collective behaviour authors were aware of the difference between the two types of crowd situation, but most modern work tends to overlook the differences. One of the major differences between the two modern approaches to collective behaviour, value-added and emergent norm, is the concept of the recurring crowd situation, and this creates one of the major objections to Turner and Killian's analysis. The crowd in the emergent norm concept is based on the spontaneous crowd, and as a result has problems dealing with the recurring crowd situation. For Turner and Killian every crowd develops its own new norm of behaviour. In the recurrent crowd, behaviour has a carry-on effect from one game to another. This is not accounted for nor is there scope to incorporate this type of crowd situation in the emergent norm concept. The value-added concept does not account for the recurrent crowd situation either but is flexible enough to allow for this type of crowd pattern without destroying the basic components of the concept, which is what happens to the emergent norm concept.

In the football crowd rumours take two basic forms, the spreading of rumours through person to person communication, and through singing and chanting. Rumours circulating in the local society can raise passions and anger within the individuals

124. Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, Op. Cit., pp. 193.

concerned who in turn bring these amplified social issues with them on to the terraces. The effect of formal communication of real incidents fuelled by rumours with their exaggeration, distortion and prejudice, can and often does increase the tensions of the crowd resulting in a hostile belief that can lead directly to collective action.

The most noticeable form of rumour is the singing and chanting between the support groups. The singing and chanting begins well before most matches and continues until just after kick-off when the game takes the attention of the clamjamfry. The chants and songs take on three forms; self-esteem, support of the team, and hatred of the opposition and their support. This includes religious songs and chants. The chants and songs serve as the basic from of aggression on the terraces, which is acceptable in the situation. [125] The clamjamfry will alter their songs and chants to react to or taunt the opposition support, depending on the circumstances. If one fan group is far larger than the other, songs of self-esteem are far more frequent, especially form the larger support group who can dominate the opposition group. When there is a small travelling support there is usually little verbal abuse between the two groups due to the numerical disparity.

If there is a large travelling contingent that tends to balance the support groups in size then songs aimed at inciting the opposition are far more common. The major factor that lends emphasis to the fervour, cohesiveness and tone of the chants and songs is again religious persuasion. If there is a religious conflict between the groups then songs of self-esteem and hatred of the opposition will predominate. The sense of identity, cohesion, solidarity will increase and and the verbal jousting will become heated with passion and animated behaviour if the two support groups concentrate

125. see Linda Hill, Language As Aggression, Bonn, 1976.

solely on one another to the exclusion of outside influences. The heated verbal jousting match before, during and after the game always takes place when there is a religious conflict, including situations where there is support of vastly different sizes. Given a religious overtone even the smallest travelling support group will verbally challenge their hosts.

Incidents in Northern Ireland are classic indications of the rumour process and its effect on the terrace crowd. If an incidents or series of incidents has taken place in the province which are particularly sectarian and violent the media will have covered the events so that both religious factions in Scotland will know generally what has happened, and then the rumour process, fuelled by media coverage, will distort and exaggerate the preconceived prejudices about the incident. If there happens to be a Rangers versus Celtic or a Hibs versus Hearts match soon after a major incident, the tension on the terraces will be greatly increased in comparison to matches played during periods of calm in Northern Ireland. The increased tension resulting from sectarian problems is reflected in the intensity of the singing and chanting of the support groups, which can take over from the match as the focal point of the afternoon's activities. During times of high tension a second indicator arises which is reflected in an increased size and animated activities of the clamjamfry. Many young supporters become very animated in their actions when singing and chanting, especially when the chants propose physical harm or death to the opposition support. The waving of fists, jumping up and down and violent head movements are the most obvious signs of animated actions and these should be noted as indicators that a large segment of the crowd might participate in collective violence if a precipitating incident takes place.

Rumour also spreads as verbal communication amongst the members of each clamjamfry in a less animated style. The most noticeable incidents of non-animated verbal communication can be seen immediately after a particularly bad foul on the pitch, [126] especially during prolonged periods of poor play. A bad foul will produce a loud response from the supporters of the fouled player, and quick conversation about how bad the foul was and how the referee should handle the situation. The supporters of the offending player may cheer the action especially if the fouled player is a good one, and the knock received may reduce his ability to play well for the remainder of the match. Since most supporters are former or current players on an amateur level cynical fouls which may or do injure the opposition are tolerated by either support group. However the referee handles the situation will be judged as wrong by one set of supporters, and not harsh enough by the other, and the decision will be attacked by both support groups, although usually one support group will view any disciplinary action against an opposition player as a positive step.

If there is an incident between the support groups before the match the rumour of the incident will spread quickly through the crowd and become increasingly distorted and exaggerated in its travels. Rumours and stories of old incidents may be recounted and amplified to add evidence against the offending support group. This biased view of the situation and a sense of "critical accountability" helps build hostility in the respective clamjamfries. [127] Rumour has a great effect on the clamjamfry; it amplifies the original incident far beyond what actually happened, and places total blame for the atrocity on the opposition support. The amplification either glorifies the support group or condemns the opposition support for starting the trouble. No matter what the actual

126. see Russel Geen and Leonard Berkowitz, "Some Conditions Facilitating The Occurrence Of Aggression After The Observation Of Violence", in Leonard Berkowitz, Roots Of Aggression, New York, 1969.

127. H. Taylor Bucker, Op. Cit., pp. 87.

outcome of the incident, the support group spreading the rumour is always victorious. The police may be blamed for the incident, or at least for ruining a good fight by arresting many of the participants. Informal communication helps build tension within and between the support groups, which is an important step towards collective action. "No riot ever occurs without rumours to incite, accompany, and intensify the violence".[128]

The effect of television on crowd activity has been hotly debated by both the football authorities and those in the television media. There can be little doubt that television has had some effect on football crowds, but the extent of the effect is open to debate. Television as part of the expanding leisure industry has added to the problem of falling attendance figures in recent years. Television cameras at matches also influence the activity of some supporters who 'want to get on 'tele" and do various things to be seen by the cameras, including violence. [129]

The conduciveness towards crowd action within the context of football is further enhanced by certain aspects of the stadium setting. Since communication plays such a vital role in the crowd, secondary issues that enhance the informal communication system within the football crowd must be looked into as to their influence on the collective behaviour process. The major factors that influence communication within the support groups are transportation and alcohol. Transportation plays an important part in the build-up of the triangular crowd. In general the home team support is far less dependent on transportation to the match than the visiting supporters. In most cases home supporters use local buses to get to and from the ground, while the

128. Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology Of Rumour, New York, 1947, pp. 191.
129. A further critical anlaysis of the affect of television of football crowds appears in Chapter Five.

travelling support tend to use trains, hired buses special football trains, and personal cars plus local transportation for away matches. It must be noted that both Rangers and Celtic have extensive support throughout Scotland, and private buses with supporters travel to every match from all over the country. Celtic supporters have a bus running from London to every match of the season. When travelling supporters join in group travel the communication and sensitising process begins. This is what Turner and Killian called the milling process, [130] the build-up to the match where expectations are highlighted, past grievances and activities remembered, and a platform for tension established. Although Smelser does not mention the milling or sensitising process at all, it is a result of the communication process. The milling process [131, 132] in football crowds is not as Turner and Killian see it either, for it does not require personal movement, and in fact physical movement can actually reduce the crowd effect. [133] The proper term to apply to football crowds is the sensitising process. The sensitising process never really stops, but heightens in anticipation of the next game, or games of great importance, or games against traditional rivals. Any type of communication can increase the person's or group's sensitivity to the game and the activities of the crowd. This is why transportation can play such an important part in this process; apart from supporters club meetings it is often the first time larger groups of supporters have face-to-face contact before a match. Communication at this point heightens tensions about the game and crowd activity. Groups of supporters are often confined in a small space for varying amounts of time with one common purpose, to support and help their team win, at any cost. After a long bus or train ride with normal communication tensions

130. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 37-38.
131. also see Michael Smith, "Sport And Collective Behaviour" in Donald Ball and John Loy, eds., Sport And The Social Order, London, 1975, pp. 295.
132. also see Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behaviour", in A. M. Lee, ed., New Outline Of The Principles Of Sociology, New York, 1968, pp. 170.
133. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 31-33.

can be increased, thus leading to an increased possibility of collective crowd action.

Communication and sensitising on transport does not generally lead to hostile outbursts. The communication process can function as a control factor. Even though communication and the sensitising process are vital elements required in any incident of collective action they can also serve as a calming influence and actually reduce tension amongst the supporters. This usually happens when a powerful leader has information which goes against the perceptions of the group. If the leader can convince the group he is right in his analysis then rumours counter to rumours creating hostility are created and this can desensitize a potentially violent situation. Even with the control element the sensitising process incorporates all forms of communication; the media, rumour, face-to-face contact, perception of events by the viewer, interpretation, and when added to personal prejudice can easily heighten tension levels on the way to and during the match.

Most of the supporters buses in Scotland are organised by officially recognised supporters clubs. The supporters clubs usually organise a bus to every away game and may organise transportation to home games if the supporters club is located far away from the football clubs' ground. Officially recognised supporters clubs help the clubs through fund raising and attendance while the club give discounts and preferential treatment on tickets plus other special privileges to club members. Supporters clubs also provide a direct communication link from the terraces to club management. Football clubs often send officials and players to supporters club meetings to pass on information and requests and to listen to supporter grievances. The supporters clubs are held responsible for the behaviour of their members and misbehaviour at a match is grounds for expulsion. Through the direct communication process the football club can

pass on requests for good behaviour on the terraces and have a direct effect on the sensitising process. When supporters club members know of the direct wishes of the club for good behaviour the sensitising process is often altered into a control process where the supporters work at good behaviour. In this way supporters clubs can have a positive effect on terrace behaviour, but most football supporters do not belong to supporters clubs and thus this effect is often limited. When non-supporter club supporters travel to matches they are often not aware of the wishes of the football club for good behaviour and thus the sensitising process takes place and the result can be a conflict on the terraces between supporters seeking good versus those seeking bad behaviour. Depending on the size of the two sensitized groups and the events of the day one will usually dominate the overall crowd activity, those seeking good behaviour.

The second and possibly the largest factor in crowd sensitivity and action at football matches in Scotland is alcohol. For over one hundred years alcohol was common on the terraces. Many men would go to the pub for lunch after Saturday morning work and have a few pints of beer before going to the match, and possibly take drink to the match with them. In today's society it is still common to go to the pub for a few drinks before the match. [134] Many supporters' buses still stop at a pub on their way to and from a match, even though this practice is now illegal. [135] Since 1980 it has been illegal to take alcohol into or to be drunk going into a football ground. [136] Before the ban on

134. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 79.

135. When doing the research for this thesis, I travelled on supporters' buses, on scheduled trains and football special trains to matches all over Scotland. In this capacity while riding supporters' buses I stopped in many pubs along the way. Most of the supporters would have several drinks before resuming their travels to the match. This practice is expressly forbidden in the Criminal Justice Scotland Act, 1980 but the practice of stopping at pubs on the way to and on the way home from matches continues to this day.

136. Criminal Justice Scotland Act 1980, London, 1981, pp. 53-56.

alcohol came into affect, alcohol of every type in various containers was common at every game and at the end of every match the terraces would be littered with thousands of empty containers. [137] Not only does alcohol add to the possibility of hostile crowd action but the containers serve as excellent missiles to throw at the opposition supporters. Alcohol has been one of the main ingredients associated with and adding to violent acts at football matches in Scotland through reducing the effect of formal and informal social control, increasing the crowd's identity with itself and hatred of the opposition, produces a false sense of superiority, increases the sense of masculinity, and acts as an amplifier of collective crowd activity. [138] Ragnar Hauge in an analysis of all existing research on alcohol and crime came to the following conclusions which support the observed effect of alcohol on football crowd activity.

> " . . . on an individual level, the higher alcohol consumption a person has, the higher is his risk of committing crime. [139] On an aggregate level, one may draw the conclusion that most studies seem to indicate that, as far as violent crimes are concerned, a relationship exists. [140] Even if this may be due partly to intoxicated offenders being more often caught by the police, it is doubtful whether this can explain all the differences. Experimental studies have also shown that aggressive behaviour, is more prevalent when the person concerned is under the influence of alcohol. The most realistic conclusion is probably that alcohol intoxication can be a contributing factor in events which lead persons to commit acts which they would have abstained from under other circumstances, especially acts of violence which arise out of personal conflicts. [141]

In the United States studies indicate that forty-six percent of those who commit

137. A mixture of whisky and sherry was very popular in the Jungle at Celtic Park. The biggest insult anyone on the terraces to do was to refuse a drink from the numerous bottles being passed around. This could create a hostile reaction and accusations of supporting the opposition, so I often drank what was offered, and staggered home after the game.
138. also see Leonard Berkowitz, "The Contagion Of Violence", in Leonard Berkowitz ed., Op.Cit.
139. Ragnar Hauge, Alcohol And Crime, Strasbourg, 1984.
140. Ragnar Hauge, Op. Cit., pp. 38.
141. Ragnar Hauge, Op. Cit., pp. 47.

offences and are sent to jail were under the influence of alcohol when committing their crimes. [142]

The Scottish Cup Final riot of 1980 between Celtic and Rangers fans is a good example of the affect of large quantities of alcohol on crowd activity. Once the hostile outburst started many who had been drinking all day from bottles and cans brought into the ground joined in with the crowd action. The bottles and cans made excellent missiles to throw at opposition supporters.[143] After the ban on alcohol came into effect in 1981 the amount of alcohol taken into grounds decreased dramatically as evidenced by the almost clean terraces at the end of most matches. At the same time the number of major crowd disturbances at matches in Scotland decreased. [144]

Alcohol can have one other bad side-effect on the terraces. Fights between supporters of the same club can start when one supporter urinates down the leg of the person in front of him instead of going to the traditionally bad toilet facilities in Scottish grounds. The terraces in any ground can easily become soaking wet [145] on a warm day after the supporters have stopped in a pub on the way to the ground and then not bothered to leave the terraces to use the toilet facilities.

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142. United States Department Of Justice, Profile Of Jail Inmates: Social Demographic Findings From The 1978 Survey Of Inmates Of Local Jails, Washington D.C., 1980, pp. 44.
143. See Appendix C for a complete description of the Hampden Park Riot of 1980.
144. Although no statistics are available to substantiate this contention, the conclusion is based on observed matches and careful monitoring of the media during the study period.
145. One English girl was amused to find herself standing on wet terraces in the Jungle at Parkhead and asked a Celtic supporter standing next to her, "does the roof leak?" the reply was a simple, "no", with a big smile. The wet terraces were caused by supporters urinating on them.

Symbols

Symbols have a vital function in any crowd, especially if that crowd is moving along the stages towards violent activity. Symbols for the football crowd appear in three basic forms; the opposing support, the police, and the identifying factor of dress. The opposition support automatically becomes a symbol of contention because of their support of the opposition team, their segregation and dress, especially in big matches. In matches with smaller crowds the symbol of the opposition support is not as strong, but can become a factor if an incident occurs to incite one or both of the support groups which intensifies feelings amongst group members. In certain cases the support groups are identified with religious factors which adds emphasis to the symbolic identification between the support groups. The identifying symbol of the home and opposition support is the scarf and other clothing in the colours of the team supported. Even when there is a religious difference between the support groups if there is no visible means of identification no major violence can take place between the two sides. This is why many supporters remove their scarves if there is any threat of trouble because they are identifiable as a target to opposition supporters.

The symbol of the opposition support when combined with other factors in collective behaviour takes away all the good qualities of the opposition and re-labels them as an undesirable group, especially if the opposition team has won the match. The opposition support becomes a non-personal symbol of everything that is wrong, while the group participated in is the symbol of righteousness, thus action is defined as right versus wrong. In the process of dehumanising the opposition chants and songs are used to build self esteem and reduce the image of the opposition. In this way individuals can justify collective action to correct perceived injustices represented by the

opposition support.

The police are the second symbol of opposition at every football match. Because of their uniform they are readily identifiable as a symbol of control and of the state. Although the police rarely disrupt the interaction between the support groups enough to control the attention of the supporters they still occupy a specific important role in the minds of all supporters. Police action, if perceived as unjust, can bring one or both support groups into singing and chanting against the police and if necessary collective action against them. As long as the police maintain a neutral stance and do not become the focus of spectator attention then their presence is generally overlooked by the supporters.

The concept of having a crowd divided into three opposing segments consisting of the two opposing crowd groups and the police is one that collective behaviour has passed over. Most collective behaviour research looks at a crowd in opposition to the police who end up on the side of defending whatever the crowd is trying to destroy. In the case of workers striking against unfair work practices the police end up protecting the property of the employer from damage and thus become the opposition. In riots aimed at looting the police try to protect property and again become the symbol of opposition to the will of the crowd. In the case of football crowds, the police do not take sides or protect one side from another. They are strictly in the role of maintaining peace and protecting property which places them in opposition to both support groups. The police by design tend to be in the middle between the support groups, suppressing their ability to create trouble as representatives of the state and social order. As a result of their position in the football crowd, and in society as a whole, the police are not liked

by the supporters but respected as a symbol of power and authority. Interviews with supporters supported this point, as the supporters generally approved of police actions as long as they kept a neutral non-aggressive position. In Scotland the police are not a symbol of opposition unless they do something perceived as unjust which angers the fans. Supporters on the terraces agree with the role of the police in the crowd as a requirement to help keep the peace. "If the police wer nae here, there would be trouble at every match". "We come to watch the match and the police have to watch them (the opposition) to 'em from starten any trouble". Although the supporters do not like the police they have a great respect for their authority, especially their ability to inflict immediate physical pain on those who violate the well-known norms of behaviour on the terraces. The Glasgow police have a reputation for being very tough and most supporters would not do anything to draw attention to themselves by the police because of the summary justice they might incur. "the police are mean bastards, but they have a job to do and I don't mess with them". [146, 147]

In England the police are often a symbol of opposition to one or both support groups. There is often conflict between the police and the support groups in addition to the conflict between the two support groups. In England, when the police have successfully controlled opposing support groups from getting at one another, the attention of the fans switches to the police who are the nearest identifiable opposition and the symbols of authority who have prevented 'aggro'. Part of the reason for this situation being more prevalent in England is that 'aggro' has become a major part of football and many people go to matches who are not fans but youths looking for violence within the anonymity of the crowd, and thus they are willing to assault the police where other football supporters are not. Many of the televised crowd violence

146. Quotations are from Rangers and Celtic supporters.

147. See Chapter Six for a further discussion of the role of the police in the football crowd.

incidents in England show direct evidence of crowds attacking the police after the police have intervened to control violence between support groups. Although the possibility of the support groups involved in violence altering their target from one another to the police does exist, often the violence is for violence's sake and any opposition will do, especially if the violence is the result of social stresses and the police are the representative of state who are held responsible for the stress.[148]

In Scotland, the only examples of supporters intentionally taking on the police have taken place with Hearts supporters. Both at Tynecastle and at other grounds Hearts supporters have attacked one another and the police in search of 'aggro'. Once Hearts supporters start fighting amongst themselves, the police usually move in to stop the fighting and are set upon by the supporters once they get well into the middle of the crowd. Since most police supervisors are not interested in a large-scale battle on the terraces, the only action taken in reprisal is to rescue the officers involved and to make a few arrests, hopefully of those involved. Hearts supporters were able to attract police attention in a match against Motherwell in the last game of the 1982 season at Tynecastle when the corner supporters started a mock fight amongst themselves, and when the police responded two policemen were severely beaten by the supporters. The two policemen were eventually rescued by other police, but not before sustaining severe injuries requiring hospital treatment and long recovery periods. [149] Other similar situations have been witnessed involving Hearts supporters in matches against Celtic at Celtic Park on 11 March 1983 when two Glasgow policemen were attacked

148. The Luton versus Millwall disturbances on Wednesday 13 March 1985 are a good example of supporters turning on the police when the police intervened to stop violence between the support groups. Both support groups turned on the police when they got between the combatants on the pitch.

149. Personal interview with one of the officers involved. West End Police Station, Edinburgh, 17 November 1982.

and on 2 September 1983 against Hibs at Easter Road when two more Edinburgh police were attacked. The incident at Celtic Park received a quick response from the Glasgow Police who inflicted swift punitive corporal punishment in rescuing the two policemen being attacked. Several dozen Hearts supporters were hit with truncheons and several arrests were made. Generally in Scotland only genuine football supporters go to matches and thus there are few incidents of attacks on the police; the support groups would rather watch the match or fight each other but are not interested in fighting the police.

It must be noted that during the course of the research a new development started in Aberdeen known as the 'casuals'. The casuals started slowly in 1982, and have progressed to open organising techniques on most large club terraces. Letters were sent out during the 1984-5 season to known supporters clubs urging supporters to join casual support groups to uphold the traditions of the club and reputations of the support groups. Casuals are a group of supporters originally of middle class background who go to matches wearing stylish clothes and looking for violence. The casuals concept has spread to many Scottish clubs, although the extent is difficult to identify. The most common form of casual activity is to go to a game without club colours and try to create trouble on the terraces through attacking either home or visiting supporters. The casuals represent the main outside influence dedicated to violence on the Scottish football terraces. Aberdeen and Hibs have the largest casual support groups, but both are relatively inactive since the main terrace support know what they are about and taunt them to become involved in violence since the scarf-clad supporters far outnumber the casuals. The casuals rarely engage in violence simply because they are out numbered by traditional supporters, although they may become involved in isolated incidents

outside the ground. [150, 151, 152]

Generalised Hostile Belief

Rumours when fuelled by structural strain and structural conduciveness create what Smelser calls a hostile belief. The hostile belief is built on a series of effects that rumours have on the crowd. An inflammatory rumour, no matter what it is about, creates ambiguity through strain, distortion, prejudice and exaggeration of the original facts. The ambiguity in turn creates anxiety about the current situation and one's own position within the crowd, but often personal anxiety is overshadowed by the overall crowd reaction to the situation.[153]

> " . . . rumours display all the components of a hostile belief system - anxiety, generalized aggression and omnipotence - and the attachment, by short circuiting, of these generalized elements to specific persons, places, situations and events".[154]

The crowd as a whole can reflect the ambiguity [155] and indecision created by rumours about a particular situation. The crowd often jumps to quick decisions based on faulty information and prejudice as a result of the anxiety created by ambiguity. Scottish football crowds, as previously mentioned, react to religious problems, and react to rough or violent play on the pitch which is fuelled by anxiety [156] and ambiguity about

150. The basis of this description of the casuals is based on observation and interviews with supporters. Unfortunately no none was able to provide a copy of the casual's recruiting letter.
151. A further discussion of the casuals appears later in this chapter and in chapter six.
152. On 25 August 1986 BBC News documented some of the organised violence groups in English football and noted the Aberdeen casuals.
153. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 248.
154. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 248.
155. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 88-89.
156. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 89.

the game and its outcome. A particularly bad tackle or violent act, even if punished by the referee, can create a noisy hostile outburst from the support groups because of its effect on the players' performance and the outcome of the game. Violent acts on the pitch increase the anxiety of the crowd about the outcome of the game, thus increasing the tension in the support groups and adding to the possibility of violent crowd action.[157, 158]

Goals can obviously have the same type of effect. When one team scores, its supporters go wild in celebration, partially as a result of the reduced anxiety over the outcome of the game, and also because it is what the supporters have come to see. On the other side the support becomes very quiet after an opposition goal which increases the anxiety about the outcome of the match and places them in a position of inferiority. If the scorer of the goal goes to the opposition support to show off his contempt for them and his elation over scoring a goal against their team, the reaction is quick and hostile towards the offending player. Players like Davy Cooper of Rangers making rude gestures to the Jungle after scoring a goal not only incite the crowd to a frenzy, but place themselves in danger by doing so. Having a goal scored by the opposition is bad enough but having the player who did the damage insult the support group in addition, increases the tension and anxiety to a higher level which pushes the crowd further towards mobilisation for hostile action against the aggressor and his support group. Not only can play on the pitch increase anxiety levels, the reaction of the support groups to one another, to the police , and to the tension of outside influences, it can also bring about mobilisation towards collective action.

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157. Arnold Buss, "Physical Aggression In Relation To Different Frustration", in Journal Of Abnormal And Social Psychology, Vol . 67, 1967, pp. 1-7.
158. also see Russel Geen and Leonard Berkowitz, Op. Cit.

In the case of Davy Cooper's gestures to the Jungle after scoring in an "Old Firm" [159] match at Parkhead, Celtic supporters reacted wildly to the player's insulting gestures as he ran in front of them. The support group surged forward crushing many against crash barriers as the vast majority of the clamjamfry tried to push their way toward the player. [160] Many coins and other objects were hurled towards Davy Cooper as he continued to slowly jog up the touch line toward the halfway line, directly in front of the Jungle. As the crowd surged toward the fencing separating the terraces from the pitch, the police quickly moved in to block the supporters from climbing the fence and charging the pitch and the player concerned. Several Celtic supporters tried to climb the low fence but were pushed back by timely, non-violent, intervention by the police. While the police were dealing with a potential pitch invasion the referee stepped in, pulled Davy Cooper away from from his position in front of the Jungle and spent several minutes talking to the player, but no official action was taken in the form of a booking. In this particular situation the quick and timely intervention by the police stopped what might have been a serious crowd situation. This particular incident emphasises the effect that players can have on supporters. Many other incidents of lesser magnitude have been witnessed at matches, none of which came close to inciting the crowd into collective action.

When the average crowd arrives in the terraces a division of labour takes place where the crowd is naturally divided into predesignated groups which is not unlike the division of labour found in the work place. [161, 162] The violent supporter who is part of the clamjamfry and the ordinary supporter make up the division of labour on the

159. see Bill Murray, Op. Cit., for a description of the full meaning or the Old Firm.
160. The clamjamfry on this day in the Jungle is estimated at between 12,000 and 15,000 out of a total attendance of 65,000.
161. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 88-89.
162. Sam Wright, Crowds And Riots: A Study In Social Organization, London, 1978.

terraces. Early in the crowd build-up the support group is "solidaristic" [163] as it has a common objective which the individual cannot achieve alone. In this case the football support groups want to support their team and help them gain a victory. As Ian Taylor notes, the unity of the support group is based on common identity, which is an added ingredient to the collective basis of football crowds.

> "If there is a central value which unites the rump of the soccer sub-culture, it is the belief that the team is theirs".[164]

Voices in unison are far more effective than each individual yelling his own support for the team, especially when trying to be heard by the opposition support. The unity of the crowd depends on the power and strength of symbols and how strongly each individual identifies with those symbols. Within the solidaristic crowd many individuals may identify with the same symbol, but when the football crowd grows and identification changes to include personally undesirable symbols such as religious hatred or violence, that individual may then remove himself from the overall crowd activity. At this point the football crowd shows its division of labour as it breaks up into the clamjamfry who identify with the symbols and the ordinary supporters who do not identify with the symbols as strongly. This separation of the supporters is normal and an intricate part of 'differential participation': supporters are totally united under the banner of team support but divided in their identity with more controversial symbols.

> " . . . the crowd is characterized not by unanimity but by differential expression, with different individuals in the crowd feeling differently, participating because of diverse motives, and even acting differently. The illusion of unanimity arises because the behaviour of part of the crowd is perceived both by observers and by crowd members as being the sentiment of the whole crowd". [165]

163. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 103-104.
164. Ian Taylor, 1971, Op. Cit., pp. 156.

The division of labour on the terraces follows the observed differences noted in Chapter One; ordinary supporters, casual supporters, the clamjamfry, and violent supporters. The divisions beginning to develop as the ground fills, most people going directly to the section of the terraces where they know they will be in the group they identify with. Those supporters with no identification with violence usually stay well away from the clamjamfry, who are easily identified because of their singing chanting and general wild behaviour. This division is very important in that it reflects personal feelings of acceptance of varying terrace behaviour patterns and indicates the likelihood of participation in collective violence. As a general rule people with generally conservative - non-violent - personal behaviour patterns in the community stand at varying distances from the clamjamfry, the distance away usually being determined by the individual's desire to join in with the singing and chanting. The people in the clamjamfry have a greater identity with the club and generally have more antisocial attitudes towards conformity in the wider society. Interviews with the fans and the police support this contention; as one senior officer noted, they tend to arrest the same people at football matches who have been arrested for violent crimes outside the football setting. [166]

The division of labour on the terraces is vital in the build-up towards collective action. Since most of the support group have no predisposition toward violence they are willing to let those who do stand in a form of surrounded isolation. This isolation allows the clamjamfry total freedom to engage in actions deemed necessary without interference or control from the majority of the crowd who may resist opportunities to push toward collective violence. The violent supporter can use the clamjamfry as a

165. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 22.

166. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, at Celtic Park during a match between Celtic and Rangers.

cover for his potential violent activity, just as the casual supporter can use the ordinary support as a cover for potential violent activity. If the situation develops to violence then both the violent and casuals will emerge and be followed by the majority of the clamjamfry. The ordinary supporters in this situation, simply by their mere presence, are viewed as lending their support to the clamjamfry, violent supporter and the casuals as they engage the opposition support. The crowd is still seen as united even though there is differential participation in collective violence. [167]

Symbols

Although symbols have been mentioned previously in this chapter, they have a specific effects when combined with other components of collective behaviour that only happen under the generalised belief. Thus, as with other components of the value-added approach, they reappear at various points.

Symbols for football crowds are both positive and negative. This situation is unique to football crowds since most symbols for crowds are negative in nature; leaders cannot be seen as symbols because of their unique place in the crowd structure. Positive and negative symbols take on very important meanings, especially in the case of religious intolerance between the support groups. Depending on the identification with religious symbols, which helps create the division of labour in the support groups, and other less important symbols such as inter-city rivalry, casuals, and general social stress, will determine the intensity with which the crowd acts. Every support group has a positive symbol in their team, themselves, and possibly a religious identity. These positive

167. also see Peter Marsh et. al. Op. Cit., chapter three for a similar description of the division of labour on the terraces at the Manor Ground in Oxford.

symbols are the incentive to actively support the team. The negative symbols of the opposing team, their support, religious identity and community identity creates the incentive to verbally attack the opposition support. Identifying with the positive and negative symbols narrows the support group's perception and to focus on those issues relating to the symbols. The narrowing of attention to the symbols intensifies the crowd solidarity, thus adding to the possibility of collective action. For the individual, especially in the clamjamfry, the unanimity of the total crowd, however illusory this may in fact be, makes the person see the crowd as morally right, incontestable, and invincible, thus he may join in collective action, which at this stage is still limited to animated singing and chanting. For most football crowds animated singing and canting is the extent of their collective action since the symbols, both positive and negative, are not sensitised enough to provoke collective violence without further components of the value-added concept coming into play. [168]

As crowd action begins to intensify, two basic changes take place. The clamjamfry becomes more tightly packed and the symbol identification changes from positive to negative. The actions of the clamjamfry also begin to become more animated. Threatening gestures and chants are made toward the opposition support. As the crowd reaches this higher level of intensity it is more expressive, [169] with generalised beliefs [170] that the actions of the support group are right and their actions will benefit the team. The image of the crowd is also changing to accept erratic socially unacceptable behaviour as normal in the situation. [171] The language of the supporter is usually very profane, another reason women do not go to the terraces. Much of the animated action

168. also see Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit.
169. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 102-103.
170. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 80.
171. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 100-109.

of the clamjamfry, if observed on an individual basis, would provoke some form of police response, but since the actions take place in the crowd they go unnoticed or at least are not responded to by the police. Only when the actions of certain individuals become so animated that they are noticed by the police as being a potential threat are they removed from the crowd. Very expressive crowds tend to over-react to any incident, either on the pitch or from the opposition, although the reaction is still verbal in nature and non-violent. The support groups react with fervour to rough play, referees' decisions and incidents relating to the opposition support. The crowd still has internal social controls that keep the situation from progressing to violence. Norms of acceptable social behaviour still have some controlling influence even though it has been greatly reduced in the build-up of the crowd process. It is the reduction of self-consciousness through crowd interaction and increasing uncertainty about the situation that continually reduced social control within the crowd. In the expressive crowd social control is weak, but still strong enough to prevent violent outbursts. [172]

Crowd Leaders

For any crowd including the triangular crowd to exist leaders must appear. [173] Although the value-added concept does not mention leaders at all in this stage of crowd structure, [174] they are a vital part of the football crowd. Leaders in the support group appear at the point when the supporters' attention concentrates on the day's events. The first chant or song of the afternoon is when identifiable leadership appears. Leaders may emerge on the spot, or they may be continuous throughout the match and from match to match. Observations indicate that leaders appear in two types; one

172. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 102-103.
173. Gustave LeBon, The Crowd: A Study Of The Popular Mind, London, 1896.
174. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 254-255. The leader for Smelser emerges as part of the Mobilization For Action stage of collective behaviour.

comes to every match and continually leads chant and songs, the second type emerges to lead one chant or song then disappears back into the crowd. In the Scottish terrace situation leaders of both types usually lead the crowd activities throughout the match by simply starting the appropriate song or chant at the proper time. Depending on the situation and the amount of hostility built up through the crowd process, songs and chants are all the leaders orchestrate, so the rest of the crowd follow the leaders and the situation remains non-violent. [175]

The English football crowd situation in relation to leadership is distinctly different to that in Scotland. Observation of English matches indicates that leaders are continuous and go to matches every week to lead support group activity. As Peter Marsh indicated the "hard case or aggro leader" is the person with a reputation for toughness or violence and thus commands respect. His leadership is followed out of fear and respect whether the activity is simply chanting or in some cases violence. [176, 177] Marsh's observations do not hold true in Scotland where the emergent or single chant leader predominates the terraces. Leaders emerge, start one chant and fade back into the crowd. Even though every Scottish support group has its 'hard men' with reputations for violence, the size of the clamjamfry, especially in Glasgow, overshadows their activities and does not allow them to dominate the leadership position. Hard men also tend to avoid leadership roles and emerge as violent supporters in response to crowd activity.

The differences between crowd leadership styles in England and Scotland is directly related to the English condition where many individuals or groups go to matches

175. also see Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.
176. Peter Marsh, "Carrers For Boys, Nutters, Hooligans And Hard Cases", in New Society, Vol. 36, 13 May 1976.
177. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 64.

looking for violence. The crowd situation in England being related to youth sub-cultures and organised hooliganism extends this leadership structure into the football crowd where Scotland's crowds do not identify as strongly with sub-cultures and thus the leadership must emerge from the crowd. [178] Since there are several leaders in each Scottish support group the leaders in most instances serve in one capacity only; leading songs and chants. New leaders appear for other activities like violence.

Since it is the leaders who orchestrate chants, songs and other support group actions which can lead to violence, they usually attract police attention. If the police feel that a leader is inciting undesired crowd activity they may remove the person from the support group to reduce tension. Although this action may alter crowd attention from the game or opposition to the police, it usually tends to reduce the tension in the crowd because the new leaders who emerge to replace those removed will act in a way as not to attract police attention.

For any crowd leader to be effective the crowd must have a degree of suggestibility. [179] [180] Although not mentioned by Smelser, the concepts of suggestibility as used by Turner and Killian when associated with differential participation goes some way towards explaining why crowds have a division of labour and why certain individuals participate in collective violence and others do not.

Football crowds are very different in forms of suggestibility when compared to other types of crowds. Football supporters are frequent visitors to the terrace crowd

178. Research by the BBC, BBC News 25 August 1986, and John Williams, Eric Dunning and Patrick Murphy, Hooligans Abroad, The Behaviour And Control Of English Fans In Continental Europe, London, 1984, support this contention.
179. William McDougall, The Group Mind, 2nd. ed., London, 1927.
180. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 32.

situation, they know the activities that go on and have preconceived notions about following or not following leaders. Preconceived notions about participation in crowd actions make the structural process towards violence move quite quickly because the clamjamfry wants to participate and are often open to suggestion of leaders and will follow when directed to. The preconceived notions of participation in the non-violent behaviour of the clamjamfry is, as Peter Marsh noted, ritualised behaviour since it has been going on over a thirty-year period. [181, 182] The preconceptions and ritualisation within the clamjamfry heighten the suggestibility of those involved towards collective violence, should the need arise.

Supporters with preconceived notions against violent actions are much harder to sway into crowd activity, even though they may stand close to and sing along with the clamjamfry. People with preconceived notions against violent activity help provide an internal control factor in the support groups because they represent non-violence and refuse to participate in any violent activities. Preconceived notions of non-violence are generally held by older and ordinary supporters who tend not to stand with the clamjamfry but stand in close proximity to it. Many join in the singing and chanting and thus present an outward appearance of being associated with the clamjamfry while in fact exercising restraint on the crowd activity.

The variance between the willingness of individuals to participate or not in collective violence is related to personal attitudes and values. These attitudes and values are often learned through the family, education and the environment, both in sociological and psychological sense. [183] The learning process is heavily influenced by the family, sub-

181. Peter Marsh, et. al., Op. Cit.
182. Peter Marsh, 1978, Op. Cit.

cultural associations, and symbolic models presented by the media. [184] The affects of learned aggressive roles are very evident on the terraces. Individuals who accept the activities of the terraces can almost always be found in the clamjamfry, or a group like the casuals. Individuals who do not have an identity with the violent side of the clamjamfry stand some distance from the centre of it, but still within contact so that the singing, chanting and other legitimate behaviour can be participated in. Interviews on the terraces support the concept of Albert Bandura that aggressive behaviour is learned through observation and / or direct experience which is then reinforced through status or material gain.[185] Although interviews were not aimed at testing how aggressive behaviour was learned, those closest to the centre of the clamjamfry universally accepted violence in response to aggression of the opposition support.[186] The distance the supporters stood from the centre of the clamjamfry had a direct relationship to the reduction in acceptability of violent responses to aggression of opposition supporters. The second major result of this observation is the age difference of the supporters. The younger supporters who were in the clamjamfry were totally willing to participate in violence. As the supporter stood further from the centre of the clamjamfry he generally became older, was employed in a good job and had a higher income level. The conclusion drawn is that age and material wealth are the two biggest influences in overriding socially learned violent behaviour.

The suggestibility factor in the clamjamfry is enhanced by informal communication within the crowd. As the individual becomes more involved in the crowd and takes up

183. Edwin Sutherland and Daonald Cressey, Criminology, Philidelphia, 1978.
184. Albert Bandura, "Psychological Mechanisms Of Aggression", in R. G. Geen and E. I. Donnerstein eds., Aggression: Theoretical And Emperical Reviews, Vol. 1, New York, 1983.
185. Albert Bandura, Aggression: Social Learning Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, 1973.
186. Interviews were conducted as part of a pilot study of a questionnaire in Appendix B, see questions 9 through 21.

its sentiment, his openness to suggestion increases while his personal perception is eroded until the crowd is the major controlling influence. [187, 188] This type of circular reaction is intensified by singing, chanting and tight physical packing of members in the clamjamfry. [189] With the increased influence of the crowd over the individual, animated behaviour spreads as more and more clamjamfry members imitate the actions of others. [190] Suggestibility is also influenced by de-individualisation. [191] De-individualisation reduces feelings of personal distinctiveness, identity and responsibility due to high arousal generated by the crowd which results in the reduction of personal standards of norms of behaviour. Individuals are more anonymous, less responsible, less inhibited, and thus are more willing to participate in antisocial behaviour associated with selfishness, greed, hostility, lust, cruelty and destruction. [192] De-individualisation reduces self-awareness and thus reduces standards of appropriate conduct and personal behaviour. [193] If the intensity of the crowd is strong enough animated behaviour will spread to segments of the support group adjacent to the clamjamfry. Once this happens the individual is much more likely to participate in violent crowd action. Without a high degree of suggestibility in the crowd and more importantly the clamjamfry, there will be only limited collective action, unless violent supporters are seeking violence. [194]

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187. Gustive LeBon, Op. Cit.
188. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 32.
189. Herbert Blumer, Op. Cit., pp. 170.
190. see Neal Miller and John Dollard, Op. Cit.
191. P. G. Simbardo, "The Human Choice, Individual Reason, And Order Versus Deindividualation, Impluse And Chaos", in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Op. Cit.
192. P. G. Simbardo, Op. Cit.
193. E. Diener, "Deindividualation: The Absence Of Self-Awareness And Self Regualtion In Group Members", in P. Paulus ed., The Psychology Of Group Influence, Hillsdale, 1980.
194. A further discussion of the violence seeking supporter appears in Chapter Six.

Mobilisation Under The Generalised Belief

Mobilisation within the generalised belief is non-violent, unlike "mobilization for action" where direct crowd action takes place, and is the last major step towards collective action. generalised beliefs bring the aforementioned components of strain and conduciveness into sharp focus through communication and the rumour process. The crowd or support group always bring with them basic forms of generalised aggression which exists in the wider society. [195, 196] This form of aggression may or may not be related to football but is a reflection of general strain in the wider society. General violence and violent activities in the community provide a basis of knowledge for football supporters to bring on to the terraces. In Scotland much of the violence has sectarian overtones and limited gang and youth culture relationships which provide a well-grounded basis for further violence on the terraces. The violence experienced by many youth outside the football situation is clearly evident on the terraces. Many of the supporters who make up the clamjamfry are associated with violence outside the football ground. The violence-prone supporter, who often appears in the forefront of collective violence, is often engaged in violence in the wider community. " Many of the people we deal with on the terraces we have arrested before for other offenses". [197]

Before any crowd can take action against any form of opposition blame must be attached to something or someone for the perceived grievance.[198] Once blame has been attached to someone or something then further action to change the situation can take place. Blame in football crowd situations is generally aimed in three directions; the

195. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 249.
196. F. H. McClintock, "Crimes Against The Person", in Transactions Of The Manchester Statistical Society 1962-3, Manchester, 1963.
197. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1983, Celtic Park, Glasgow.
198. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 104-105.

opposition team and support, the police, and one's own club. The blame for most incidents at most football matches is placed squarely on the opposition and their support. Depending on the action taken by the opposition the reaction by the home support will reflect the identification of the transgression and the blame placed upon them for it will determine the type of action taken in response. Reactions can take many forms; ambivalence, a return chant or song, threats of violence, and reciprocal violence. The second direction of response is toward the police who can create the same type of response from the support group as the opposition can. All police actions are watched by the crowd, and if the police actions are perceived to be unnecessary, overly aggressive, or wrong the crowd may react to thwart the police actions.

The third place blame can be applied is to the club itself. Supporters may, as in the case of Rangers support demanding a managerial change, identify the club through the players or management as being to blame for poor play and demonstrate their displeasure. The situation is not, as Ian Taylor proposed, a case of working class youth trying to re-establish their supposed control of the club back from upper-class ownership. [199,200,201 &202] There has not been one documented case in Scotland of supporters actively attacking the club offices or the Board of Directors in an attempt to change the process of decision making. Supporters may voice displeasure with management decisions or try to force changes that they think will produce a winning side. These actions are usually non-violent. The violence involving supporters usually

199. Ian Taylor, "Hooligans: Soccer's Resistance Movement", in New Society, Vol. 14, 7 August 1969.
200. Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology Of Football Hooliganism", in Eric Dunning ed., The Sociology Of Sport, London, 1970.
201. Ian Taylor, 1971, Op. Cit.
202. Ian Taylor, "On The Sport Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in J. Hargreaves ed., Sport Culture And Ideology, London, 1982.

takes place amongst themselves and the police and is not in any way directed towards the club. Once collective action has started destruction and violence can be aimed indiscriminately at various objects, and club offices may become a target, especially of the opposition club. Even though Taylor notes the differences between the footballing and social traditions in England and Scotland, [203] the concept of football being predominantly working class youth revolting against upper class ownership that has taken their position in the club and then discarded them is not the basic reason for collective crowd action. This concept has been, and is now a general illusion; supporters have never had any real control over clubs, only a better relationship with the management and players. In some instances collective action may be taken against the club and its officials by the supporters but this is the exception. The supporters fight each other, the police, and destroy property. Most fans in Scotland support the management because the owners are usually the only people who have the money to put into the club and make it successful.

In the case of both Hearts and Hibs wealthy people have taken control of the clubs during the course of this research. Both new Chairmen have put personal money into improving the clubs' performance on the pitch and improving the physical facilities. In the course of interviews with fans of both clubs, supporters may question an individual issue like the transfer of players, but generally have an overall positive view of the ownership and management of the clubs, unless the playing side is performing particularly poorly. Most supporters recognise the necessity of people with independent wealth to be involved in the club ownership and support the ownership in the quest to create a winning side.

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203. Also see H. F. Moorhouse, Op. Cit.

Once blame for a situation has been placed on those perceived to be the perpetrators of the act then there must come a desire to punish those responsible. [204] Without the desire to punish the perpetrators no matter what the action taken by the opposition no reprisal will take place. This does not mean that non-violent reactions will not take place as most reactions to perceived aggressions by the opposition are non-violent in nature, usually only involving chanting, animated crowd movements, and threats. Even if there is a desire to punish the opposition for their actions the police are almost always able to stop any real trouble before it gets started in the ground due to the physical barriers that separate the support groups. The desire to attack or punish the opposition, and thus remove or destroy the responsible party is a major determinant step which every crowd must pass before it can reach a stage for collective action. [205]

After the crowd has achieved a wish to punish the opposition it acquires a stronger sense of crowd unity and power. [206] Once the crowd has identified and blamed the opposition support for some act it has perpetrated it must develop a sense of omnipotence before any collective action can be taken. [207] Similar to the concept of crowd power that Canetti uses omnipotence gives the crowd the feeling that it has the exaggerated ability to remove the perpetrator. Even if a crowd has gone through the stages of anxiety, ambiguity, blame and the wish to punish, if the crowd cannot develop a sense of superior power or omnipotence it will not act against the opposition. This is one of the main reasons few acts of collective violence take place between large and small support groups. The small support group will not gain a sense of superiority and thus will not attack the larger support group, and on the other side it will not

204. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 223-224.
205. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 107.
206. Elias Canetti, Crowds And Power, Harmondsworth, 1973, pp. 327-329.
207. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 103.

perpetrate acts which the larger support group will perceive as aggressive and thus incur an attack. Fear of violence plays an important role in keeping smaller support groups' fans from doing anything outside normal terrace behaviour. When there is a small opposition support group the larger support group can feel in a position of power quite quickly, but if there are no acts by the opposition to justify using their numerical superiority then no collective violence will occur. It is when the support groups are similar in size, or the visiting support is large enough to be intimidated by the home support, that one group may through formation of crowd unity develop the feeling of omnipotence necessary to take collective action.

Conclusions

The Scottish football crowd brings with it an array of wider social stresses which find a place for expression in the support group. Although none of the social stresses present are unique to Scotland their combination is distinctly Scottish, thus giving the Scottish football terrace an independent identity and creating a unique situation from which 'football hooliganism' emerges. Scottish history, religious, intolerance, class structure, social change in wider society and younger supporters becoming predominant on the terraces, inter-city rivalry, youth sub-culture influences, and the crowd structure itself all help to account for the modern day non-violent terrace situation.

The recurring or continuous crowd of football supporters have long established traditions, structure and leaders who through generalised beliefs based on social stress and conduciveness have become an innate part of terrace life. Although always evolving the football crowd maintains a structure based on the physical facilities of the

football stadium which isolates sports crowds and especially football crowds from other crowd types. The triangular crowd, with the two support groups and the police finds its most common forum in sports and particularly football crowds.

Football crowds are what Turner and Killian called "expressive crowds", [208] in that they form an active collective almost immediately upon assembly on the terraces. The football supporter knows the situation very well. The crowd has social conduciveness, social strain, built-in generalised beliefs that Smelser identifies yet has additional components which make football crowds unique. The football crowd is highly structured, triangular in nature, and its actions are ritualised, [209] which places football crowds in a special situation not generally recognised in the field of collective behaviour.

This type of structured crowd situation is one of the main obstacles to the emergent norm theory as an analytical tool. Within the emergent norm theory the crowd develops its own norms of behaviour, which the football crowd has done, but the development of behavioural norms should take place in each new crowd situation which is not the case in football crowds. The norms of behaviour do not change quickly or from match to match. The outbreak of violence is not the norm of football crowds, it is the exception. Less than one half of one percent of football supporters become involved in crowd violence. [210] Although the development of violence from ritualised behaviour could be viewed as emergent this still does not explain the ritualised behaviour or why on a particular day ritualised behaviour becomes violent.

208. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 102-105.
209. As Peter Marsh noted, ritualised behaviour is important to the supporter and is not seen as anything out of the ordinary on the terraces but this behaviour pattern is extremely important in the buildingblock structure of the value-added process towards collective violence.
210. John Harrington, Soccer Hooliganism: A Preliminary Report, Bristol. 1978, pp. 5.

Despite the overall lack of acceptance of the emergent norm concept it still offers many vital points to the analysis of football crowds, many of which were overlooked by Neil Smelser. In this context Turner and Killian offer an analysis of the historical development of the now ritualised terrace behaviour pattern. The dominant younger supporters have brought a different set of values on to the terraces, and the values of youth have had a definite influence on the behaviour of football crowds. Whereas the older supporter placed little or no value on semi-organised chants and songs, young supporters do. The young supporters created new norms of behaviour for themselves within the terrace setting as the older supporters left for other leisure activities. As terrace activities changed noticeably in the early 1960s emergent norms of behaviour developed. This type of emergent norm is not the type that takes place in the spontaneous crowd, as this norm emerges and disappears with each crowd. In the football crowd norms of behaviour have developed much more slowly. Initially, norms may have developed quickly along the lines of a spontaneous crowd by creating new definitions of normal behaviour, especially in the violent situation. Early non-violent and violent events had to develop new definitions of behaviour because no ritualised patterns existed, as is the case today. The evolving terrace structure and behaviour patterns set standards and precedents by establishing unwritten codes for both non-violent and violent activity. The norms evolve at each and every match, vary noticeably between support groups, and are carried on from match to match, but can be altered quickly to respond to new issues or new forms of control placed in the crowd's way. The evolution of terrace activity tested social acceptability and the police. As new types of behaviour were tested the police, community, media and the government all reacted to a greater or lesser extent. When little control was exercised against an emerging behaviour pattern it would often become an established pattern, but if the

authorities reacted to restrict the behaviour pattern it would often not be engaged in on a regular basis. Once new forms of collective non-violent behaviour became established on the terraces the possibility of violent collective activity increased. Despite the installation of physical barriers, crowd segregation, all-ticket matches, and increased police presence the possibility of violent collective action is now far greater than it was before ritualised patterns of behaviour that now pervade most football crowds were established by the clamjamfry.

Despite the historical usage of the emergent norm approach to collective behaviour it still does not adequately deal with the ritualised behaviour patterns in the modern football crowd. As ritualised behaviour patterns have become established and the football terrace become a place for adolescents to go and engage in unacceptable behaviour Turner and Killian's approach finds difficulty in explaining this pattern and finds further problems in explaining how this type of acting crowd moves on to become a violent crowd. Smelser's value-added concept, although not directly addressing all these issues, is elastic enough to accept the issues in the football crowd without contradicting the entire concept.

While not attempting to test the value-added framework certain modifications have been made to it in order to allow for a more adequate analysis of football crowd violence. Within the hostile outburst concept, the setting in which violence or potential violence takes place is a major contributing factor influencing all subsequent elements in the crowd structure. Social strain and stress are enhanced as a result of the football terrace setting where two isolated support groups are in confrontation over both the match and themselves. By combining the structural conduciveness and structural strain elements of the hostile outburst, it has been possible to analyze the wider social concerns

appearing on the terraces without the repetitive problems inherent in Smelser's original framework. These modifications do not detract from Smelser's overall framework, other than to indicate that modifications are necessary in the analysis of football crowds.

Football crowds, outside Glasgow, have evolved since the 1960s into a social situation where an individual can go and identify with a cause and engage in unacceptable behaviour with little possibility of arrest because the antisocial behaviour is acceptable in the setting. [211] The behaviour on the terraces is not normally violent, just a bit wild and noisy. Individuals can go to football matches and express social dissatisfaction and other grievances in a setting where ritualised non-violence is acceptable, but sets the stage for further developments towards violent collective crowd action.

211. Kurt Lang and Glayds Lang, 1970, Op. Cit.

CHAPTER V

PRECIPITATING FACTORS IN COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

Social factors that influence strain on the football support groups must include, leadership, previous experience, and some kind of precipitating incident to spark off a new episode of collective violence. Very few football crowd riots are truly spontaneous, most occur in response to social strain, the terrace situation, reputations, and learned experience from previous football crowd disturbances witnessed in person or on television.

As the building block approach to explaining collective crowd action proceeds, it reaches a contentious point. The precipitating factor, as Smelser originally designated it, was an important ingredient in the structure of collective violence. [1] In later work, Smelser, responding to the criticism of Currie and Skolnick, [2] reduced the emphasis on the precipitating factor and placed it in the category of a subheading within generalised beliefs. [3] Although Smelser reduced the emphasis on the precipitating factor, it is still of vital importance to football crowds. Even after the crowd has reached a point where they are ready to take collective violent action something or someone must instigate the actual violence. Since football crowds are carefully

1. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour, London, 1962, pp. 249-253.
2. E. Currie and Jerome Skolnick, "A Critical Note On Conceptions Of Collective Behaviour", in J. E. Short and M. E. Wolfgang eds., Collective Violence, Chicago, 1972.
3. Neil Smelser, "Some Additional Thoughts On Collective Behaviour" in Sociological Quarterly, Vol 42, 1972.

segregated and generally kept in a restricted area, there is a limited focus of attention and awareness due to the intensity of the football match as a spetacle. The focus of the supporters is on the match, the opposition support, and the police, in that order. When the focus narrows to the opposition support or the police, then the probability of collective action increases. When the focus of the supporters is limited, an individual act, no matter how insignificant, can be perceived by one or more crowd members as a signal to participate in violent collective action. When this happens, the crowd leader takes the initative, or a new leader emerge, acts on the precipitating incident and takes the crowd, or support group into collective violence. [4]

After observing in excess of four hundred football matches and the ritualised [5, 6] behaviour patterns that exist on the terraces, the question of a precipitating factor is shown clearly to be very important. Ritualised behaviour creates high levels of excitement which can easily become violent and thus there must be something missing from, or added on to, the structure that prohibits collective violence. The missing element is the precipitating factor or incident to spark off violence. Social control agents and individual restraint may keep the precipitating factor from ever occurring, but social controls can not restrain collective violence once it starts. For whatever reason the precipitating factor does not occur, whether this is due to crowd activity not reaching a level of intensity required, personal restraint, or to social control agents. It is the lack of an incident, however significant or insignificant, that keeps football crowds from becoming violent. The precipitating incident breaks up ritualised behaviour patterns, solidifies support group identity, and narrows the focus of the support group to the events at hand and those responsible. Even though Smelser discounts the value

4. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 249-253.
5. see Peter Marsh Elisabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder, London, 1978
6. Peter Marsh, Aggro: The Illusion Of Violence, London, 1978.

of the precipitating factor, once one has occured, some form of collective crowd action will take place, but that reaction will not necessarily be violent.

In the football setting the precipitating factor is very hard to identify, especially at the time it happens. There may be more than one incident that sparks the opposing support groups into action. In the Hampden Park Cup Final riot of 1980 between Rangers and Celtic supporters one newspaper identified the precipitating factor as a ball being kicked into the back of the Rangers' net by a Celtic supporter. This was in fact the signal for overt action, but other precipitating factors brought the supporters to the ready stage. Earlier in the post game festivities, Celtic players ran to the Celtic end to wave and receive their acclaim. When the players went to receive the Scottish Cup their supporters jumped over the low protective barriers and ran across the pitch to watch the cup presentation. This may not have actually started the trouble, but it certainly enhanced the possibility of what eventually happened. The Rangers supporters followed suit by jumping over the barrier and charging onto the pitch to see the runners-up medals presented and the scene was set for violence. The support groups take great meaning out of minor things, but these actions can be the initial precipitating factor in collective violence. In the case of the Hampden Park riot the precipitating incidents followed a three stage sequence. First, Celtic players went to their supporters end before going to receive the Cup. When they went to the main stand the supporters climbed over the barrier in pursuit of the team and a good vantage point for the presentation. Second, the Rangers supporters climbed over the barrier at their end of the ground. Third, a Celtic supporter kicked a ball in the Rangers' net, this was the incident that sparked widespread violence.

Before any precipitating factor can spark off collective violence, the generalised and

hostile beliefs of the support groups must have reached a state of omnipotence [7] and power [8] to react to the perceived action. Even if the most outrageous precipitating act is performed, if the crowd is not at a stage of mobilization ready to be sparked off, then no major violent reaction will take place. The best example of this witnessed was at Celtic Park in 1982 when a Celtic supporter jumped out of the Jungle, ran out on the pitch, and hit Gorden Strahan, then of Aberdeen with an empty whisky bottle. The police quickly grabbed the culprit and forcibly removed him the ground. This type of incident in an important match with a charged atmosphere could easily have been the precipitating factor to ignite a violent exchange between the two support groups. The incident did not cause collective violence because neither support group had reached a stage of aggressive crowd activity necessary to create a mass reaction.

This points to acceptance of the crowd's intrepretation of an action as a precipitating factor. If the focus of the support groups is still on the match then the incident will pass, but if the support groups are focused on each other, then the incident could spark off a hostile outburst. As a result, many acts that might normally be interpreted as precipitating incidents become seen as individual acts of bravado or violence and are generally seen as such by the crowd and the police.

Once a precipitating factor is interpreted as such by one or both support groups, the act can have several effects which help justify action against the opposition.

> "The precipitating factor for the hostile outburst channels generalized beliefs into specific fears, antagonisms, and hopes. . . . The precipitating factor confirms the existence, sharpens the definition, or exaggerates the effect of . . . (1) confirm or justify existing generalized fears or hatreds, . . . (2) introduces a sharp new deprivation in the

7. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 102-105.
8. Elias Cannetti, Crowds And Power, London, 1973, pp. 327-329.

> midst of generally difficult conditions, . . . (3) suddenly closes off an opportunity for peaceful protest, . . . (4) signalizes a 'failure' which demands explanation and assignment of responsibility, . . . (5) one hostile outburst may be a precipitating factor for further outbursts, . . . and (6) a rumor reporting one or more of the above events." [9]

The precipitating event always intensifies the negative image of the opposition support, while at the same time confirming and justifing the individual's own feelings of righteousness in the cause - this further justifies taking collective action against the opposition. Since the incident signals the beginning of some sort of crowd activity it usually closes off any form of alternative action. In the case of football crowds there is little alternative but violence if action is to be taken, because there is little else available for the crowd to pursue except verbal insults to rectify the injustice. Other crowd situations may have the option to negotiate an acceptable outcome to a problem, but that route is not open to football crowds because the grievance is immediate and not negotiable. They must either take action or return to ritualised terrace behaviour.

When "normal" social control totally disappears from the crowd, then violent collective action will occur. At this point the crowd has become an acting crowd. [10] The acting crowd builds on the aforementioned steps, but it still needs additional emphasis placed on certain criteria to go beyond the "point of control". [11] The symbol of the opposing support group must have reached a stage where it is thought of as an overt enemy which must be defeated. The polarisation has developed to the point where violence is seen as creating solidarity between the support group members and the team, [12] and

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9. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 249-252.
10. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1957, pp. 98-102.
11. Neil Smelser, Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, Chicago, 1972, pp. 104-105.
12. Kurt Lang and Glaydis Lang, "Collective Behaviour Theory And The Escalated Riots Of The

the opposition support must be punished. The focus and aim of the crowd has changed from supporting their team to taking positive action to physically punish the opposition supporters. This action is perceived as totally legitimate within the support group by those who participate and by many who do not. Collective action has the effect of reducing the legitimacy of the opposition support and increasing future solidarity because the opposition rarely seems to have lost when the participants reflect on their actions.

Precipitating factors take many forms, both inside and outside the ground. Once the crowd has reached the intensity necessary to take action even minor incidents can cause major hostile outbursts. In football crowds there are three major areas in relation to which incidents take place; play and players on the pitch, individuals in the crowd, and control agents. When the visual perceptions of the opposing support groups are already excited by religious fervor, action on the pitch can intensify the tension, excitement, fear and hatred. If play on the pitch becomes more violent than normal, the support groups will react to support their players and barrack opposing players. Even in the situation of a small clam crowd, violent play can incite the support groups. In most cases, verbal abuse towards offending players is the only reprisal available to supporters, but violence in the form of objects being thrown and physical assaults can occur. [13]

Players actions toward the crowd, especially the opposing support group, can greatly increase the potential for violence. Players' react to support group animosity by

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Sixties", in Tomotsu Shibutani ed., Human Nature And Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1970.

13. also see Jeffery Goldstein and Robert Arms, "Effects Of Observing Athletic Contests On Hostility", in Sociomentry, Vol 34, No. 1, 1971, pp. 83-90.

showing disrespect, especially from the relative safety of the pitch. Insulting or rude gestures to the opposing support, especially after a goal, or at any time the referee is not watching can incite the support group into a frenzy and it only requires a single minor incident to set off collective violence. Since the supporters' focus is still on the game players' actions usually only create an animated response from the support group with missile throwing being the only form of violent behaviour. One player was observed to drop his shorts to the opposing support group on several occasions, when the referee was not looking. This cheeky gesture not only incited the support group into animated actions but was also very dangerous as many types of missiles were thrown at the player.

Individuals can commit numerous acts including; missile throwing, pitch invasions, and support group infiltration, which can spark off violence. Often the acts involve throwing some type of missile because of the protection from detection and apprehension the crowd offers. Once missiles begin to fly, retaliation is usually fairly quick and the terraces turn their attention to the 'aggro' from the game. Occasionally individuals will invade the pitch on their way to the opposition end and be followed by other crowd members. This usually invites a counter invasion from the opposition support so the resulting collective violence can be intense. Support group infiltration is the third style of precipitating incident. Usually carefully planned, supporters wearing opposition colours enter the opposing terrace and, on cue, or when the opposition score a goal, attack the opposition support. This situation is common at Easter Road when Celtic play Hibs since the official club colours are the same. Celtic supporters often go into the Hibs terrace and cause trouble if Hibs score a goal.

The police can also precipitate terrace trouble. If the police make what seems to be an

unjustified arrest, use what seems as unnecessary force against an individual or show too much strength for the situation, they can receive a quick and violent reaction from the support groups. Although previous discussion has focused on support group conflicts, Smelser contends that it is social control agents that dictate crowd response actions.

> "These (the police) determine how fast, how far, and in what direction the episode will develop". [14]

In the triangular crowd - the two support groups and the police - it is the two support groups who dictate the response, with the police occupying a middle ground. The police can easily create a potentially violent reaction by over-reacting in their duty and further incite the crowd by altering the focus of the combatants from one another to themselves. This situation seldom happens in Scotland but is more common in England where there is more open animosity between the police and the crowd. The supporters occasionally do challenge the police, especially if the police have to take some form of action, even in the normal line of duty to prevent or stop collective crowd violence. [15] In Scotland the police have to be seen to act in a very unjust way to incite hostile crowd reactions. For normal police actions verbal abuse is the only response from the support groups. The police can receive a rude animated response from both support groups with a massive show of strength. Even Rangers and Celtic supporters will unite to verbally abuse the police when they march in to provide replacement officers around the pitch. The supporters see the police action as being either an

14. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 17.

15. The televised match between Luton and Millwall in The Football Association Cup in 1986 where major crowd disturbances took place is a prime example of the situation in England. The supporters fought a battle with each other on the pitch after the match until the police moved in to stop the fighting, when the supporters collectively turned on the police and fought them on the pitch for several minutes before order was restored.

obstacle to 'aggro' or unnecessary in the situation. [16]

The focus of the supporters is the vital element to the interpretation and reaction of the support groups to any observed precipitating incident. Although the support groups must have gone through the stages of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and mobilization under the generalised belief in the building block process of the value-added approach to collective behaviour to reach a level where collective violence can take place, it is the focus of the support groups that decides what, if any, action will be taken. In most cases football crowds as a result of ritualised behaviour, are at a level of a generalised belief simply by being in the ground. The question then becomes, why does every overt act of aggression or direct violence not spark off collective crowd action? The answer lies in the focus of the supporters. If the focus of the support groups is on the match then most incidents which could be interpreted as a precipitating incident either are not seen or are interpreted as an individual action because the focus remains on the match. If an incident is not witnessed, the rumour process must alert the crowd to the situation which slows the reaction process, results in distortions which often amplify minor incidents into horrific episodes, and still can produce a violent response. Incidents that are actually witnessed by the clamjamfry produce a greater likelihood of a violent response because they can alter the focus of the supporters

16. At a match between Partick Thistle and Celtic at Fir Park on 24 April 1982, several girls' football teams were presented to the crowd at half time and given awards for participation in a girls football league sponserd by Partic Thistle. After the trophy presentation the girls ran around the ground in front of the terrraces to shouts of "take it off, take it off, take it off", from both support groups. One very well endowed girl removed her top to give the boys a show. To the biggest ovation of the day the girl ran in front of the Celtic supporters only to be grabbed by two policemen who covered the girl's substantial assets with their hats. Both support goups immediately began to chant, "if you hate the fucking police clap your hands", while trying to hold back the laughter. When the two officers returned from escorting the young lady from the pitch, both support groups hurled abuse at them for the rest of the match. The abuse was given in a humorous manner concerning what the officer had done with the girl while away.

instantly, thus providing a quick refocus onto violence. Since the focus of the supporters is the main determinant of collective action, the match itself becomes one of the main controlling factors in keeping the support groups from focusing on each other and producing collective violence. Football over all, is the main point of common interest amongst the supporters. [17]

In contrast to the limiting effect of the match on the focus of the majority of the supporters, this disappears when the match ends or is stopped. The focus can now change to alternative events which can become precipitating incidents. The Rangers versus Celtic Cup Final of 1980 is a classic example of the match having ended and the supporters' focus leaving the match and turning to interpret the precipitating factors that were to follow. As a result, several thousand supporters fought a major battle on the Hampden Park pitch after the match. Since there was nothing to divert the focus of the support groups, the violence spread quickly to include all those who wanted to participate and the collective action developed quickly, was easily maintained, and became one of the major modern crowd 'riots' in Scotland. [18]

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17. An illustration of this point can be seen in the disturbances that occured at a Dundee United versus Celtic match at Tannadice in 1983. During the first half the two support groups were in their normal positions which allows for close contact along the north terrace, the supporters only divided by a twelve foot space set off by high fences. A few individuals in the support groups began to throw rocks, bottles, coins, and other missiles at each other over the dividing fences. While standing in the area where the missiles being thrown by the Celtic supporters were landing, general observations were made of the crowd situation. Many supporters who did not want to be involved moved out of the area while others who wanted to participate moved in. Missiles continued to be thrown with increasing intensity as more aggressive or violence prone supporters arrived in the area and focused their attention on the missile fight. The average supporter only became involved in the missile throwing when a missile would hit them and they would throw it back; their focus remained on the match. As a result of only a minor number of supporters on both sides diverting their focus from the game to missile throwing a major disturbance was averted without police intervention.
18. See Appendix A for a full account of the Hampden Park Riot of 1980.

Indirect Precipitating Factors: The Media

Precipitating factors do not necessarily have to take place in the football stadium. Influences outside the football ground can and often do have a direct bearing on the probability of an individual having preconceived notions to act in a specific manner when in a crowd situation. Although indirect precipitating factors could be considered as structural strains and conduciveness, the media fall outside this category because of the distinct effect the media have on football terrace violence. This is a distinction that Smelser does not make in his work, but is important in the analysis of football crowds because the indirect precipitating factor has a greater long-term influence on behaviour than social stress or conduciveness. Social stress does not specifically lead to predetermined behaviour patterns while indirect precipitating factors can.

The media, unlike social strains, reflect, analyse and condemn the activities of the minority of supporters who engage in violence. The coverage of events by the media brings information of incidents of terrace violence, however minor, into almost every home in Great Britain. The dissemination of information about this social problem may in turn influence further outbreaks of violence. This particular facet sets the media apart from social strain and conduciveness and places it within the area of a precipitating factor in collective football terrace violence.

As noted in Chapter One, the media are highly influential in defining a social problem and demanding that action be taken to control it. [19] In this process, the media can expand the awareness of the activity they wish to condemn and have the effect of

19. Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems As Collective Behaviour", Social Problems, 18:197, pp. 300.

spreading and accelerating the actual problem they wish to curtail. [20] The media can and do provide information to terrace supporters who may imitate [21] the activity through social learning [22] and thus acquire the knowledge necessary to increase the probability of future participation in outbreaks of collective violence. As a result it is important to look at the structure of the media and to investigate how the influences of the media affect football crowd violence.

The Print Media

As noted in Chapter Four many factors enter into structural strain in the build-up to possible collective action. The effect of the newspaper coverage of football crowd violence through identification, exaggeration and stereotyping of football supporters helped build the process of social strain. The identification, definitions and exaggerations of the press created another division within the community, this time over football. The media campaign to control hooliganism plus prominent stories of each new event, helped increase the rate of departure of older traditional supporters, leaving more and more young supporters on the terraces by themselves. Older supporters who left the terraces, due to the changing social patterns of Saturdays and the emerging behaviour patterns on the terraces were left with the newspapers to provide information about the match and the problems of the terraces. As has been noted, the newspapers provide the definition of crowd violence and orchestrate the reaction to it. If hooliganism, either real, threatened, or defined by the press has caused the traditional supporter to leave the terraces the emerging problem of hooliganism can

20. Stuart Hall, "The Treatment Of 'Football Hooliganism' In The Press", in Rodger Ingram, et.al., Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, London, 1978.
21. Gabriel Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, New york, 1903.
22. Albert Bandura and Richard Walters, Social Learning And Personality Development, London, 1975.

easily provoke reactions of outrage, resentment, reprisal and a demand for control of those involved. Thus, for those traditional supporters forced off the terraces through the fear of, or actual crowd violence, the stage is set for a newspaper orchestrated reaction and call for control of 'football hooliganism' which they agreed with and promoted.

The control campaign in this case found a receptive and supportive audience because the problem was real - although highly exaggerated - and of personal importance to former and current football fans. The control campaign was a totally media defined and orchestrated problem for those who had never visited a football terrace, which accounts for most of the public, especially women. As a result, both the average supporters and those who had never attended a football match were receptive to media demands for control of the supposedly increasing problem of football hooliganism because any demand for the control of violence appeals to most people. As Ian Taylor contends:

> ". . . with any headline social problem, it is very difficult to decide how much of a real increase in the reported activity there has been. When there is this greater sensitivity to soccer hooliganism, the police will increasingly be unconstrained in cases of 'trouble' on the terraces, magistrates will increasingly be willing to sentence, and criminal statistics will increasingly be full of 'objective' evidence giving details of the problem." [23]

As noted in Chapter Two, football crowd violence has existed since the beginning of the sport itself. The style of violence has changed as the game has changed. The amount of football crowd violence has increased and decreased due to various social factors throughout history. The current situation is simply one where the media have played an important part in the supposed increase of 'football hooliganism' where in

23. Ian Taylor, "Hooligans, Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society, Vol. 14:7, August, 1969, pp. 206.

fact the amount of violence may not have increased but the amount of reporting has. As Stanley Cohen notes, the effect of media attention to a specific subject can have major consequences.[24]

> "Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereo-typical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the panic is passed over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself." [25]

Football hooliganism has created a moral panic as defined by Ian Taylor. Unlike the analysis of mugging by Stuart Hall et. al. which took place over a thirteen month period, [26] the moral panic over football crowd violence has existed at varying levels since the mid- 1960s, which coincided with the development of the tabloid press. Press coverage of football violence before the emergence of the tabloid press was generally limited to notations in match reports, but became a headline story in the new popular newspapers.

> "The press can have the effect 'of boosting' the very phenomenon which society and the press want to control. If the official culture or society at large comes to believe that the phenomenon is threatening, and growing, it can lead to a panic about it. This often precipitates the call for tough measures of control. This increased control creates a situation

24. Neil Smelser, Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, Chicago, 1972, pp. 104-105.
25. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers, London, 1972, pp. 28.
26. see Stuart Hall, et. al., Policing The Crisis: Mugging, The State And Law And Order, London, 1978, pp. 7-8.

> of confrontation, where more people than were originally involved in the deviant behaviour are drawn into it - forced to 'put up a good show' or increase the wager, up the odds. Next week's 'confrontation' will then be bigger, more stages, so will the coverage, so will the public outcry, the pressure for more control . . . This is what is sometimes call the amplification spiral - and the press has a significant part to play in each twist of the cycle. Press coverage can, inadvertently help produce the direct opposite of what is aimed at - more rather than less of the deviance it is trying to control". [27]

The press, radio and television not only define a social problem and orchestrate the reaction to it, they place information on the structure of crowd violence in the minds of terrace dwellers who in turn become more susceptible to involvement in collective violence. By reporting an isolated incident or series of incidents from the limited and controlled circumstances in which they occur to the public as a whole, the media place football hooliganism in the forefront of public concern. When incidents of crowd violence first appeared as headline stories in the press they had an informing effect, but as the reporting increased it had an exaggerating effect on the perceptions of the public and the terrace supporter. The perception of escalating violence occurred at the same time as changes on the terraces brought on by emerging social and work practices. As the older supporters left the terraces the opportunity of violence amongst the younger supporters increased due to a major form of control having a reduced effect. With the increased opportunity for violence, an undoubted increase in violent incidents and press interest in football hooliganism the structure was set for a moral panic over football violence.

> "It is more likely that media - depicted violence has an undesirable 'triggering' effect than that it has a desirable 'carthasis' effect. This triggering effect is probably only operative among some small faction of the population who have predispositions towards such violence in the first place, and even then only under certain restricted circumstances".[28]

27. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 25.

The triggering effect is clearly illustrated in relation to the clamjamfry. Press coverage of early restricted and isolated incidents of football crowd violence provided the information about the structure of collective action to the clamjamfry who are the group who are 'predisposed' in a 'restricted circumstance' toward violent activity. As a result of increasing press coverage of incidents that had previously gone unreported or reported only in match reports a triggering effect took place. As incidents of violence increased, further reporting followed thus triggering further events and thus a vicious cycle of repetitive collective violence was reinforced by media coverage.

As noted in the previous chapter, communication is vital to any episode of collective violence. Without communication within the crowd collective action is impossible. The communication process runs throughout the crowd, in interpersonal contact both in the crowd and in wider society, and is amplified by the information provided by the media. Even though the media do not have a direct influence on communication within the crowd itself, they have an indirect a carry-on effect from match to match. Even if a supporter is not directly involved in a violent incident the media can define the problem and give a description of what happened. If the supporter was involved in a violent incident the press can redefine the incident and provide information about the incident not perceived while actually involved. This results in a real and media definition of football hooliganism. The press, in reporting violent incidents, defines what 'really happened' to participant and non-participant alike. This in turn provides information used in the communication process which increases the strain on the terraces through sensitising supporters to the problem and thus increases the probability of further outbreaks of collective violence.

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28. Robert K. Baker and Sandra J. Ball, eds., Violence And The Mass Media, Vol. XI, Washington D. C., 1969, pp. 501.

The cycle that develops from media coverage of football hooliganism is collective behaviour reinforced by publicity, which in turn creates an increased knowledge of violence on the terraces, which in turn leads to an increased probability of further collective action. This cycle builds on itself, especially if there is a continuous reference to crowd violence in the press after every Saturday match. With one hundred and thirty league football teams in Scotland, Wales and England, and sixty-five games scheduled on a normal Saturday only one violent incident receiving prominent national press coverage can overshadow well behaved supporters at every other match. One violent event handled in the style of "SOCCER FANS'S RAMPAGE" [29] can reinforce the violent concept of those who occupy the terraces in every ground and give the public the impression that all football matches are violent. This concept needs only one and a half percent violence rate per Saturday to function. The stigma of one violent incident is spread to all clubs. The carry-on effect not only relates to the specific incident but can result in long-running coverage over several days which focuses public concern resulting in a 'moral panic' about football hooliganism. The Hampden Park Riot of 1980 is a good example of this, with newspapers running follow-up stories for two weeks after the event. [30] The follow on effect and moral panics give the impression the football terraces are continuously violent and stigmatise all supporters as being violent.

With a policy of reporting crowd violence, the tabloid press use terms like 'rampage, bother boys, thugs, riot, hooligans, terror, horror, yobs,' and others which present an image of violence. Football crowd violence sells newspapers. By using large headlines and pictures which catch the public eye, and create sales, even the most minor incident will receive coverage. With approximately four thousand league and cup football

29. The Sun, Tuesday 6 April 1971, pp. 1.
30. The Scotsman, 12-22 May 1980.

matches in Britain in a forty week season the possibility of of crowd trouble and the resulting media coverage is fairly high.

Press coverage has another effect which is directly related to the triggering effect, and that is in building violent reputations for clubs' supporters. When newspapers report a violent incident the supporters are identified by their colours and and associated with a club. The reported violence, either real or exaggerated, helps build a reputation for violence which amplifies the triggering effect by the desire of supporters to maintain or challenge reputations. Glasgow Rangers supporters have a very violent reputation. As a result of violent crowd actions in Barcelona, Birmingham and Newcastle the club was banned from Europe. Many Rangers supporters openly admit "we have a reputation to maintain', which results in Rangers supporters trying to maintain that reputation and other supporters often challenging it.

> "The prominence of reporting on 'football hooliganism' thus helps promote it as a topic in the general agenda of concern in the minds of the public. Second, we know we are encountering a phenomenon of very great public resonance when we discover stories which break out of the segregated enclave of the sports pages, and gain a wider, more general coverage on the front page of the paper. This signals that something has happened which links or connects sports with other news . . . that sport has gone political". [31]

The effect of football violence reporting has not only increased public awareness of the subject, it has created what can be called a cycle or recurring moral panic about football hooliganism. The moral panic as noted by Stanley Cohen [32] and Stuart Hall [33] was studied as a singular phenomenon which occurred once and then died away as a news

31. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 18.
32. Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit.
33. Stuart Hall, et. al., Op. Cit.

story. Football hooliganism through cycles of violence, often coinciding with each new season, has resulted in corresponding cycles of reporting resulting in a recurring moral panic. As Cohen noted, moral panics often reach the political arena if the public outcry is strong enough. In the case of football hooliganism, governments of both parties have addressed the problem in the House Of Commons, through government White and Green Papers and through legislation. [34] Most government reports and legislation deal with controlling football crowd violence through physical containment, but have generally not addressed the underlying social issues which cause the problem. As a result, successive governments have legislated over a thirty year period with little effect in controlling football crowd violence. Certain measures, generally regarding safety, segregation, all ticket matches and policing policy, have been enforced, but all they have done is to force the combatants to alter their tactics in a style similar to the evolution of football violence through history. While this pattern of governmental reaction to moral panic continues the cycle will continue, a series of violent incidents brought on by the triggering effect, media coverage, moral panics, ineffective government action, more violence, recurring moral panics and further ineffective government action.

The press has been singled out for much of the criticism concerning the portrayal of football crowd violence. The press, unlike radio and television, send reporters to every match which means that one violent incident, however trivial, can be reported in the national press the next morning. As a result an isolated incident at an English fourth division or a Scottish second division match can produce national headlines when well behaved crowds at larger grounds are not mentioned. Thus one violent incident can overshadow a peaceful Rangers versus Celtic match. This type of coverage can give

34. See the bibliography section, Offical Reports, for a list of government studies and reports on football crowd violence.

the impression that every football match is violent when in reality violence is the exception at every match.

The triggering effect, reputation and the recurring moral panic are clearly demonstrated by the aftermath of the Chelsea versus Sunderland Milk Cup semi-final second leg played at Stamford Bridge on Monday 4 March 1985. After the game major disturbances took place between the rival supporters and the police. Chelsea supporters have a long tradition of violence, and the frustration of being eliminated from the Milk Cup was one of the main issues which sparked off violence in and around the ground. The press reported the violence and on Wednesday 13 March, Millwall played Luton Town in the Football Association Cup at Kenilworth Road. After having seen newspaper, radio and television coverage of the violence at Chelsea, Millwall supporters - having another long-standing reputation for violence - became involved in a nationally televised episode of football hooliganism. The first event triggered the second through reputation, the second episode created a moral panic which led to the Prime Minister calling for reports on how to solve the problem. The triggering effect continued with several incidents reported at League matches on Saturday 16 March. The media campaign in 'reaction' to the violence was swift and effective in that official acknowlegement resulted, but when no further incidents of violence occurred the issue became old news and thus no further stories appeared, no further violence occurred and the moral panic was over, until the next incident started the cycle again. As a result of press coverage after three weeks of violence and public concern, the government did act by calling for fencing between the supporters and around the pitch, measures required under the Safety At Sports Grounds Act, [35] and to introduce legislation banning alcohol in English grounds. [36] The Football Association also fined all the clubs

35. Safety At Sports Grounds Act 1975.

whose supporters were involved and ordered future matches played with all-ticket crowds only. Despite the moral indignation and government action, the carry on effect culminated in the violence at the European Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool on Wednesday 29 May. The violence started by Liverpool supporters caused a crowd panic resulting in thirty eight Juventus supporters being killed in a crush caused by a collapsed barrier. [37] The moral outrage as a result is still being felt three years after the incident. Many accused of being involved are still awaiting trial in Belgium and the British government is still struggling to find answers about curtailing violence- prone supporters travelling to European matches.

The Broadcast Media [38]

Radio and television supplement and expand the coverage given to football hooliganism by the press. While the press enjoys more 'freedom' to print what it sees fit, the broadcast media are restricted in their coverage to being impartial. The press -

> " . . . whose private, commercial character gives it greater freedom to comment - is a more active agent than television or national radio, which are governed by stricter rules about 'impartiality'. However, once a phenomenon like 'football hooliganism' has been widely defined as a 'problem' about which 'we ought to do something', even television and radio can work from the basis of a common consensus about it. They can then comment and recommend without much fear of contravening the rules of impartiality and balance. Hooliganism like crime, violence and acts of aggression against the state, is a matter about which even publicly-owned or controlled medial, like radio and TV, are not required to be balanced. [39]

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36. Alcohol was banned in Scottish grounds under the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980.
37. See page 1 & 2 for a full description of the Hessel Stadium riot.
38. The term broadcast media is used in the American sence to mean both radio and television.
39. Stuart Hall in Rodger Ingram, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 16.

As Stuart Hall notes, the broadcast media cannot ignore a major social problem, once it has been identified, defined and condemned by the press. Unlike the press, radio and television occupy a vastly different position in relationship to the crowd violence syndrome than that of the print media. Newspapers collectively cover every match played, while radio and television are restricted to a limited number of matches each week. [40] The restriction on televised matches reduces the probability of live or recorded broadcasts of violent incidents. When violent incidents do take place in front of the cameras they are broadcast for all to see.

Radio and its effect on the listening audience has not been a subject of extensive research, but the effect of television on the viewing audience has. The results are contradictory, but in the case of football hooliganism certain television - behaviour relationships are evident. Chants of "can you hear us on the box", extreme profanity, and arm waving are common at matches when the television cameras are there but are not evident at non-televised matches. The "I want to be on tele" attitude of generally younger supporters often produces increased incidents of individual bravado and greater possibility of collective action if individual acts are seen as precipitating actions by the crowd. In this fashion the television cameras, simply by their presence, influence football crowd behaviour.

Although many experts urge caution in relating a direct causal relationship between television viewing and viewers' subsequent activity, in this case the relationship may be more clear cut.

"Other features of our culture in general, such as the mass media may

40. The number of matches covered and the format on television changes from season to season depending on agreements between the television networks, the Leagues and the Football Associations in England and Scotland.

> promote acceptability of male violence or make violence so banal that large segments of the population are no longer sensitive to expressions of violence. At least these fail to encourage non-violence. Whether television viewing or otherwise vicariously experiencing violence functions as a catharsis is not a scientifically resolved issue. The sheer frequency of screen violence, its intensity as well as context, and the myriad forms it takes, cannot be claimed to instill firm notions of non-violence in the children who are witnesses. Unless the logic of the assertion that violence in the mass media encourages violent behaviour is destroyed by scientifically acceptable evidence, we play dangerous games with the socialization process of the adult products". [41]

Although informal opportunities for violence in the wider society have been slowly reduced by the police and other forms of social control over a prolonged period of time, opportunities for violence in certain situations have increased as evidenced by the reported increase in football crowd violence and other forms of general hooliganism.[42] The increase of football hooliganism in the 1960s took place at the same time as television viewing increased in Britain, especially viewing of football. [43] The increase in football crowd violence, the changing terrace population, and increased television viewing of football may only be coincidental but the conclusion drawn is that a relationship exists between television violence and subsequent terrace violence.

One effect of watching matches on television is to keep some supporters off the terraces resulting in the 'armchair supporter' who only sees football through the camera and is limited in perception to what is broadcast. A second effect, as previously noted, is that television cameras affect the behaviour of supporters as they attempt to "get on tele". A third effect of television coverage is that any incident of violence shown can and often does have a carry-on or triggering effect for future incidents. Although the evidence is somewhat contradictory the findings of the National Institute of Mental Health who

41. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Violent Behaviour, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 10.
42. F. H. McClintock, Crimes Of Violence, London, 1963, pp. 241-247.
43. see "Football - Our Most Popular Sport", New Society, Vol. 54, 23 October 1980, pp. 171.

studied over three thousand individual research projects into the effect of television violence on the viewer is, "violence on television does lead to aggressive behaviour in children". [44, 45, 46] Although this conclusion is based on general television violence, learned violence patterns from television can influence behaviour when similar incidents occur to the individual in person. [47] As a result, viewing live or recorded football hooliganism on television can have triggering and carry-on effect to future matches.

> "It would appear that producers of sport telecasts are eagerly attempting to satisfy home viewers' love for violence and competition by giving them a 'double dare' - the action plus the dramatic commentary . . . television coverage can out do what ever live attendance things - it can dwell on and amplify the violent aspects of the game, the exploration of the precise mechanisms by which enjoyment is derived from witnessing violence . . . " [48]

Televised crowd violence at any match always results in different perceptions from the participant, non-participant, television viewer, and newspaper reader. The participant may be caught up in the crowd structure or be violence-prone and willing to participate in the violence with internal justification. The non-participant on the terraces may have some sympathy with the cause of his side, but as a witness gains a different perspective from the participant or television viewer. The television viewer is limited in perspective

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44. D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet, and I. Lazar, eds., Television And Behaviour, Ten Years Of Scientific Study And Implications For The Eighties, Vols 1&2, National Institute For Mental Health, Washington D. C., 1982.
45. also see Eli A. Rubinstein, "Television And Behaviour", American Psychologist, Vol. 38, July 1983.
46. also see Thomas Cook, Deborah Kendzierski, Stephen Thomas, "Implications Of Television Research", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 47, Summer 1983.
47. David L. Lange, Robert K. Baker and Sandra J. Ball, Violence And The Mass Media, Vol. 9, Washington D. C., 1969. pp. 376.
48. Jennings Bryant, Paul Comisky, and Dolf Zillman, "The Appeal Of Rough-And-Tumble Play In Televised Professional Football", Communications Quarterly, Vol. 29, Fall 1981, pp. 261.

to what is actually shown on the screen and thus may have a completely different interpretation of the events in comparison to those in attendance.

> "A general characteristic of the television presentation was that the field of vision of the viewer was enlarged while, at the same time, the context in which these events could be interpreted was less clear. Whereas a participant was able to make direct inferences about the crowd as a whole, being in constant touch with those around him, the television viewer was in the center of the entire crowd. Yet, unlike the participant, he was completely at the mercy of the instrument of his perceptions. He could not test his impressions - could not shove back the shover, inspect the bystanders' views, or attempt in any way to affect the ongoing activity. To the participant, on the other hand, the direction of the crowd activity as a whole, regardless of its final goal, still appeared as the inter-play of certain peculiarly personal and human forces. Political sentiment, whenever encountered, could thus be evaluated and discounted. Antagonistic views could be attributed to insufficient personal powers of persuasion rather than seen as subjugation to the impersonal dynamics of mass hysteria. The television viewer had little opportunity to recognize this personal dimension in the crowd. What was mediated over the screen was, above all, the general trend and the direction for the event, which consequently assumed the proportion of an impersonal force, no longer subject to influence".
>
> This view of the 'overwhelming' effect of public moods and the impersonal logic of public events is hypothesized as a characteristic of the perspective resulting from the general structure of the picture and the context of television viewing". [49]

The effect of viewing real violence on television produces an increased possibility of future violence on the part of the viewer. "Adolescent aggression increases with perceived reality of TV violence". [50, 51, 52] This type of imitative [53, 54] behaviour is clearly seen in young supporters trying to imitate professional players, by the fact

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49. Gladys Lang and Kirt Lang, "The Unique Perspective Of Television And Its Effect", American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, 13 February 1953, pp. 11-12.
50. Charles Atkin, "Effect Of Realistic TV Violence vs. Fictional Violence And Aggression", Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 60, Winter 1983, pp. 615.
51. also see Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, 1973.
52. also see Leon Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, New York, 1962.
53. Gabrial Tarde, The Laws Of Imitation, New York, 1903.
54. John Dollard, et.al., Fustration Aggression, London, 1944.

that chants are similar all over the country, new behaviour patterns seen on television spread quickly to other clubs, threatening gestures and blatantly violent activity as seen on television are quickly picked and repeated. " . . . television teaches aggressive styles of behaviour". [55] Not only does media coverage influence the crowd into repeated violence it identifies a place where a violent individual can go to seek out violence thus further adding to the carry-on effect. As a result repeated televised incidents of football crowd violence, whether live transmissions or in repeated news and documentary programmes, have a generally adverse effect in the effort to control the problem. Imitative behaviour patterns increase the probability of further collective outbursts at subsequent matches which reach a peak associated with a general moral panic before receding to start all over again with the next major outburst. [56]

Conclusions

The nature of this study, with a primary emphasis on participant observation, does not allow the scope empirically to test the relationship between the media and football crowd violence, but the systematic way in which this research has been carried out gives strong support to the view that football crowd activity is greatly influenced by media coverage. The idea of being on 'the tele' encourages young supporters to attract attention by becoming involved in incidents in the hope they will attract the cameras and be seen by family and friends for the status this may bring. Media coverage helps build the process of the moral panic by covering as many occurrences of crowd disorders as possible while at the same time, even if inadvertently, triggering off new incidents of

55. A statement by Albert Bandura in "Is Television A School For Aggresion", Center Magazine, Vol 14, November-December 1981, pp. 20.

56. also see Gladys Lang and Kirt Lang, "Some Pertinent Questions On Collective Violence And The News Media", Journal Of Social Issues, Vol. 28, 1972, pp. 108-109.

collective action, at the same time calling for action to be taken to stop the problem. The triggering effect, reputation building, and imitative effect created by the media leads to an increased possibility of collective crowd action at subsequent matches.

The media, through normal and sensational reporting of football hooliganism in many cases, have brought the behaviour patterns of a minority of supporters to the attention of all supporters and the public as a whole. By defining the problem and calling for control of the problem many non-violent fans have left the terraces in fear, thus leaving a greater opportunity for violent supporters to control the activities on the terraces who through imitative behaviour patterns are then more likely to engage in collective violence.

With reporting of violent incidents and repeated analysis the stage is set for a triggering effect on future crowds which in turn sets off a moral panic as an ever-increasing cycle of violence develops. This process is repeated at least once during every football season because supporters are sensitized to the possibility of crowd violence. This results in a recurring moral panic over football hooliganism which eventually leads to governmental action to try to control the problem.

Precipitating events play an important role in any football crowd situation. Both the media influence and the actual physical act are vital ingredients in the collective behaviour process in relation to football crowds. Although down-played by Smelser the precipitating event, both in the indirect influence of the media and the direct influence of a physical act, make it vital in linking the non-violent crowd situation to the violent crowd. By being aware of the media effect on crowds, and by swift, fair action using as little force as possible in dealing with individual actions the police can avert the

possibility of a precipitating event sparking off collective crowd action.

Once collective violence has taken place the media must be encouraged to downplay the incident in an effort to reduce the carry-on effect. Although direct control of the press, radio and television is not recommended, the media must realise the problem that reporting and dwelling on violent incidents causes, and in their understandable effort to control the violence, must voluntarily restrict the amount of coverage given, especially in lengthy follow-up reporting. Since the media are a prime influence in the carry-on, triggering effect resulting in moral panics, or in this case recurring moral panics, this voluntary change in reporting practice will help reduce the imitative behaviour on the terraces and as a result reduce the probability of future collective violence.

CHAPTER VI

MOBILISATION FOR ACTION: THE VIOLENT CONDITIONS

Introduction

After all the stages of the building block process have taken place the crowd is ready for mass violent collective action. Once the crowd has responded to a precipitating event "mobilization for action" [1] takes place in which the rest of the crowd responds and follows the leaders into action against the opposition. The crowd has moved from a general analysis to a specific one. To re-emphasize the value-added framework, the following components are necessary in the mobilisation for action before collective violence takes place.

> ". . . (a) leadership; (b) organization of the hostile outburst; (c) the shape of the hostility curve". [2]

Mobilisation for action in the football crowd takes place outside the ground, inside the ground and after the match. Since the elements of collective violence take place in a variety of situations, it becomes necessary to to use Smelser's framework in relation to the setting of football crowds. As a result this chapter will look into; outside influences on football crowds, violence outside the ground, violence inside the ground and control of collective violence.

Neil Smelser's work in collective behaviour was based on political activities in the

1. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour, London, 1962, pp. 25.
2. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 253.

United States in the 1960s in which crowds became violent in response to social and political stress. Most crowd activity is two dimensional with confrontations between the crowd and the police. Football violence is unique in that the confrontation is triangular in nature; between two support groups and between the support groups and the police. [3] This results from the physical structure of football stadiums with two isolated support groups separated by physical barriers and the police. In addition, outside influences may influence crowd behaviour at this stage, influences that are not reflected at earlier stages of the analysis. As previously noted, subcultural influences, leadership, and the focusing process become important in the analysis of football crowds.

Influences On The Mobilisation For Action

The casuals in Scotland are a loosely organised group of generally young, well dressed supporters associated with each large club who choose to attend matches seeking violent confrontations with home or visiting supporters. Usually without identifying scarves, the casuals congregate in a prearranged section of the ground and attack the nearest supporters of either club. They also run around outside the ground before and after the match attacking small groups of supporters from any club. Because of their youth, the casuals are ineffective as their physical stature will not allow them to attack older supporters for fear of reprisal and their organisation and numbers involved are not large enough to challenge the clamjamfry. [4]

3. Robert E. Park, The Crowd And The Public, Chicago, 1972, pp. 56, notes that social opposition creates competition. This is reflected in the two opposing support groups, and the support groups conflict with the police.

4. Whilst standing in Easter Road before a Hibs versus Rangers match a group of approximately fifty very young Hibs casuals ran up and threatened violence, but ran away again when the leaders were threatened with more severe pain than they were likely to inflict. I was not wearing

In England semi-organised groups use football as a staging ground for violence just as the Mods and Rockers use Brighton as a staging area for their confrontations. [5] This type of external influence can be viewed as another aspect of structural strain, but since its presence is not a problem at most matches it can only be considered as part of mobilisation for action since violent subcultures do not necessarily require the elements of collective behaviour to become violent.[6, 7]

Despite limited research conducted at English football grounds, the indications are that the violent youth subcultures of 1970s have shifted from recognised traditions, [8, 9] to using football grounds as points of confrontation as this lessens the chances of being apprehended by the police. This has developed as a result of police success in reducing opportunities for violence between established subcultures, media coverage of seemingly successful football crowd violence, and the natural evolution and change in identity of youth subcultures. In England, subcultures of violence exist who follow certain football clubs. This has come about because of the long tradition of football violence, guaranteed victims for the violence, and reduced possibility of apprehension by the police due to the presence of the crowd.

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any identifying scarves to indicate support for either of the clubs which helped convince them to go and look for another victim.

5. see Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers, London, 1972.
6. Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20.
7. The casuals are not active enough to influence most matches because there are too few involved. When there are enough casuals at a match, their influence can be significant on the crowd and the value-added system.
8. See Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures In Post War Britain, London 1976.
9. see Mike Brake, The Sociology Of Youth Cultures And Youth Subcultures: Sex Drugs And Rock'n Role, London, 1980.

Although this study is concerned with the structure of crowd violence, subcultural influences are present in a limited number of grounds and may help to explain the rationale behind the use of football as a staging ground for violence. As mentioned in Chapter Four many working class values are expressed on the terraces. Similar values are also expressed in subcultural organizations, especially those dominated by working class membership including:

> ". . . demonstrations of masculinity and toughness, . . . lower - class boys, appear more likely to be oriented towards direct expression of aggression than are middle class boys", feelings of belonging, status, autonomy, fate, excitement, and smartness." [10]

When subcultures emphasise violence and seek " . . . trouble, which frequently involves fighting or sexual adventures while drinking," [11] they often express attitudes similar to the clamjamfry except that football is not the reason for the subcultures presence at the match. The similarity of values between the subculture seeking violence and the clamjamfry results in little animosity between the two and often times means that the clamjamfry will respond to and participate in violence started by the subculture. If a subculture group starts violence, its leaders can act as leaders for the clamjamfry and direct violence towards specified targets such as the police, which normally the clamjamfry would not assault themselves.

Despite the insights given by subcultural literature into gang and organised violence, subcultural identities are not a major influence on the Scottish terraces. Most supporters do not have subcultural allegiances and nor do they identify with or participate in violence unless it is a crowd activity. Although Lewis Yablonski [12] and

10. Walter B. Miller, Lower Class Culture And Gang Delinquency, Journal Of Social Issues, vol., 14, 1958, pp. 8.
11. Walter B. Miller, Op. Cit.
12. Lewis Yablonski, The Violent Gang, New York, 1962.

David Matza [13] have argued that football crowds can be viewed as gangs with a fluid membership and limited leadership, football crowds are much more complex and the explanation of their violent activity can not be accomplished through a subcultural or gang theoretical framework. This is because of the broad make-up of football crowds and the lack of any general alienation from cultural norms. In Scotland, this includes both the average supporter and the clamjamfry. Only where subcultures or gangs seek violence at football grounds do the above perspectives become applicable, however they must still be examined with regard to collective behaviour and how they affect overall crowd activity. [14]

The violence prone supporter is often involved in violence outside the football setting and finds the Saturday terrace situation highly conducive to violence with limited scope for arrest. Interviews with the police and supporters in Scotland, indicate that many well known aggressive individuals, who may or may not have a subcultural affiliation, go to football matches and come to the attention of the police through their leadership of animated chants, isolated violent incidents, and leadership of collective violence. "Many of the supporters we remove from the terraces have previous arrest records for other violent activity." [15]

Gratuitous Violence

Although there have always been a few violent supporters in every clamjamfry, the

13. David Matza, Delinquency And Drift, New York, 1965.
14. This type of research has been conducted by Stanley Cohen in relation to youth subcultures but it is not the intention to examine football crowd violence in a subcultural context, except to note the relationship and its influence on the football crowd in England and Scotland.
15. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, Celtic Park, 1 January 1983.

identification of football as a place to create gratuitous violence is impossible to date, but it is the result of media coverage of collective violence at matches. The actual structure of the crowd and crowd activities block specific analysis of the violent supporter since they only appear as a direct precipitating agent or are involved in gratuitous violence away from the crowd. [16] The difference between gratuitous violence and collective violence can be established by eight factors: 1, Violence prone supporters often follow various clubs looking for violent opportunities; 2, gratuitous violence does not follow the basic crowd structure, building towards violence; 3, gratuitous violence is conducted by a relatively small segment of the crowd, usually without the support of the clamjamfry; 4, those involved in violence for violence's sake do not follow basic crowd patterns of violence, the violence is aimed at individuals or small groups and not at the opposition crowd; 5, The violence is aimed at doing real physical injury to those attacked and does not follow "the rules of disorder" outlined by Peter Marsh; 6, the police are seen as legitimate targets for violence; 7, the football crowd itself is used as a place to stage violence and as a place to escape police attempts at identification and apprehension; and 8, the result of violence prone supporter activities can accelerate crowd activity or be a precipitating event in a collective outburst, thus giving the impression that large segments of the crowd actively support the violence.

Violence seeking supporters are often attached to subcultural or political groups who support violence such as the National Front [17] who are active at Ibrox and Tynecastle.[18] Their actions are difficult to separate from that of the crowd when there

16. For further information on violent supporters arrested at matches see John White, A Social-Legal Approach To Football Hooliganism, Edinburgh Ph. D. 1985.
17. Similar information was found by Mr. Justice Popplewell, (Chairman), Committee Of Inquiry Into Crowd Safety And Control At Sports Grounds, Interim Report, London, 1985, pp. 39.
18. The National Front is active selling their newspaper Bulldog outside both Ibrox and Tynecastle

is a common sentiment between the violence prone individual and the clamjamfry but when there is conflict between the two, the individual engaging in violence may put himself at risk of reprisal by the clamjamfry, including being handed over to the police. [19] In this way collective crowd activity can and is often non-violent, although some outside observers would call the crowd activity hooliganism.

The violence prone individual in Scotland can accelerate the collective process toward violence only if the crowd is at the point where a precipitating incident could be effective. However, most of these incidents are viewed by the crowd as individual acts that do not represent the collective sentiment of the crowd and thus are not supported. At Ibrox, during half-time in a match between Rangers and Celtic a Celtic supporter jumped on to the track around the pitch, ran toward the Rangers end and attacked the first Rangers supporter he found. The supporter was immediately and mercilessly beaten up by several Rangers supporters before the police arrive to rescue and arrest him. Not one Celtic or Rangers supporter followed the individual's lead despite heated verbal exchanges over religious intolerance because neither support group wanted to have the second half cancelled due to their activities. The focus of the support groups was on football, not on collective violence, so what could have been a precipitating incident was seen rather as an individual act of stupidity.

Groups of violence-seeking persons at matches can have an increased effect on the crowds activity over that of individuals. If large groups go to matches to seek violence they can do so in two distinct styles; one by attacking isolated groups of supporters

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Parks. Rangers supporters have been witnessed to give Nazi salutes while singing God Save The Queen, a National Front hallmark.

19. This type of activity has been witnessed at Parkhead and Annfield where individuals tried to start fights only to be set upon by the clamjamfry, severely beaten and bloodied and then handed over to the police, when they arrived.

before, during and after the match and two by antagonising one of the two support groups into collective violence. Group activity can quickly accelerate collective action in response to threats or actual attack. As Smelser notes, the collective process allows for new situations of strain to emerge within a known situation and sharp new deprivations to become apparent, thus allowing those involved to shift their attention and react accordingly. [20] In the case of groups seeking violence, the crowd's reaction can accelerate the collective process very quickly since there is no minimum or maximum time frame for a crowd to take action. If a group attacks the clamjamfry the collective response will be quick and coordinated because of the ongoing terrace relationships between supporters. The resulting collective violence will follow a format similar to that between support groups with those not wanting to participate leaving the area and with others joining in.

The casuals originated in Aberdeen as a generally middle class group who went to matches to start trouble against visiting or home support. They enter the terraces and walk around looking for violence, but only start trouble if the fight is one they can win. Even though the casuals started as a middle class phenomenon in Aberdeen, the fad has spread to other Premier Division and some First Division clubs. Many casuals have been recruited by formal letters sent to known football supporters, most being members of official supporters clubs, of all major clubs. [21] As a result of active recruitment, many members are now of working class origin, but still wear smart clothes, no scarves, and are organised on a club by club basis. They view themselves as representing the tough violent part of the support group.

20. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit.
21. Unfortunately the letter was sent out while research was being conducted in England and as a result a copy was unavailable for this study.

The clamjamfry of any club can identify the casuals quite easily. Celtic supporters in the Jungle often see the casuals in their own ranks or in the opposition support and sing "casuals, casuals, come on in, casuals, casuals, come on in". Since the casuals are usually small in number they will not actively engage a large clamjamfry in violence, but instead attack isolated supporters outside the ground or go to poorly attended matches to start trouble. Just as in the triangular crowd, casuals need numerical equality to make the risk involved acceptable. Since the casuals of all clubs represent a small segment of the support, their activities are restricted to minor altercations, usually before or after matches.

The casuals fit into and follow the crowd pattern, in that they actively join in the collectivity or they create their own isolated group on the terraces. When the casuals join in with the clamjamfry, they often provide leaders who intensify crowd activity by engaging in actions that the normal clamjamfry would not. Through animated and provocative actions, casual leaders may move the clamjamfry towards collective action, although these actions often result in police response. If the leader is too animated in his actions, the police will often move in and remove the individual and others nearby who support him. The removal of a casual leader may meet with general approval by the clamjamfry or be seen as a provocative act. This can intensify the crowd situation through new leaders appearing and orchestrating animosity towards the police. The most common result of police intervention in Scotland, is the tension in the clamjamfry being reduced with the supporters reducing the number of chants and returning their attention to the match.

From personal observations and interviews with Hearts, Hibs and Celtic supporters,

the casuals are not a major influence on the Scottish football terraces. The casuals are generally too young to be an effective force within the crowd and thus limit their activities to minor violence in and around the ground. Although most clubs have some kind of group that call themselves casuals, they are not automatically welcome in the support groups. The casuals claim to represent the club in battles with other supporters, a view not held by most in the clamjamfry. As a result the casuals operate on the fringe of football, creating the odd incident, but generally being too small in number to cause any major trouble on their own. Their main influence on football violence is to incite the clamjamfry into possible collective action.

Influences on the terraces in Scotland are distinctly different to those in England. As previously noted, religion is the main influence on Scottish terraces despite the presence of the casuals. Religious bigotry provides a common cause for many terrace supporters, and influences the organisation of all terrace activities, including collective violence. Organisations like the Orange Order within the Ibrox support, while not as strong the National Front in some English clubs, have influence throughout the terraces. The National Front is also active at Ibrox and when combined with the Orange Order provides strong leadership in opposition to the Catholic community in Scotland. The National Front is active in organising English attacks on Scottish supporters in London and Glasgow, which is an anomaly since they are active at Ibrox and Tynecastle. With the Skin heads at Easter Road, Catholic influences at Celtic Park and the casuals at Pittodrie most major Scottish clubs have some kind of outside organization to influence terrace behavior. Despite the presence of these influences on the Scottish terraces they are not as influential as their counterparts in England. [22] Even without major organisational influences, the percentage of supporters who engage

22. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit., pp. 39.

in collective action is far greater in Scotland than in England. [23]

Nationalism is one influence that cuts across all sectarian and club boundaries in Scotland. Almost every football enthusiast in Scotland supports the national side, either in an active or passive role. Scottish supporters will follow their team anywhere, in vast numbers, to support one of the few symbols of national identity left to them. Club and religious issues are forgotten as the tartan is worn in common cause of national pride and victory. Every May [24] when Scotland play in the annual game against the "Auld Enemy" most Scots unite to beat the English. The tradition of all Scottish travelling support is non-violent. Scottish supporters have celebrated victories on the Wembley pitch, only to be branded as 'football hooligans' by the English press, the Football Association, and Parliament. [25] English supporters have until recently stayed away from the match at Hampden, but recently have caused trouble in Glasgow after the match, only to be dealt with severely by the Strathclyde Police. [26] They are

23. Also see Stephen Wagg, The Football World: A Contemporary Social History, Brighton, 1984, pp. 207.

24. The Scotland versus England match is the oldest international football fixture in the world. Scots set aside money every week for the bi-annual trip to London. Up to two hundred thousand Scots travel to London for the match even though Wembeley Stadium only holds one hundred thousand spectators. The trip to London, the drink, the weekend out, taking the mickey out of the English, and the game draw Scots by the thousands to London every other year. Every form of transportation is completely booked, as the "Tartan Army" invades London. For most, the trip to London is an over exuberant celebration with little or no malice towards their English hosts. As in every support group there are always a few who go beyond the bounds of control and cause trouble. Any trouble involving the Scots tends to be over exaggerated by the English press and exploited by the Football Association, who want to end the travelling tradition of the Scottish supporters by moving the match to Wednesday night.
See John Rafferty, One Hundred Years Of Scottish Football, London 1973. pp. 61.

25. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.

26. In the match between Scotland and England at Hampden Park in 1985, approximately 300 National Front turned up in the Scottish terraces and taunted the Scottish supporters. The police moved in and removed the English supporters. Many of the National Front supporters were severely treated by the police, who 'helped them from the terraces onto busses and back into England'.

influenced by the National Front and have rioted all over Europe in the past ten years.[27] The Scottish support may be over-exuberant, but they rarely if ever get into trouble. [28] If the situation does develop where action is required, the Scottish supporters can become one of the largest collective crowds in regards to the number involved in mass violence. [29, 30]

Despite the lack of influence by the casuals in Scotland, they and other more powerful subcultural groups that appear on the English terraces can be described as a "subculture of violence", as formulated by Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti. [31] Since these subcultures are often seeking violence they can have a noticeable influence on the collective structure of the crowd, increasing the possibility of large scale violence. [32] With the decline of subcultural identities such as the Mods, Rockers, Skin Heads, and Punks, football has been identified as a place for violence, replacing previous areas for staging violence which have been effectively closed off by the police. The subcultural problem is most evident in England since the groups are more organised and dedicated to violence.

The subculture of violence approach may not provide a complete framework for the analysis of collective football crowd activity but it may help to explain why certain individuals go to matches and seek violence. The violent supporter can be part of a subculture of violence or naturally violent in a biological [33] or anthropological

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Personal interview with an Edinburgh Police Sergeant on duty at the match, May 1985.

27. John Williams, et. al., Hooligans Abroad: The Behaviour And Control Of English Fans In Continental Europe, London, 1984.
28. John Rafferty, Op. Cit.
29. New Society, 14 May 1981, pp. 253.
30. Stephen Wagg, Op. Cit., pp. 207.
31. Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture Of Violence, London 1967.
32. Stanley Cohen, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20.

sense,[34, 35] both of which contend certain individuals are born more violent than others. In either case, these contentions help explain differential participation in collective action. [36] The violent supporter and the supporter with subcultural affiliations have "pre-existing orientations and perceive the situation from the outset as one in which certain attitudes and actions are appropriate". [37] As a result of media coverage, football has become a place for subcultures and violent individuals to go and engage in desired violent activity. Since these individuals are part of the crowd they may increase the rate at which the crowd moves toward collective action, the probability of violence, the amount of violence, the duration of the violence, and influence those against whom the violence is aimed. Before the crowd becomes violent these individuals or groups are almost impossible to distinguish unless they engage in animated or leadership behaviour. Consequently they are only distinguishable as the main protagonists in collective violence once it starts.

Violence In The Ground

In Smelser's framework for the analysis of collective behaviour, leaders emerged at this point to take the crowd into violence. Leaders have existed in football crowds starting chants and other non-violent terrace activity since the beginning of the crowd formation. [38] Once the crowd has reached the mobilisation for action, previously established leaders may continue to lead the crowd into violence or new leaders, as Smelser suggests, may emerge. [39, 40] Leaders who emerge to lead violent activity

33. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, New York, 1966.
34. Robert Ardrey, African Genesis, New York, 1963.
35. Ashley Montegu, Man And Aggression, Oxford, 1968.
36. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 93.
37. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 93.
38. See Chapter Four under the subheading Leaders, where this point is discussed.

are often "hard men" or violence seeking individuals who use crowd activity to engage in violence. [41, 42] It is these individuals who often respond to precipitating events and take the crowd into collective violence. Without a leadership response the crowd will not respond to a precipitating event. Leaders play an important role in the structure, organisation and duration of the violence.

The Heysel Stadium riot followed a pattern similar to patterns of violence at the Hampden Park riot. Leaders of the violence from the Liverpool supporters charged into the Juventus support. Taking advantage of poor crowd segregation and few physical barriers, crowd leaders were able to attack the Juventus support on the terraces with large numbers following behind. The leaders charged the Juventus support who retreated under fist and missile bombardment, just as would happen in a battle on the pitch. The leaders and the organisation of the violence itself reflect the structure of the terraces with the violent supporter emerging from the clamjamfry to engage in collective violence. After the initial success of the violent supporters, the Liverpool clamjamfry occupied the area vacated by the Juventus support. The deaths caused by the terrace invasion by the Liverpool support were not the result of physical violence, but due to the panic caused when average supporters tried to leave the area. The panic caused a wall to collapse and the supporters died from being crushed or suffocated.

Leaders or violence - disposed [43] individuals often go to football matches as a place where violence can be participated in in relative safety from arrest. After a violent

39. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 255.
40. also see Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 89-90.
41. also see Peter Marsh, et. al., The Rules Of Disorder, London, 1978.
42. also see Peter Marsh, Aggro The Illusion Of Violence, London, 1978.
43. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Criminal Behaviour A Psychosocial Approach, Englewood Cliffs, 1986, pp. 150.

incident in Cardiff between Cardiff and Manchester United supporters, Paul Harrison interviewed one supporter who used football as a staging arena for violence.

> " 'I go to a match for one reason only: the aggro. Its an obsession, I can't give it up. I get so much pleasure when I am having aggro that I nearly wet my pants - it's true. I go all over the country looking for it. I couldn't sleep all last night, I got so worked up looking forward to this match. . . . Before the match we go around looking respectable (he has a shirt and smart trousers on); then if someone looks like the enemy, we ask him the time. If he answers in a foreign accent, we do him over, and if he's got any money on him we roll him as well.' Having entered the opposition the supporter said, 'then we saw one of our lads - he wears irons on his leg-out on the dock getting his head kicked in. There were only eight of us against twenty of them, but we were beating them till the police came. This scarf I got here, the bloke I got it off was bleeding from everywhere on his face when I'd finished. . . . You've got to keep proving yourself that way.' " [44]

This type of statement is typical of individuals who use football as a staging ground for violence. In many instances football grounds have become a legitimate place for youth to seek violence for violences sake, football is a secondary issue for these individuals. The violence at Chelsea, Luton, and in Brussels indicates an increasing use of football grounds as a staging platform for semi-organised violence. This type of violence is much more evident in England than Scotland, although Scotland does have a problem with 'the casuals'. [45, 46]

At this point in the value-added theory, Smelser uses the concept of "short-circuiting" to explain the change in the crowd - from a passive to an active. [47] Before short-circuiting can occur, the crowd must have passed through all the stages of the value-

44. Paul Harrison, "Soccers Tribal Wars", New Society, 5 September 1974, pp. 603.
45. See chapter one for a definition of casual supporters.
46. The BBC has conducted further research into organised violence and has shown interviews with individuals claiming to go to chosen matches simply for the purpose of violence. BBC 5 August 1986.
47. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 103.

added theory of collective behaviour. The concepts under the generalised belief, responsibility, anxiety, generalised aggression, and omnipotence are exaggerated to a specific belief in the crowd's ability to alter the existing situation. [48] The movement from generalised beliefs to the exaggerated ability takes more than a simple concept of short-circuiting. Fusing of wires in an electrical connection creates a short-circuit, and applying this concept to the crowd is questionable. Smelser defines the concept as:

> "Short-circuiting involves the jump from extremely high levels of generality to specific, concrete situations". [49]

Although the definition is useful to the analysis of football crowds, the terminology is not. The term short-circuiting needs to be replaced with a more accurate definition, the focusing process. Since most football crowds reach a level of crowd behaviour near the short-circuiting level a further development is necessary to bridge the gap between the passive and active crowd. The reason the two opposing support groups do not clash at every match is because the attention and focus of the fans is on football, not on each other. Before during and after the match the support group's main focus is on the game and other issues like getting to and from the match. Only when the focus switches from the match to each other will collective action take place.

The focusing process, does as Smelser indicates bridge the gap between the passive or, in this case, ritualistic crowd to the active crowd. The focusing process can clearly be observed in the crowd at specific times. The focus of attention moves from point to point throughout the match, depending on the activities on the field. Before the match the supporters will focus on each other, but the crowd has not passed through the

48. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 102.
49. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 82.

requisite steps for collective action and the overriding influence is the anticipation of the game so little violence will occur. During the game, play on the pitch keeps the focus of the supporters off one another. While inside the ground physical barriers prohibit easy movement of supporters and help prevent focusing taking place.[50] Focusing takes place when the attention of the supporters switches from the game to one another. This can be seen when the supporters divert their vision from the pitch, or other object, to the opposition support. This is usually accomplished through head and eye movement. As the focusing intensifies on the opposition support, the ability to analyze conflicting information is intentionally diminished as total blame and a desire to punish those responsible intensifies. When focusing takes place in conjunction with a precipitating incident, violent collective action will follow.

The discussion in Chapter Five indicates the importance of the precipitating incident in collective behaviour. If the crowd is not focused on the opposition support then a precipitating act may go unnoticed. When the focusing process has occurred the precipitating incident will start large scale collective violence despite the physical barriers that are placed in the way. Once the violence starts, violent supporters and casuals will immediately go to the point of conflict and those who are opposed or afraid of the violence will move away and simply observe the carnage.

Once the focus of the support groups is on one another, leaders of the support groups have responded to a precipitating incident, the situation usually deteriorates as the opposing sides prepare for battle. Where the confrontation takes place will determine the scale and organisation of the violence. [51] Physical barriers which limit contact area

50. See the, Guide To Safety At Sports Grounds, London, 1976, for a description of all the requirements for crush barriers and other safety features which help keep supporters separated.

51. See Chapter Four for the discussion about the football setting and it's effect on crowd violence.

may restrict the numbers actually fighting and force other participants to throw objects at one another. This is the case if there are fences between the support groups, until they are torn down or circumvented, only a few individuals will actually fight while the rest of the participants are restricted to other forms of violence. End invasions follow similar patterns due to the presence of crush barriers with the fighting being restricted to the relative few leading the invasion and those trying to stop it. Most supporters simply leave the terraces. If the violence takes place on the pitch a totally different organisation will develop. The clamjamfry, along with anyone else who wishes to participate will charge down the pitch towards the opposition support. When contact is made fights will break out between the violence seeking participants who are usually in the forefront of the charge down the pitch. Other participants will throw missiles at one another from various distances and avoid the fist fights due to caution or there is no room to get through to the opposition support. The actual contact does not last very long as fist fights are of generally short duration. One or both sides will retreat from the point of contact leaving a 'no man's land', which is then maintained for the rest of the collective episode. The no man's land provides a buffer between the two sides which allows each side to take turns charging into it and launching fist and missile attacks on the opposition before retreating. These lines of demarcation are maintained through out the collective action and are influenced by the size of the pitch. The barriers which keep the supporters off the pitch also keep the combatants on it; crowd leaders and police intervention also affect demarcation lines. [52]

One major factor influences all collective behaviour, especially football crowd violence, identification. Although not isolated by Smelser as a component of the 'mobilization

52. See Appendix A for a full description of the Hampden Park Riot of 1980 which emphasise this point.

for action', identification of the opposition is necessary in any collective action. Without an identifiable opposition no organised collective violence can take place. Identification of opposition symbols can be in the form of inanimate objects such as building, the opposition support group, or the police. Each of these symbols requires an identifying mark which can include, signs, scarves and uniforms. These identifying signs or symbols allow the opposition to focus its attention, engage the enemy, and organise the violence. Without identification collective action can not have any organisation and thus collapses into individual actions.

Support groups identify each other by their dress. The scarves, hats shirts, and trousers in team colours instantly identify the individual's loyalty. If anyone can be identified as the opposition support, they become a legitimate target for violence. If there is no identification except for the isolation of the support groups on the terraces then little violence can take place because the lines of demarcation will quickly become blurred, preventing any long term organised violence. Even though the support groups are segregated by tradition at all grounds this still allows for identification of the opposition which facilitates ritualised behaviour patterns of singing and chanting. It is only when collective action does occur that the identification factor becomes most important. When pitch invasions occur the opposition must be identifiable throughout the incident. Scarves worn by the supporters identify friend and foe, allowing each side to stay together in collective moves. Without identification, the no man's land would not develop, the supporters on each side would mix and the collective nature of each side would break down.

The identification factor is extremely important for the supporters on their way to and from the ground. When the crowd is not developed and supporters are on their own or

in groups, identification is necessary for attacks on opposition supporters. If the supporters are not wearing scarves, the risk of attack is reduced because of the ambiguity created in not being able to differentiate between friend and foe. Many supporters take advantage of this by hiding scarves under their clothing while outside the ground thus reducing the chance of being attacked. If large numbers of home supporters do not wear scarves outside the ground, visiting supporters may turn their point of attack to shops and houses in the community. By damaging property in the city the visiting supporters have "left their mark". Without an identifying symbol, individuals are generally excluded from collective violence because they are not recognised as a participant. Collective violence against an unidentified opposition has no meaning since no claim can be made by the victors as to whom they fought.

The police and other forms of social control play an important role in the scope and duration of collective violence. [53] The police react to all violence at matches. The police strength and tactics will determine the response of the leaders in the support groups. If the police are ill-equipped, the crowd may turn on the police or continue to fight one another. When the police intervene, they may become the focal point of the support groups. The focus of the support groups can change from one another to the police, if they are seen as a legitimate target. This creates the triangular crowd, with one or both support groups fighting the police.

In England, the police are legitimate targets for crowd action. Their intervention often alters the focus of the participants from the opposing support group to the police. This is influenced by crowd leaders who turn their hostilities on the police when they intervene and prevent the support group from fighting the opposition support. In

53. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 256.

Scotland, the supporters do not change their focus from support group hostility to the police. The influence of religious intolerance, mass crowd participation and police reputation keeps the focus of the supporters on one another. One major reason for not attacking the police in Glasgow may be the reputation they have for long memories and heavy handed retaliation against those who assault them. [54]

Violence before or during a match can usually be controlled because the crowd is divided. Part of the crowd is focused on the violence while the majority is still focused on the match. As previously noted, most violence takes place after the match or after an important goal is scored late in the game. With the game over or near the end, the focus of the support groups changes more easily from the match to violence. Celebrations by one group of supporters over a victory, especially one achieved through a late goal in an important match, can be matched by frustrations of the losing team's supporters.

> "Hostility data collected at the (American) football games indicated that, regardless of team preference and the outcome of the game, subjects were significantly more hostile after observing the game than before."[55]

The verdict on the pitch can have a profound effect on the support groups. The winning support group is happy, they have helped their team to victory while the loosing supporters have failed in their effort. As previously noted, the identity with the team, winning and losing, excitement seeking, and self-esteem, can all be affected by the outcome of the match. Hostility, generalised aggression and crowd structure influence the shift of support group focus through increased frustration after a loss by

54. A detailed discussion of the effect of the police on crowd disorder appears in the following section of this chapter.

55. Jeffery Goldstein and Robert Arms, "Effects Of Observing Athletic Contests On Hostility", Sociometry, 34-1, 1971, pp. 88.

the team.

> ". . . emotional stress in spectators may well be as great or greater than the physical effort put out by the athletes they watch . . ." [56]

Winning supporters or supporters of both teams after a draw are usually happy with the result, unless the game was violent. For supporters of a losing team, frustration may set in and lead to aggression. Frustration aggression [57] can be a major reason for after-match spectator group clashes as supporters of the losing team try to vindicate their team by defeating the opposition support in battle.

> "Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of responses, one of which is and instigation to some form of violence".[58]

Frustration aggression theory is divided over the impact of viewing athletic contests on individuals, but in given circumstances losing can create frustration related violence.[59, 60] The circumstances are directly related to the importance of the match, Cup and important League matches often produce great anxiety and expectations of victory. When defeat is the match verdict, frustration aggression can result if the opportunity for violence is present. [61, 62]

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56. M. Roberts, Fans! How We Go Crazy Over Sport, Washington D. C., 1976, pp. 15.
57. John Dollard et. al., Frustration Aggression, London, 1944.
58. Neil Miller et. al., "The Frustration Aggression Hypothesis", in Leon Berkowitz ed., Roots Of Aggression, New York, 1969, pp. 30.
59. Lloyd Slone, "The Function And Impact Of Sport For Fans: A Review Of Theory And Contemporary Research", in Geffery Goldstein ed., Sport, Games And Play: Social And Psychological Viewpoints, Hillsdale, 1979.
60. Jeffery Goldstein and Robert Arms, Op. Cit., pp. 88.
61. Leonard Berkowitz, "The Frustration Aggression Hypothesis Revisited", in Leonard Berkowitz ed., Roots Of Aggression, New York, 1969, pp. 16.
62. The contentions of Leonard Berkowitz and the others cited are supported by personal observations of football matches in Scotland. General aggression levels are increased as a result

The most common response to frustration is verbal abuse, [63] which makes frustration aggression impossible to distinguish from ritualised terrace behaviour. When frustration is present in the crowd, it becomes an intermittent variable which can have a direct influence on collective behaviour process. As Smelser indicated in his 1972 observations, psychological variables are important in the crowd and its ability to become violent. [64, 65] If the expectation of victory, the anxiety created by the match, and tension are high, a late goal or bad foul by the opposition will increase frustration and help place the blame for the deprivation on the opposition support. Frustration aggression created by a loss quickens the identification of the opposition support as being responsible for the loss. It also channels generalised aggression, helps exaggerate the omnipotence and desire to punish those responsible, and helps move the focus on to the opposition support. All that is needed for collective violence is a precipitating incident.

When violence occurs at the end of the match, the focus of those involved is totally on the violence. For those not involved in violence the focus is on avoiding trouble, watching the events, or leaving the area. Without the influence of the match to divert the majority of supporters' focus, collective violence can become far more wide spread, including more participants, be more destructive, have a stronger organization, and last longer. The violent supporter often becomes extremely aggressive with little regard for human life or personal property. Although few deaths result from collective violence at

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of a loss, especially a loss against a specific rival or in matches of great importance.

63. Jay Coakley, Sport In Society: Issues And Controversies, St. Louis, 1987, pp. 77.
64. Neil Smelser, "Some Additional Thoughts On Collective Behaviour", in Merideth Pugh, ed., Collective Behaviour: A Source Book, New York 1980.
65. Neil Smelser, "Two Critics In Search Of A Bias: A Response To Currie And Skolnick", in James F. Short and Marvin Wolfgang, eds., Collective Violence, Chicago 1972.

matches many serious injuries occur, either through direct fighting or by being hit by thrown bricks and bottles. Peter Marsh described collective violence as ritualistic, the same as the non-violent crowd actions. [66, 67] Collective violence associated with football has an organisation, but this should not be regarded as ritualistic behaviour. Most participants in collective violence in Scotland intend to cause as much pain suffering and physical damage as possible to opposition supporters. The lack of actual injuries and deaths in violent incidents is the result of the lack of weapons [68] and police intervention. Police action to control collective violence often disrupts the organisation and the contact combatants have with one another. This usually restricts the amount of physical damage done because individuals try to avoid arrest by running away from the police.

Violence Outside The Ground

Before The Match

Crowd violence takes place outside grounds before and after matches as well inside the ground.[69] Often violence before and after matches receives more press coverage than violence in the ground due to extensive property damage, despite the fact that fewer people participate. The amount of violence outside grounds is dependent on the size of the travelling support. Clubs with large travelling support like Rangers, Celtic and to a lesser extent Hearts, have greater potential for collective violence at all times, but

66. Peter Marsh, Aggro, The Illusion Of Violence, London, 1978.
67. Peter Marsh et. al., The Rules Of Disorder, London, 1978.
68. In England weapons are more common at matches. On 9 March 1985 London Transport Police searched supporters on their way to see Southampton play at Chelsea. Numerous Stanley knives were dropped by supporters before being searched by the police.
69. During the course of the research no violence was observed before a match.

especially outside grounds they visit. Like an invading army, large travelling support enter a host city and are usually escorted to the match by police escorts in an effort to prevent trouble. Since the focus of the supporters is on the game, the potential for violence before the match is limited in Scotland. Once the game is over the focus of the supporters is no longer on the match and the possibility of violence is increased. [70] Reputations for violence, religious intolerance, inter-city rivalry, blocked access to violence in the ground, and nationalism all influence the possibility of violence outside the ground. [71]

The travelling accommodation, specifically special trains and coaches, can have the same effect on the supporters as standing on the terraces. The crowd, although in this case in a smaller segmented situation, can build through the value-added framework to collective action. The build-up to the match begins when the supporters gather with common identification, tradition, reputation, and hatred of the opposition. This often takes place within the confines of transportation to the match, either home or away. The building block system of the value-added framework can be accelerated by the confines of transportation due to the increased facility for communication, rumour transmission, and expectations about the match. Rumours bring out past grievances over previous matches, religious differences, inter-city rivalry, the police, and the opposition supporters. These grievances can heighten desires for violence to pay off old debts.

Heightened tensions and hostility are also accelerated by alcohol. Many supporters'

70. Despite wide spread beliefs that "football hooligans" do large amounts of property damage, only minor incidents were observed over the course of the research.

71. These contentions are supported by interviews conducted with the Edinburgh Police, 16 to 19 December 1982.

club coaches continue to stop at a pub on the way to and from the match and alcohol is taken on trains by supporters. [72] Under the influence of alcohol, crowd cohesiveness, general aggression and willingness to participate in collective activity is increased. When supporters arrive in a city for the match, the walk from the train station or coach park to the stadium can be long and bring opposing supporters together for the first time. When the support groups meet, running battles may develop. The battles are usually fast moving because the supporters want to get to the ground, so have few participants, and result in only limited police intervention. During these running battles, shop windows may be broken by visiting supporters. This is often done because the shops represent the local team and the city of the opposition. When windows are broken and other property damage done, it degrades the area, the local team, its support, and enhances the reputation of those who do the damage. The damage is not as Ian Taylor might infer, an act of working class youth against an upper class business. [73] Most of the football grounds in Scotland are located in working class areas and the shops reflect the social situation in which they exist. The damage is done to degrade the town, the area around the stadium, and the opposition team.

> "We smash windows just to make the road look like the ground, a pile of 'shite', just like Hibs". [74]

In many instances once trouble has started, supporters will damage property just for the fun of it, and because they are protected from easy detection by the crowd.

> "We just smash up Easter Road for the fun of it, and to show those Catholic bastards Rangers are here". [75]

72. These practices are prohibited by the Criminal Justice Scotland Act, 1980, but the practice continues.
73. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness And Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen ed., Images Of Deviance, Harmondsworth, 1971.
74. Personal interview with a Rangers supporter on Easter Road, Edinburgh, 7 May 1983.

It must be noted, like most aspects of football crowd violence, the situation in Scotland is different from that in England. The differences are acute on transportation and violence outside the ground. In England, the destruction caused by travelling supporters has at times been frequent and often extensive. Manchester United supporters were notorious for the damage they could do to towns on their way to and from away matches. Once Manchester United supporters had established a reputation for damage and destruction before, during and after matches, a contest developed between the supporters and the police in each city to see which one would be successful in their quest. Supporters' trains would be met by large numbers of police, escorted to the ground, closely supervised in the ground, escorted back to the train station and sent home. If the police are successful, only minor damage occurs, but on many occasions supporters were able to do considerable amounts of damage to transportation and property. The opportunity for collective violence and property damage is often aided by home supporters who actively seek confrontations. Defeat of a known violent support group transfers the reputation to the victorious supporters. Chelsea, Leeds United, Derby County and Millwall all have reputations for violence which necessitate a large police deployment and an increased possibility of home support confrontation.

In Scotland, the problem of the invading army style of travelling support has been limited. Celtic, Rangers and Hearts have the largest travelling support. Other teams can gather large travelling support for special games. For most Scottish clubs the tradition of destroying property and transportation has never taken hold, although there are always exceptions. The few isolated incidents of violence and property damage outside grounds is almost exclusively restricted to Derby matches; Rangers versus Celtic, Hibs versus Hearts, Dundee United versus Dundee and Morton versus St.

75. Personal interview with a Rangers supporter on Easter Road, Edinburgh, 7 May 1983.

Mirren. Violent incidents rarely occur on transportation to the match. Destroying buses or trains can result in a long walk home, high probability of arrest, and the distinct possibility of missing the game.

After The Match

After the match, trouble is far more likely to occur. When supporters' groups exit from the excitement and control of the stadium, the freedom of city streets can provide the perfect opportunity to vent anger and frustrations built up during the game. The crowd structure breaks up to a limited extent on exit from the ground, except for units within the crowd, casuals and the clamjamfry. Maintaining a structure combined with new opportunities the support groups often find that the post match exit from the ground is the best opportunity for violence to take place. The effect is enhanced due to the lack of the ground structure, physical barriers and easy police control. As a result, the police deploy extra officers to segregate the supporters groups after the match when they leave the stadium and on their way into city centres. [76]

76. Grounds like Easter Road and Celtic Park offer good natural segregation routes for supporters leaving the ground. Ibrox and Tynecastle offer little or no natural segregation for the police to use. The exits from Tynecastle allow the Hearts support to fill the road in front and behind the visiting support resulting in many bricks, bottles and fists raining in on the opposition support. As a result violence often takes place outside these grounds. Gorgie Road outside Tynecastle Park has often been the scene of violence as Hearts surround the opposition support to drive them out of town. Even with the modern facilities at Ibrox Park, the exits allow the opposing support groups to mix in front of the stadium. Bus and Underground routes require the support groups to cross paths, creating the opportunity for violence, which often happens when Rangers play Celtic. Several pitched battles have developed outside Ibrox Stadium as a result of the supporters crossing paths on their way out of the ground. Celtic Park has excellent natural segregation for supporters leaving the ground. The police can keep the support groups separated along city streets until they reach Glasgow city centre. This often results in fights taking place around the city after the police presence has decreased. Despite the good naturally segregated egress routes from Easter Road, Hibs support have been able to get in behind the opposition support on Bothwell street and chase them onto Bothwell Street Bridge which is narrow. The

Much of the violence that takes place outside football grounds in Scotland is perpetrated generally by young supporters who see violent activity as a necessary element in the general football activities. Many young supporters appear to have the misconception that some kind of violence or property damage is a normal part of going to a match. When no violence takes place in the ground then the emphasis shifts to outside the stadium. Much of the misconception supporting violence at matches is gained from the media and stories of past activities surrounding matches. Young supporters may engage in violence to gain status and fulfil expectations of violence not fulfilled in the ground. The casuals can always add to the possibility of violence after a match by attacking groups of supporters. As previously noted, casuals tend to be young which is one factor in their choice of opposition who are also generally young. Young supporters, using the opportunity of the streets after a match are more likely to become involved in minor violence and property damage. When older supporters become involved the violence and damage becomes greater.

The police are often at their greatest disadvantage when trying to control supporters on their way out of the ground. The police have large areas to cover which allows violence seeking individuals or groups to avoid quick detection and become involved in violence and property damage. When the police are notified or detect the violence, the offenders have the time and opportunity to escape arrest by running off into side roads, through back gardens, fields or anywhere else the police will not likely follow. Often

resulting pile up of supporters trying to crowd the bridge gives Hibs supporters the opportunity to throw stones, bottles and glass, often causing severe injuries. Hibs supporters and Hearts supporters often meet each other in St James Centre, on Rose Street and George Street to fight and do property damage because the police are often not around to keep them apart and stop potential trouble.

the police response is to simply keep the violence and property damage to a minimum by dispersing collective groups. [77]

The trip home after the match is when most of the damage is done to trains and buses. If there has been violence in the ground or after the match, it may be carried over onto buses and trains. If the visiting team lost the match, supporters may vent their frustrations by destroying seats and other part of the buses or trains. This type of collective violence is part of the same collective crowd violence that takes place in the ground and after the match. All the same elements of the value-added theory of collective behaviour are necessary for destruction of transportation as is required for fighting opposing supporters, it simply takes place in a small confined space and the violence is aimed at an inanimate object. The focal point becomes the carriage, which can easily be destroyed by collective violence.

This type of collective action is far more prevalent in England than Scotland. [78] Trains and buses have a long history of being destroyed in England. Without any kind of police presence on most trains supporters often engage in collective destructive action. Once a precipitating event takes place an entire carriage load of supporters can destroy it in a few minutes. Although not as prevalent now, competitions existed between support groups to see who could do the most damage to British Rail trains. Carriages had their seats torn out, windows broken, toilets destroyed and cars set alight.

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77. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police 16-19 December 1982.

78. In the six years of watching an average of two matches a week during the season and travelling on all kinds of transportation, trains, buses, football special trains, and supporters buses, not one incident of vandalism was witnessed. Over the same period several incidents occurred in England. The major type of vandalism against transportation in Scotland involved Hibs fans throwing bricks at opposition supporters' busses as they left Easter Road.

Social Control

Social control is the final element in Smelser's value-added theory of collective behaviour. Social control has effects on all the elements of the value-added framework.

> "The operation of social control, in certain respects this final determinant arches over all the others. . . . the study of social control is the study of those counter-determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect or inhibit the accumulation of the determinants just reviewed." [79]

Social control takes two distinct forms in football crowds; informal and formal. Informal social controls are all types of personal and societal restraints that prevent individuals and crowds from acting in an anti social manner.

> "Social control involves the institutionalizing of respect for law and for orderly means of expressing grievances. It involves the alleviating of conditions of strain which generate dissatisfactions. It involves the softening of prejudice and discrimination which deepen social cleavages. It involves the minimizing of divisiveness among ruling groups in society". [80]

Smelser did not differentiate between formal and informal social control in the crowd, but in football crowds both operate independently of one another. Formal social control is the responsibility of the state through the police and the club. Informal social control operates within the crowd itself and reflects the attitudes of the people, especially those who denounce all violence at football matches.

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79. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 17.
80. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 17.

Informal Social Control

Informal social control is part of every crowd. Each person entering the terraces brings with him or her a certain set of social values and norms of behaviour which are reflected in every person's behaviour and thus by the crowd as a whole. [81] Social bonds [82] are why the vast majority of football supporters behave totally within the bounds of normal social acceptability. Any crowd situation or series of triangular crowd situations where collective action takes place incorporate the breakdown of social bonds or social restraint in the individual through the crowd's influence.[83] There is a direct correlation between the increase in crowd influence, progression through the value-added framework, and the decrease in the effect of internal social control on the individual. [84] When collective violence takes place, those who do not participate directly usually stand and watch the violence. Reasons for non-participation or differential participation [85] include; personal behaviour standards, lack of identification with the crowd action, fear of injury, the deterrent effect of the police, age, material wealth, sex, values, and immediate associates are all major influences on individual participation in collective violence. [86] Older supporters with a good job, female companion, and friends over twenty one years of age usually keep individuals from participating in collective violence. The social bonds that develop with a good job,

81. Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, Op. Cit., pp. 198.
82. also see Travis Hirschi, Causes Of Delinquency, Berkeley, 1969.
83. P. G. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice, Individuation, Reason, And Order Versus De-individuation Impulse And Chaos", in Leon Berkowitz ed., Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, Lincoln, 1970.
84. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 93-94.
85. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.
86. These influences, in some cases can be observed directly, or are conclusions based on analysis of information collected by:Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches; A Study In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 35-57, for specific age group, gender, employment, education, and social class statistics on Scottish football crowds.

responsibility, age, and social interaction create acceptable norms of behaviour which are reflected on the terraces. [87]

The young supporter who has not yet developed acceptable forms of internal social control and those older supporters who have had their social bond development disrupted through subculture identification are much more likely to engage in ritualised behaviour of the clamjamfry. Once involved in the clamjamfry, these supporters are more susceptible to the influences of the crowd process, resulting in an increased likelihood of participation in collective violence. The learning process [88] involved in developing internal social bonds resulting in control can be greatly influenced by family relationships, [89] education level, social and economic problems, [90] peer group pressures, [91] (subculture affiliation) and personality factors. [92] The development of the individual is often affected by one or more of these factors which cause poor development or drift[93] away from internal social control or bond. The intensity and duration of anti-social behaviour is determined by associations with influences that reinforce these activities. [94] Almost every individual participates in some kind of deviant behaviour, [95] and it is the reaction to that behaviour in the form of positive or negative reinforcement which influences the likelihood of further deviant acts. [96] Society may react to deviant behaviour in the form of labels and official sanction [97] -

87. Travis Hirschi, Op. Cit., pp. 18-19.
88. see Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory, Englewood Cliffs, 1977.
89. Travis Hirschi, Op. Cit., pp. 3-10.
90. President's Commission On Law Enforcement And The Administration Of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency And Youth Crime, Washington D. C. 1967, pp. 222.
91. Albert Bandura, Op. Cit.
92. Albert K. Cohen, Deviance And Control, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, pp. 55.
93. David Matza, Delinquency And Drift, New York, 1964.
94. Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey, Criminology, 10th ed., Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 80-82.
95. David Matza, Becoming Deviant, Englewood Cliffs, 1969.
96. R. L. Akers, Deviant Behaviour, A Social Learning Approach, 3rd. ed., Belmont, 1985.
97. Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies In The Sociology Of Deviance, New York, 1963, pp. 33-4.

negative reinforcement. For the juvenile, peer groups of subcultural associates may react in a positive fashion, thus reinforcing the deviant behaviour, which will then be re-enacted at appropriate times in the future. [98]

The football terrace structure provides, through the division of labour, [99] a place for individuals to interact with others who may lack the same internal control - the clamjamfry. The clamjamfry allows individuals who choose to enter the opportunity to engage in otherwise unacceptable behaviour, with full reinforcement for their activities and little intervention by the police - negative reinforcement. This type of positive reinforcement has allowed the clamjamfry to develop ritualised behaviour patterns with little outside interference.

As previously noted, ritualised behaviour leads to an increased possibility of collective action. Although it could be argued that reinforcement of antisocial behaviour patterns in the clamjamfry leads to the establishment of subcultural behaviour patterns, it has been noted in Chapter Two that the overriding emphasis is non-violent. This is because the focus of the clamjamfry is on the match and not on violence. For individuals who seek out the clamjamfry as a place to act out antisocial behaviour, reinforcement does not create a situation where violence will occur at every match which could happen in a subcultural setting. Violence will only occur when the element of collective behaviour have been met by the crowd. At this point; individuals who value antisocial behaviour or who lack strong social bonds will be in the forefront of the collective action. The antisocial behaviour that is part of collective violence may be reinforced through success in the fight, by the peer group, and by the media which results in the recurring

98. R. L. Akers, Op. Cit., pp. 45.
99. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit.

patterns of collective violence. [100]

As crowd violence increased in the 1960s physical barriers were erected in all grounds to help prevent collective violence. The barriers are effective in isolating the support groups, limiting the ability of supporters to focus on one another and by increasing the ability of non-violent crowd members to influence the behaviour of potentially violent supporters. Control within the crowd can be reflected in traditions of non-violence which are created through internal control within the collective behaviour framework. In the same way that collective violent activity is created collective non-violence takes place. Those not wanting collective violence influence the value-added framework to the point that those seeking violence are isolated and are not powerful enough to change the non-violent crowd to a violent one. Reputations for good behaviour are hard to build and easily destroyed. Those in the crowd who are easily influenced towards violence can, with enough numerical support, overcome the non-violent sentiment in the crowd. Non-violent reputations are also lost because the opposition support attacks a non-violent support who then defend themselves. [101]

Social control factors in the crowd are further evident in the differences between the clamjamfry and groups of average supporters. Average supporters, who stand at

100. This point has been previously discussed in Chapter Five in relation to recurring moral panics.

101. The Kop in Annfield, Liverpool is the best example witnessed of a non-violent reputation at work. One Saturday in 1982, an individual in the Kop threw a bottle that hit Joe Corrigan, then the Manchester City goal keeper, on the head. A few moments later a large gap appeared in the supporters with everyone singing "get the bastard out". One lone person was left in the gap with many supporters pointing at him. The police had no trouble identifying, arresting and removing the guilty person. Liverpool supporters may have a reputation for good behaviour at Annfield in front of television cameras, but they are well known for attacking opposition supporters outside the ground. When Liverpool play away from home, their supporters have engaged in several incidents of collective violence including damage done in Wolverhampton in April 1983 and the Heysel Stadium riot in May 1985.

varying distances from the clamjamfry, have a strong social bond and their behaviour patterns are well within the limits of social acceptability. The average supporter is distinguishable by the lack of extravagant dress in team colors and lack of animated behaviour, this does not preclude this group from singing and chanting in support of the team. Generally older, the average supporter reflects traditional values, while the clamjamfry is younger with weaker links to conforming behaviour. Without parental control, [102] the clamjamfry have developed their own ritualised behaviour patterns[103],[104] which reflect their general behaviour patterns in society. [105]

Formal Social Control - The Police

The police perform many duties and services in the community, one of which is crowd control at football matches. Almost universally disliked by the officers assigned, the police are deployed at every match. [106] Each Premier Division and many lower division matches are staffed by a predetermined number of constables which is established in meetings between senior police officers and the home club who pay for the policing. In Edinburgh, the average number of police deployed is one officer for every two hundred and fifty supporters at Easter Road and Tynecastle. [107] Police enforcement of the law and crowd segregation start well before the match. Approximately two hours before the match all officers assigned to the game gather for a briefing before deploying on known routes supporters use to get to the match. Officers are also assigned to watch turnstiles and the terraces. As the ground fills officers move from the street to reinforce those in the ground. During the match reserve officers stand in sight of the support

102. Travis Hirschi, Op. Cit., pp. 3-10.
103. Peter Marsh, Op.Cit.
104. Peter Marsh et. al., Op. Cit.
105. also see Walter Miller, Op. Cit.
106. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.
107. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.

groups before deploying to relieve constables on the terraces and around the pitch. As the final whistle approaches officers will leave the ground and take up positions along egress routes to ensure segregation as the supporters leave the match. These tactics are successful in stopping violence at almost every match. [108]

Although there is no specific statute that defines football hooliganism, the police are responsible for enforcing a group of laws designed to control general anti-social and violent behaviour. These laws include: Breach of the Peace, Criminal Justice Scotland Act, Urinating in a public place, Assault, Assault on the police, Resisting Arrest, Failure to obey a police order, Possession of an offensive weapon, Drunk and incapable, Malicious mischief and Vandalism. [109] Such offences as Breach of the Peace and Assault commonly take place on the terraces as part of the ritualised behaviour of the clamjamfry, but are overlooked by the police. "We can't arrest every one of them" [110] As a result, relatively few arrests are made at matches when compared to arrests for Breach of the Peace and Assault in the wider society. [111, 112]

To assist the police, club stewards, have responsibility for the enforcement of club rules at football matches. Every football club in Scotland uses official stewards to assist the police. Stewards, at one time, were the main form of crowd control, [113] but

108. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982. and personal observation at matches over the course of the study.
109. Fred Coulter, et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 107.
110. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.
111. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 102 and 132.
112. See John White, A Socio-Legal Approach To Football Hooliganism, Edinburgh Ph.D., 1985, pp. 118-138, for a extended analysis of the law and enforcement policy of the police at football matches
111. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1982.

as crowd activity became more unruly the police became more involved. Today the police and club stewards share responsibility for crowd control at matches. Stewards are usually appointed through a relationship with the club. They are generally not trained for crowd control, fire fighting,or anything else. [114] They are positioned throughout the ground, man entry points, exits and help the police watch the crowd. Stewards have no powers of arrest, but can enforce club rule through ejecting individuals or calling in the police. They also call in the St. Andrews Ambulance men if supporters need medical attention.

Stewards range in age from fairly young to very old men. They are given free admission to the ground for their services. Often recruited from official supporters clubs, stewards represent the club and their commitment to non-violent crowds. Younger stewards are often placed in positions where they know individuals who have been involved in violence. They are seen as being more acceptable by the crowd since they can not make arrests, are more lenient, and often have been in the crowd itself. [115] This relationship can have a positive influence on the clamjamfry since antagonism towards the police is reduced. On the negative side, stewards are intimidated by the crowd because of their non-police function and personal relationships with individuals in the crowd. Stewards' main function is to control potentially violent situations before violence starts and to influence supporters on their way to and from the ground, but not to take over the role of the police.

It is police action and its relationship to collective violence which determines the opportunity for the beginning, scope and duration of football hooliganism. The policing of football crowds has a direct effect on the "hostility curve", [116] which is the

114. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit., pp. 25.
115. Mr. Justice Popplewell, Op. Cit., pp. 25.

natural duration of collective violence, or defined as the build-up, climax and control of one or a series of violent incidents. [117] In this case, the concentration is on the specific incident, not on a series of collective crowd disturbances.

The police can have six effects on Scottish football crowds: [118] (1) their presence is enough to prevent crowd disorder, which happens in the vast majority of games, (2) police actions incite an aggressive but non-violent response from the clamjamfry, (3) police actions incite violent reactions from the clamjamfry, [119] (4) lack of intervention allows the crowd to progress to collective violence, (5) police response to collective violence affects its development, organization, and duration, [120] and (6) police action in controlling crowd violence can alter the focus of the participants from each other to the police.

Within these six categories of police crowd interaction variables exist which influence the relationship. The most important influence on the terraces is the relationship between the police and the wider community. If the police and the community or a segment of the community have a particularly bad relationship, then open hostility may result on the terraces. [121, 122] A small amount of hostility always exists between the police and the clamjamfry, but interviews with supporters indicate that they support police activity as long as the police act in a proper manner. The Luton versus Millwall crowd violence is a good example of police community tension. As soon as the police

116. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 257.
117. See Chapter Five in reference to the recurring moral panic.
118. The following effects of the police on football crowds are the result of personal observation and in two cases are supported by other research.
119. also see Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 163.
120. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 384.
121. David Cowell, Trevor Jones and Jock Young eds. Policing The Riots, London, 1982.
122. William Belson, The Public And The Police, London, 1975.

intervened, the crowd turned on them. In Scotland, the police and the wider community have a fairly good relationship which is reflected by the lack of collective violence aimed at the police at football matches.

Interviews with supporters in all sections of the crowd indicate a general acceptance of the police and their activities. The clamjamfry showed the most hostility towards the police, but still recognised the need for them. "If they were'nt here everybody be fighten". "They make sure the game gets played". The major complaint of the clamjamfry concerned the police removing individuals from the crowd. "They always get the wrong person". Although police action is aimed at calming a potentially violent situation, by removing someone from the crowd they often invoke increased hostility. "The bastard police come in wrecken our fun, tell 'em t' leave us alone. We aint causn nay real trouble". Despite the hostility, general respect exists within the clamjamfry for the police. If constables are continually on duty in a support group, members often know the officers by name and speak to them. This is evident in the Glasgow and Edinburgh horse units which are on duty at most matches. Many supporters know the names of the horses and riders. Even the dedicated clamjamfry supporters have been seen talking politely to mounted constables and giving the horses an affectionate pat.[123]

Police actions, both inside and outside the ground are watched very carefully by the clamjamfry. All action taken by the police is evaluated and reacted to accordingly. If the police are doing their job within accepted limits, then the reaction will be within the normal ritualised aggression present in the clamjamfry. If the police are seen to act in an unjust manner, then the reaction will become progressively stronger. If the police move into the clamjamfry to remove a leader, the clamjamfry will react verbally to

123. Quotes are from supporters at Ibrox and Celtic Park conducted over the length of this study.

protect him. Verbal abuse is the normal reaction to police intervention. If the police use excessive force, as perceived by the clamjamfry, the reaction can become violent. In reacting to excessive force, the clamjamfry will usually move in two ways, free the individual arrested, or they will attack the police. Both these actions are a reaction to a police created precipitating incident. By using excessive force - as perceived by the clamjamfry - the police turn the focus of the crowd from the match to themselves and become the identifiable target of collective violence. [124]

Just as police action can provide crowd violence, police inactivity can also indirectly lead to crowd action.

> " . . . vacillation on the part of the police authorities in deciding to utilize force tends to encourage the spread of disorder. " [125]

If the police fail to recognise the activities within the crowd that lead to collective violence, then lack of action to control the crowd may be interpreted as weakness by the crowd and encourage them to take violent action. The police, therefore, must recognise the elements of the value-added framework and move decisively when the clamjamfry is in a heightened state, leaders are present, violent supporters are obvious, and a precipitating incident is the only missing element, to control the situation. In doing so, the police must act in numbers, using the least amount of force necessary, to alter the focus of the supporters from one another to the match or themselves. In most cases, simple police movement to reinforce their men and women in the area will avert the total focus of the supporters from one another and break up the collective process.

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124. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 267 supports the change in the focus of supporter from each other to the police. Smelser's explanation shows how the crowd moves from attacking inanimate objects to the police.
125. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 267.

Once an episode of support group violence has started, the actions of the police will directly affect the development, organisation and duration of the violence. Lack of police manpower and organisation will allow the participants to organise themselves with leaders and followers, spread the violence, and continue the violence over a prolonged period.

> "When authorities issue firm unyielding and unbiased decisions in short order, the hostile outburst is dampened." [126]

Quick decisive intervention by the police is necessary to restrict the violence through disrupting its organisation and disbanding the participants. According to Smelser, the police can use any amount of force necessary to control the violence including the use of lethal force. The superior power and organisation of the police will always quell disturbances. [127, 128] Since over-reaction by the police can cause a change in crowd focus from support group violence to violence against the police, the best form of police reaction is to use the minimum force necessary to control the situation. [129]

> " . . . control agents operate within the political system where the crowd members have rights which must be respected and where the majority of the individuals who make up the crowd respect the legitimacy of these agents. The use of maximum rather than minimum force is regarded as a last resort . . . " [130]

In Scotland, using minimum force necessary has taken the form of officers on foot with truncheons, mounted officers with batons, and officers with dogs. When the police must control collective violence, four main objectives exist.

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126. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 256.
127. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 265.
128. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 261.
129. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 160.
130. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 163.

> "(1) Prevent communication in general, so that beliefs cannot be communicated. (2) Prevent interaction between leaders and followers, so that mobilization is difficult. (3) refrain from taking a conditional attitude towards violence by bluffing or vacillating in the use of the ultimate weapon of force. (4) Refrain for entering in to the issues and controversies that move the crowd; remain impartial, unyielding and fixed on the principles of maintaining law and order."[131]

By simply disrupting the organisation and communication within the collective violence framework, the collective begins to break down, which alters the focus of the participants from the violence to avoidance apprehension. With the interruption of the focusing process the violence quickly dissipates. By using minimum force, superior organisation and discipline, the police should be able to break up collective violence without having to shift the focus of the supporters to themselves. [132] Since the Scottish police are not formally trained in crowd control, officers learn to deal with football supporters through experience. [133] As one Glasgow Police Inspector said:

> "The best way to control a crowd is through humour. . . They know us and they know what we will do if they get out of line . . . the best way to ease a bad situation is through humour . . . The supporters are very funny and like a good joke. ". [134]

Although humour may not be part of any collective behaviour theory, it plays a major role in the police handling of football crowds in Scotland. Humour, together with the effective reputation of the Glasgow police, play an important role in defusing possible violent situations. One Rangers supporter trying to enter Ibrox for a Rangers-Celtic match immediately after the ban on alcohol at matches came into effect, was frisked by an officer at the turnstiles. When the constable felt a half bottle of whisky in the

131. Neil Smelser, Op. Cit., pp. 160-162.
132. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Op. Cit., pp. 163.
133. Personal interviews with the Edinburgh Police, 16-19 December 1982.
134. Personal interview, Glasgow Police Inspector, 1 January 1982.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

This thesis has studied football crowd violence in Scotland using the value-added theory of collective behaviour. Aspects of the football crowds in Scotland, and in comparison to England, have been investigated as they relate to the problem of collective violence in and around football grounds. Historical, social, and analytical issues have all contributed to the adoption and modification of the value added theory of collective behavior. As a result, these conclusions and implications can only look into ways of reducing the problem as it has been studied in the previous chapters. Although many recommendations have been made by government investigations and other studies, these conclusions are restricted to the relationship between football crowds and collective behaviour.

Historical References

In both historical and contemporary analysis, football has always had a relationship with collective crowd violence. [1] Historically, the frequency of collective violence has increased and subsequently decreased due to social stress in the community. The modern problem, may be understood as an intense period of collective violence reflecting social stresses in a complex society. Chapter Two indicates the long history and evolution of both the game and its relationship to crowd activity. First requiring

1. See Chapters Two and Three.

mass participation for the game to be played and evolving into a mass spectator sport, football has a history that coincides with the development of modern industrial society. The development of spectator sports and organised police control reduced the collective input of mass participation in the game and shifted it to the terraces. This does not mean that the collective nature of the public was reduced in the evolution from mass participant to spectator sport. The ability of any crowd situation to shift from peaceful assembly to collective violence is not a function of changing relationships between football and mass participation. The ability of any assembly of people to become violent is natural. Nonviolent crowds reflect social, psychological and physical restraints which inhibit the crowd from progressing through the stages of the value-added framework.[2]

Even though the media have identified football hooliganism as a major contemporary social problem, it has always existed in various forms, and will continue to be a problem in the future. Football crowd violence has changed forms, as the game itself has changed. As a result, crowd violence, to some degree, will always be associated with football. It is only the number and frequency of incidents that can be controlled. Control can be applied through a reduction in social stress and by disrupting the crowd process so that it can not progress to the stage of collective action.

Theoretical Assertions

Having analysed football crowds through the value-added theory of collective behaviour, it becomes apparent the the theoretical concepts reviewed in Chapter Three

2. This conclusion is based on the writings of Robert E. Park, The Crowd And The Public, Chicago, 1972., and applied to the value-added theory of collective behaviour.

do not adequately account for the structure of football crowd violence. Each of the approaches have not only failed to account for the structure of the violence but have failed to explain why most matches are non-violent. Despite these drawbacks, all the perspectives as outlined by Ian Taylor [3, 4] make a significant contribution to the analysis of football crowd violence because they correctly identify many of the the underlying social stresses that contribute to football hooliganism.

Structural theories, relating subcultural concepts to football hooliganism, as presented by John Clarke and his associates, [5] indicate how changing relationships between age, economic conditions, social conditions, the reestablishment of traditional working class values, and football result in crowd violence. These changes have taken place in a natural evolution in which football and spectators have changed with or reflected changes in the wider society. Although Clarke and Ian Taylor base much of their work on preconceptions of class relationships and struggle, football has always been a multi-class institution, with no one class totally dominating any aspect of the sport. Although the terrace supporter may be traditionally working class, they do not dominate the terraces to such an extent that violence can be seen as a class dominated subcultural struggle against the middle and upper class. [6] Interviews indicate that no specific set of working class values are dominant on the terraces or that their re-establishment is demanded by the supporters. Violence that occurs is not aimed at the upper class establishment, traditions, or individuals, it is aimed at opposing supporters. In this

3. See Chapter Three for Ian Taylors typology.
4. Ian Taylor, "On The Sports Violence Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited", in John Hargreaves, ed., Sports Culture And Ideology, London, 1982, pp. 165.
5. John Clarke, "Football And Working Class Fans: Tradition And Change", in Rodger Ingram et. al., 'Football Hooliganism': In The Wider Context, London, 1978.
6. See Fred Coulter et. al., Crowd Behaviour At Football Matches: A Study In Scotland, Edinburgh, 1984, pp. 114, which indicates that football crowds are multi-class.

application class and subcultural concepts have assumed that violence is a reflection of change and stress in the wider community which it is, but it is not a function of class conflict which results in widespread social unrest aimed at political and social change.

Ian Taylor's early work, [7, 8, 9] although similar to Clarke's, uses a conflict approach instead of a subcultural one. "Internationalisation and professionalisation" lead to a dismantling of a "participatory democracy" that existed between the management and supporters. This resulted in the "rump" of working class supporters being left on the terraces trying to re-establish traditional working class values and influences over the game. The history of football suggests that football has never been a functional participatory democracy. There has always been a division between ownership, management, players and spectators. No one class dominates any one level of football, although material wealth does influence at what level individual participation takes place. Supporters seldom aim violence at the club and management, but they chant and sing to communicate their dissatisfaction with the players or manager. In this way the participatory democracy works, as it always has, but it is not reflecting a class struggle to reestablish working class values. The criticism aimed at John Clake's work, applies also to Ian Taylor's work. In both cases the social issues raised are important to the overall evaluation of football hooliganism but neither provide an adequate framework for the analysis of the violence itself.

Peter Marsh's work [10, 11, 12] using a social anthropological approach, views

7. Ian Taylor, "Soccer Consciousness An Soccer Hooliganism", in Stanley Cohen, ed., Images Of Deviance, Harmondsworth, 1971.
8. Ian Taylor, "Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology Of Football Hooliganism", in Eric Dunning, ed., Readings In The Sociology Of Sport, London, 1971
9. Ian Taylor, "Hooliganism: Soccer's Resistance Movement", New Society, 7 August 1969.
10. Peter Marsh, Elizabeth Rosser and Rom Harre, The Rules Of Disorder, London, 1978,
11. Peter Marsh, Aggro, The Illusion Of Violence, London, 1978,

football crowd violence as a form of ritualised behaviour based on masculinity, toughness and territoriality which is expressed on the terraces. Some of the insights noted by Marsh were identified on the Scottish terraces, ritualised behaviour patterns and subgroups within the crowd. Scottish support groups are more flexible in size and participation, not restricted in career orientation or age delineation, and are more prone to mass participation in collective violence when it starts than the crowds Marsh observed. [13, 14] Despite the similarities found in Marsh's work and football crowds in Scotland, violence when it does happen is not governed by rules which prohibit excessive use of force. The lack of injuries in crowd violence is the result of the structure of the collective episode which limits the scope, duration of personal contact, and time frame of the fighting. As with the previously mentioned theories, Marsh does not provide a framework for the analysis of the build up of the crowd to collective violence. Although he does note the structure of the violence when it does occur, the gap between the non-violent crowd and the violent one must be bridged.

Stanley Cohen, [15] used a form of labelling theory in an attempt to analyse football crowd violence. Labelling approaches have general problems in that they account for after the fact relationships between the offender, agents of social control and the wider society. It does not look at what causes the activity that creates the label by defining agencies. Labels may be important in relation to the media and society in their interpretation of crowd violence, but it is not important to the participants in football

12. Peter Marsh, "Careers For Boys, Nutters, Hooligans And Hard Cases", New Society, 36, 1976, (710)
13. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., conclusions support the these contentions about the Scottish football crowd.
14. Also see F. H. Moorhouse, "Professional Football And Working Class Culture: English Theories And Scottish Evidence", Sociological Review, May 1984.
15. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils And Moral Panics: The Creation Of The Mods And Rockers, London, 1972.

crowds. Just because someone wears a football scarf does not mean they are a hooligan. The vast majority of supporters are not involved in violence, are not arrested, so they do not assume the label of a hooligan. Despite the general label applied by the press, football supporters are not ostracised from society because they can not be identified without special dress. Just as in actual crowd violence, identification is crucial to the ability of those opposed to individuals or groups to take action. Without daily identification as a "football hooligan" society can not apply the label and the individual will not assume the label. Most supporters simply see themselves as individuals who support their club at matches, and not as potential hooligans.

Collective Behaviour

The value-added theory of collective behaviour is flexible enough in its framework for evaluation of crowd action to incorporate the positive points made by the above mentioned theories. This can be done without contradicting Smelser's components because the stages of structural stress and strain are designed to incorporate all kinds of social problems that appear in the crowd that lead to collective violence. The one common point of criticism of the previous theories is that they do not offer a framework for the examination of the process which takes a football crowd from a passive group to a riot. Each theory investigates various social issues that contribute to the problem, but none has adequately addressed all these. This results from the restrictions, that arise from the assumptions the authors use. The value-added theory requires that the social problems present in the crowd are both a reflection of the wider society and are to be analysed before moving on to linking them with the actual structure of crowd violence.

Despite the general acceptance of the value-added theory of collective behaviour, certain modifications to the theory became necessary as a result of the research carried out in football crowds. Following the order in which the modifications occur, they are: combining of structural conduciveness and structural strain, crowd settings, leadership, re-emphasising the importance of the precipitating incident, including the effect of the media and the recurring moral panic, outside influences on the mobilisation for action, the triangular crowd, and the focusing process as a replacement for Smelser's "short circuiting". These modifications to the the value-added framework do not make it unacceptable for the study of football crowds. The modifications may only be relevant in relation to football crowds, especially the changes involving leadership and the triangular crowd. The modification involving the structural strain and conduciveness was simply one which allowed for easier analysis of the social problems on the terraces and avoided problems of repetitiveness. Changes involving re-emphasising the precipitating incident may not be of great significance, but it does take on added emphasis when related to the media and recurring moral panics. The changes which most affect Smelser's framework are the psychological influences in the crowd and the focusing process. These two points when combined with the triangular crowd make football crowds unique within the process of collective action.

Structural Conduciveness and Strain

The setting of the football stadium which helps create the triangular crowd is the overriding influence on football crowd violence. This structure creates the opportunity for ritualised behaviour patterns between the two support groups which emphasises leadership, communication through rumours, crowd omnipotence, suggestibility, and

blame being placed on the opposition or the police for existing or new deprivations. The triangular crowd will react much more quickly to precipitating incidents because most of the participants are familiar with the setting and know what to do when incidents take place.

Structural conduciveness and strain reflect wider social issues which are present in the crowd. The crowd assigns blame, or responsibility for grievances on the opposition and uses the opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with existing conditions. Communication in the form of rumours among the crowd, provides a common definition and form of expressing grievances through a collective response in the form of singing and chanting. The major source of social stress on the Scottish terraces is religion. Religious intolerance not only fuels most of the singing and chanting associated with Hibs, Hearts, Celtic, and Rangers but is a major underlying cleavage in the wider community. The communities through churches and civil authorities need to take steps to reduce discrimination in education and employment. Football clubs need to take steps to distance themselves from religious backgrounds. Even though all clubs in Scotland claim to be religiously neutral, old traditions of religious identity are still maintained. Celtic fly an Irish flag over Celtic Park and Rangers still do not have a Catholic player in the first team. Both practices should be ended.

The working class tradition of football in Scotland is still alive, but supporters of the modern game come from a wide cross section of the population, [16] yet the majority are under twenty-one years of age. [17] It is the young supporters, without regard to class background, who are responsible for most of the violence in and around football

16. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 38-39.
17. Fred Coulter, et. al., Op. Cit., pp. 35-36.

grounds. The identification of football as a place for violence has reduced the number of older supporters on the terraces, intensified the number of subcultural influences on the terraces, brought in more violence prone individuals, which has resulted in the increased possibility of collective violence. Age, not class background is more important in football crowd violence. Football provides excitement, the opportunity of general aggression and to take part in identifying with a winning team for the younger person. In doing so football, with its distinctive triangular crowd situation creates a high risk area for crowd violence.

Generalised Hostile Belief

The crowd builds on social stresses through the rumours which create anxiety, generalised aggression and places blame on those responsible and results in a general hostile belief. This segment of the value-added framework is similar to the ritualised behaviour patterns noted by Peter Marsh, [18] since they happen at every match. Leadership develops early in the crowd build -up. The identification of the opposing team, or symbol as Smelser calls it, takes place on the way to the ground and becomes stronger once the first chants begin in the ground.

Leadership in the crowd is greatly influenced by the triangular situation. Smelser's framework had leaders appearing in the 'mobilisation for action' category. In football crowds leaders emerge as soon as a collective group exists on the terraces. Leaders can be continuous from match to match and active throughout the game or individuals who emerge to lead one chant before returning to a following role. Short term leaders are very active in Scottish football crowds and are usually more interested in chants

18. Peter Marsh et. al., Op. Cit.

than violence, like long term leaders often are.

The symbols which make up the identification factor in football crowd violence are made up of team colours and police uniforms. Supporters wear team colors in the form of scarves and other apparel which identifies them inside and outside the ground. Identity symbols are necessary for any large scale structured collective violence between crowd factions to take place. The obvious conclusion from this is to prohibit individuals from wearing team colours inside football crowds. Although difficult if not impossible to enforce it would reduce the possibility of long term fighting between support groups. Without identifying markings crowd action would be reduced to individual fighting or the support groups would combine to fight the police, who are identified by their uniforms.

A second way to reduce crowd violence would be to prohibit visiting supporters in the home ground. Without opposition supporters to create conflict with the home support little or no collective violence would take place in the football setting. The triangular crowd would not exist, the home support would have the police as their only opposition. Although the high cost to clubs in prohibiting visiting supporter entry to the ground might be seen as a reason for not introducing such a measure, the possible increase in attendance by supporters who are worried about crowd violence could offset the losses incurred by not allowing visiting supporters in the ground. The experiment going on at Kenilworth Road in Luton, where no visiting supporters are allowed in, should serve as a guide to the reduction of crowd violence and the economic cost to the club.

Mobilisation Under The Generalised Belief

Once blame for a situation has been placed on those perceived to be responsible, a desire to punish those responsible must develop. In order to punish those responsible, the omnipotence or crowd power, must exist. Omnipotence creates the exaggerated ability to alter or remove those responsible for the deprivation.

This stage in the development of collective action is one where physical barriers and crowd segregation play an active role in reducing crowd violence. Government mandated safety regulations and crowd segregation rules [19, 20] isolate support groups on the terraces. The result is that one clamjamfry may develop the power and exaggerated ability to attack those in opposition, but can not do so because the barriers inhibit mobility. When the supporters have to climb over barriers, cross the pitch, or do some other physical task to make contact with the opposition, crowd unity breaks down and the power to fight the enemy is destroyed. The restriction on mobility may not stop collective action at all matches but it does help prevent the crowd from reaching a stage where a precipitating incident will spark off violence no matter what the restrictive physical barriers are.

Precipitating Factors

Although Smelser played down the importance of the precipitating incident, it can not be overlooked in the football crowd. The precipitating incident or series of incidents, acts as a signal for the followers in the crowd to become involved in violence. The

19. Safety At Sports Grounds Act, 1975, London, 1975.
20. Guide To Safety At Sports Football Grounds, London, 1976.

incident sharpens the focus, deprivation suffered, omnipotence, power and the ability of the supporters to act. In so doing, control within the crowd is lost and violent collective action follows. Since football crowds seem to be more apt to react to a series of precipitating incidents than to a single event, the police must be aware of this process and act to disrupt it. By doing so, the police can control most potential large scale incidents at an early stage by altering the focusing process and by reducing the feeling of power that is developing in the crowd.

In addition to the direct physical incidents which spark off collective violence, indirect actions have a major influence on the stress within the crowd. Social issues can increase the tension on the terraces, but it is often the media that sharpen the definitions of social stress and keep the issue of collective action in the minds of the supporters. Although not mentioned by Smelser, the media play an important role in bringing violence in matches to national attention. The media through reporting newsworthy incidents bring the idea of crowd violence into the minds of those on the terraces. This process, discussed in Chapter Five, alters what Smelser called the "hostility curve". [21] The hostility curve exists in relation to each incident of violence and is influenced by the size of the crowd and police actions. The football crowd influences the hostility curve in two specific ways. First, the duration and intensity of an incident may be prolonged as participants try to out do other recent events. Second, the media create moral panics about "football hooliganism" which then acts as a precipitating factor, or has a triggering effect, for further outbreaks of violence. The hostility curve then takes on a two dimensional effect; the traditional scope of the riot, and the carry on effect as one group of supporters tries to outdo previous crowd actions. This creates the recurring moral panic in which a series of violent incidents occur. This relationship is extremely

21. Neil Smelser, Theory Of Collective Behaviour, London, 1962, pp. 257.

important to the control of football crowd violence. Media coverage in the form of sensational headlines and repeated stories of incidents needs to be played down in order to prohibit coverage from becoming a precipitating incident for future violence. In the same way, good behaviour needs to be rewarded by the media, as a precipitating factor in future non-violence at matches. [22, 23]

Mobilisation For Action

Influences on the mobilisation for action step in the value added framework are important to any collectivity. In this case the casuals, subcultural groups, and psychological factors all influence individuals or groups of individuals to seek violence in the crowd setting. This speeds up the value-added process and increases the probability of collective violence. Outside influences are present in all collective behaviour situations. In the case of football crowds, the ongoing collective nature of the terrace environment attracts those who seek violence. Violence prone individuals, subcultures, and psychological factors such as frustration aggression, all contribute to the collective mood of any crowd. Although difficult if not impossible to measure, their effect can not be overlooked.

The focusing process, as a replacement for Smelser's concept of short circuiting, relies not on an abstract change in the crowd from passive to active, but on an identifiable change in the crowd based on observable individual and crowd actions. During the game most of the supporters can be observed following the play on the pitch through head movements. When head movements stop following the match and move to the

22. See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory, Englewood Cliffs, 1977, whose concepts support this point.
23. See R. L. Akers, Deviant Behaviour: A Social Learning Approach, 3rd. ed., Belmont 1985, whose concepts support this point.

opposition support for any prolonged period, focusing has occurred. Focussing narrows the perception of the individual by reducing the awareness of conflicting stimuli, (conflicting stimuli are never completely removed from the individual's perception) and increases the concentration on one specific object. This process includes the concepts Smelser mentions of crowd omnipotence, power and the ability to alter states of perceived deprivations. Once focussing has occurred, a precipitating incident will spark large scale collective action, if a crowd leader makes the first move in response. The police must be aware of the focusing process. Once focusing occurs the police should be able to distract the support groups from focusing on one another, even if this means getting the support groups to focus on them.

The triangular crowd, is made up of the two support groups and the police. The third component, the police, are left in a unique position in relation to crowds. Usually they stand in direct opposition to crowd objectives, but in this situation they occupy a centre ground and try to keep the support groups apart. As a result they are seldom the focus of support group violence, and their sole purpose is usually to maintain control over the support groups. In doing so the police must keep the support groups from focusing on one another, even if this means having supporters focus their attentions on them.

The police in Scotland are generally very effective in controlling football crowds. Their tactics and reputation keep them from becoming targets for attack. When responding to collective violence the police must be careful not to be perceived to use excessive force or be so lenient that the supporters will assume that they can continue in their activities. This requires a firm but fair hand, since excessive force can lead to the support groups turning on the police, and not enough force can lead to continued collective violence.

One of the major side-effects of controlling violence in the ground is its moving outside. Physical barriers, closed circuit television and the police have eliminated most opportunities for easy contact between the support groups. As a result more violence may occur after matches, outside grounds when control is more limited. Violence prone supporters and the clamjamfry having passed through the stages of the value-added theory may simply have to wait until they are outside the ground in city streets to participate in collective violence. The time it takes for the crowd to move out of the stadium disrupts its collective nature, thus reducing the numbers likely to participate in violence, but does not restrict the probability of its happening. Since control of violence outside the stadium is more difficult and property damage usually occurs, it may be better to allow collective violence to happen inside the ground, if it happens at all. Control of violence inside the ground is much easier because of the confines of the stadium which the police can use to their advantage.

The triangular crowd which influences leadership, precipitating factors, and the focusing process are all modifications to the value-added theory of collective behaviour. These modifications indicate why every form of collective crowd action must be studied individually within the social and physical setting where they occur. The modifications cited here may not be applicable elsewhere, but they are important to football crowds and go some way into understanding the nature of football hooliganism.

The very nature of football, where fans are attracted to watch a sporting contest in large partisan numbers, standing in close proximity on terraces creates the ideal situation for collective violence to occur. The supporters are encouraged to identify with the team and shout their support for the players, it is only natural that the support groups come

into conflict with each other. The structure of the game throughout its history has created conflict between large numbers of people. This adds to the possibility of collective behaviour amongst those involved in the crowd. As a result collective violence has existed in some form throughout the history of football, only the nature of the violence has changed as the game itself has changed. The modern problem is simply an extension of a phenomenon which is natural, collective behaviour. The problem has developed in a more complex form in the past three decades reflecting a more complex society.

APPENDIX A

CASE STUDIES OF OBSERVED VIOLENCE AT FOOTBALL MATCHES

Introduction

During the course of this study, three hundred matches were observed, but violence was only witnessed at ten matches. This chapter presents case studies of several of the matches where violence was observed. In most cases the violence was generally minor and dealt with by the police very quickly. The one major exception to this pattern was witnessed at Hampden Park at the Scottish Cup Final of 1980. This one event triggered off a media blitz of publicity about the 'riot' and led indirectly to the Criminal Justice Scotland Act 1980 containing legislation banning the bringing of alcohol, bottles or cans into any designated sports grounds in Scotland. The legislation also prohibited intoxicated individuals from being admitted to football grounds. [1] The Hampden Park riot was the single largest incident of crowd violence witnessed or that occurred in Scotland during the course of this study and therefore, maybe somewhat unrepresentative of every match and of the forms of violence that do take place, but it does represent the potential for large scale participation in collective violence which could happen at any match. [2]

1. See the Criminal Justice Scotland Act, 1980
2. I arrived at Hampden Park a little before the advertised opening of one o'clock. With a ticket I was sent by the Scottish Football Association, I entered the Celtic end. I stood away from the clamjamfry in the average Celtic supporters. My position provided a good view of the Celtic and Rangers ends plus the pitch. I remained in the same position throughout the match and for the fighting afterwards. After the pitch was cleared I moved out of Hampden Park which led directly into no man's land of the street fight, so I moved back inside the stadium and climbed up

Glasgow Rangers versus Glasgow Celtic:

Scottish Cup Final,

Hampden Park, Glasgow: Saturday 10 May 1980

"WAR - IN THE CENTRE CIRCLE"

"A Pitched battle was fought at Hampden Park yesterday - minutes after the end of the Scottish Cup Final.

Thousands of rival Old Firm fans poured on the field and clashed at the centre circle.

Dozens were injured as they fought with bottles, sticks, flags and stones.

Bottles and cans rained from the terracing on fighting supporters.

Police attempting to break up the fighting, sustained several casualties.

Four Officers were taken to hospital, one seriously injured.

The trouble started as the final whistle blew with Celtic 1-0 winners after half hour of extra time.

Celtic players ran to the east terracing - the 'Celtic' end - to greet their supporters.

Hundreds of fans poured over the protective fences to join the team on the park.

But, after the cup had been presented, Celtic fans ran to the Rangers end, where they sang and gesticulated at their rivals.

One fan kicked a ball into the net where Celtic had scored the winning goal. That was the signal for a counter-charge by Rangers fans.

They poured onto the park. Celtic fans retreated to the centre line, where a pitched battle was fought.

Police were outnumbered at least 10-1, as they tried in vain to separate the rival supporters.

Finally, six mounted police charge onto the field.

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on the back bank of the earthen terraces and stood beside several young Celtic supporters who were throwing chunks of concrete and earth at Rangers supporters in the street. After the police broke up the street fight, I walked through several side streets to look for further trouble but found none.

As they did so, one of the horses swerved to avoid a group of fans, and a policeman was trampled underfoot. He was carried unconscious from the field.

The mounted police drew their batons and charged through the middle of the mob, splitting it in two.

210 ARRESTS

They were joined by six more mounties, including three police women...

Having split the fans, they charged the Celtic supporters, driving them back over the wall into their own terracing. Then they did the same to the Rangers supporters at the other end.

With relative calm inside the ground, a fleet of ambulances carried the injured to the Victoria Infirmary.

Sporadic fighting went on in the streets around the ground, as opposing fans met.

Last night police said 210 people had been arrested - about 160 in or around Hampden and the other 50 elsewhere in the City.

A police spokesman, Chief Inspector Ian McKie said over 300 police had been on duty in and around the ground.

'They did as good a job as possible in the circumstances. I have never seen anything like it. It was the quietest final on record up till the final whistle'..."[3]

Upon arriving at Hampden Park via British Rail from Central Station with dozens of scarf-clad supporters, all the gates were found closed and locked. The pipe band could be heard on the pitch as the advertised opening of one o'clock came and passed without the turnstiles admitting any of the growing number of spectators queueing at their respective gates. Hundreds of Rangers and Celtic fans waited with growing hostility towards one another and the late gate opening. By 1.25 p.m. the police finally appeared and took up positions at each major section of turnstiles. Finally, after a thirty-five minute delay, the turnstiles opened and the onslaught of spectators began to

3. The Sunday Post, 11 May 1980, p. 1.

pour into the old dilapidated terracing of Hampden Park.

As soon as the first partisan spectators began to fill the terraces, the green and white of Celtic and the blue and white of Rangers were clearly segregated to opposite ends of the old stadium. Thousands of partisan scarf-clad spectators flocked into the terraces and began to sing and chant support for their teams. The bagpipe band and later an American high school marching band had very little effect in controlling the chants or songs; the participants only sang louder to drown out the music. This was especially true of the Rangers end who enjoyed the value of the covered terrace.

The chants and songs grew in intensity as the crowd grew to the limit of 80,000. Both ends chanted, sang, waved banners and drank various kinds of alcohol continuously, building to a pre-kick-off climax. The terraces became a sea of tightly packed supporters. As the numbers grew, the threatening chants increased, Rangers supporters, using the full value of their enclosed end, sang "God Save The Queen", a direct reference to the Catholic-Protestant problem in Northern Ireland. The Celtic end immediately replied with a chorus of "You Will Never Walk Alone", and the Irish anthem, a direct reference to Irish Republican Army tactics against British troops in Northern Ireland. No matter how loud the American marching band played, they were barely able to compete with the constant noise of the ends.

As the sunny day continued to warm the spirits of the hopeful fans, alcohol was being consumed in great amounts by supporters in both ends. Many spectators entered the terracing having consumed great amounts of wine, whisky and or beer. Great numbers of bottles and cans full of the favourite intoxicating beverage of the day were being

passed around, to the delight of all. The consumption of great amounts of drink lent another important aspect to the atmosphere at each end.

With the slow approach of the three o'clock kick-off the crowd began to grow tired of the American High School marching band. With numerous shouts of profanity at the band, the time dragged on. Finally the players appeared, still in suits, to test the pitch. The teams drew respective cheering, boos and whistling as they appeared. The teams' appearance added to the intensity of the chants and singing at both ends. Each end taunted and responded to each insult or self-homage emanating from the opposite end.

Finally the time was near. The stands and terraces were full, the chants loud, and a small brass band marched down the track to a position in front of the players' entrance to the pitch. With a great cheer from each end, the players appeared and walked out onto the pitch, turned and faced the large stand. As soon as the players were in position, the Celtic end began to whistle, boo, and do everything possible to drown out the small brass band playing "God Save The Queen". As the band began to play, the Rangers supporters took up the words in direct opposition to the Celtic end. The small band was hopelessly drowned out in a sea of opposing noise.

The bands left the pitch and the players began to warm up. The referee moved to the centre of the pitch and summoned the respective team captains. The coin was tossed and each team defended the goal in front of their supporters. With great cheering, chants and songs, the game began, the supporters urging their teams on to victory. As the intensity of play increased, the noise level decreased. Only in slow periods did the supporters increase the noise level and chants. The ball was played back and forth, back and forth, but after forty-five minutes neither team had scored. As the sides left

the field for half-time, the ends again carried on vociferous chants and songs in support of their teams.

The American marching band reappeared on the pitch. Some watched the show, but most drank what was left of the alcohol and chanted and sang songs of self-eminence, personal superiority, and degradation and hatred of the opposition. As the long half-time dragged on, more and more shouts of vulgarity could be heard as the spectators grew impatient for the teams to return to the arena.

The alcohol was having a profound effect on many of the spectators. Many of the fans had consumed far too much of their favourite booze and were stumbling around and occasionally falling down, which caused several injuries. These injuries were keeping the first-aid teams on the pitch behind the goals busy, treating minor cuts and scrapes. The major result of the alcohol was a great need for the majority of the participants to urinate. With poor public convenience facilities and the drunken spectators' desire not to miss anything on the pitch, the aisles became an open urinal. Many beer cans were filled and emptied, but as the aim began to deteriorate and the need to go increased, the aisles were surrounded by urinating spectators. The lower aisles became rivers of alcohol-laced urine flowing down to the barrier surrounding the pitch.

The players finally reappeared to a tremendous welcome from each end and the American marching band finally left the field. The teams lined up for the second half kick-off with each end shouting support for their team. The teams moved up and down the pitch creating numerous goal-scoring opportunities, but each time the defences turned the attackers away. The partisan chanting decreased as the intensity of the game again escalated. Both ends were tense with fear and hope as the fortunes of their

respective teams constantly changed. Only during slow points in the contest did the supporters revert to chants and singing. No matter who started the first hostile chant, it was immediately answered by the opposite end. As the ball was kicked up and down the pitch, great groans would emit from the end of supporters as a shot was taken by their team, but went wide of the goal, then a round of applause for the player who took the shot. Goalkeepers were also applauded for saves by their respective fans. As usual, the referee took the brunt of the abuse. No matter how the call went, the referee was wrong in someone's eyes and the supporters let the referee know about it with whistling and booing. After a second forty-five minutes of hard play, neither team had scored a goal. So with a great roar of approval from the combined spectators for the previous ninety minutes in preparation for thirty minutes of extra time.

The five minutes of rest for the players provided a break in the anxiety for each end, which resulted in chants and songs from everyone involved. The chants gained in intensity with the realization that a goal by either team in extra time would probably win the game. Each end shouted support to the players who remained on the pitch during the short break.

The first-aid crews at each end of the pitch were busy treating the drunken supporters who were injured in the terracing. Many fell due to the amount of drink, others were felled by punches, some stumbled while negotiating the stairs and a couple were hit by flying bottles. The unfortunate victim would be passed down to the barrier surrounding the field. Two stretcher bearing members of the first-aid crew would meet the victim at one of the gates through the barrier on to the pitch. A police constable would open the gate and the victim would walk if possible or be placed on a stretcher

by other helpful spectators and be passed through the gate and taken to the pitch for treatment. Most of the treatment was minor, requiring only a little disinfectant and a bandage. Some of the victims were taken to waiting ambulances and transported to a local hospital. Many of the victims after being brought out onto the terraces on a stretcher would vomit as a result of being treated if necessary, and then stagger to their feet and return to the terraces, a hero, especially if they took the opportunity to wave a partisan scarf whilst on the pitch.

The police had maintained a noticeable, but not overbearing presence in each end. Between ten and fifteen officers were always in evidence on the track between the pitch and the terraces. There was also a contingent of officers on the terraces in the ends themselves. They mingled with the spectators and did little except keep the aisles clear and intervene if any minor skirmishes started. The officers around the pitch watched the crowd continuously. When injured spectators came to the gates in the retaining wall separating the terraces from the pitch, the officers would open the gate and assist the injured person. Many of the police officers in the terracing also helped injured fans down to the barrier to obtain first-aid. The police seemed to have only half their force deployed at one time as each officer was relieved once during each half by officers waiting in the wings.

The teams were once again assembled for the kick-off. The supporters roared encouragement to the sides and extra time began. Everyone was tense with the pleasure to score and not be scored against themselves. The spectators cheered and groaned with every well-played ball. Again the intensity and the importance of the play held down the chants and singing. For the one hundred and fifth consecutive minute no one could produce the much needed goal and the players changed ends for the last time.

The spectators kept up the noise level even though the warm day, alcohol and continuous shouting was taking its toll. Finally, after one hundred and seven minutes of play a shot by Celtic captain Danny McGrain deflected off George McLuskey past a diving Peter McLoy, the Rangers goalkeeper. Rangers fans were stunned into silence. Celtic supporters went wild. Everyone yelled, jumped up and down and created a huge dust cloud from the old earthen terraces. The wild celebration resulted in six people being taken out of the terraces on stretchers, injured in the wild melee. As the game continued on the pitch the Celtic supporters settled down to wait out the last thirteen minutes for victory. Real concern developed as Rangers continuously attacked, but each time the needed goal was denied. The ends shouted, chanted and sang, Celtic supporters expecting a victory, and Rangers fans still proud of their team. Then the whistle blew ending the sporting contest, and signalling the beginning of a very different contest on the pitch.

The Celtic players all ran to congratulate one another and then ran down to the Celtic end to wave and receive the accolades from their loyal supporters. As the Celtic players stood on the pitch waving to the crowd, many fans moved to and climbed up on the barrier separating the pitch from the terracing. The limited number of police tried to keep the spectators off the barrier. As the police moved along the barrier, everyone would jump down and just climb back up as the police moved along the barrier. Several officers appeared from the reserve force and moved into the crowd leaving the small force to protect the pitch. All during this time there was a wild celebration going on in the Celtic end. No-one was leaving. Everyone was jumping up and down, congratulating one another and creating another tremendous dust cloud. Again as in the celebration following the goal, several people were knocked or fell down and required

first-aid. These people were again passed down to the barrier to obtain help. As the Celtic players began to move off towards the main stand to receive the Scottish Cup many young supporters climbed on and jumped over the barrier surrounding the pitch. The group of spectators on the pitch increased despite police actions to keep them in the terracing, there were not enough police to stop every person from scaling the barrier. As the Celtic players moved into the main stand to receive the Scottish Cup the Celtic supporters who were on the pitch rushed over to get a better view of the Cup presentation. This caused more Celtic fans to jump over the barrier and follow their comrades across the pitch to view the Cup presentation. With a great cheer from the Celtic fans, the Scottish Cup was presented to Danny McGrain, the Celtic team captain. He waved it triumphantly over his head to show everyone he had won the Scottish Cup before passing it to each member of the victorious Celtic team.

During this celebration for the Celtic team and spectators, the Rangers supporters began to leave. Some stayed on to watch the cup presentation and the second place award presentation to the Rangers players. As the Celtic players ran to the Celtic supporters end and then went to the Cup presentation many young Rangers supporters also began to climb over the barrier on to the pitch. These young spectators milled around behind the goal at the Rangers end watching the Celtic and Rangers players preparing to receive their respective awards. Just after the Scottish Cup was presented to the Celtic players the first few Celtic supporters ran towards the Rangers' supporters who were on the pitch directly behind their goal and a football was kicked into the net by a Celtic supporter.

This caused many Rangers' fans to flee back towards their own end. After the Scottish Cup had been presented and waved around, it was time for the second place award to

be given to the Rangers players. This prompted a massive charge by the Rangers supporters towards the area in front of the presentation box, occupied by Celtic supporters. The Celtic supporters retreated as the on-rushing Rangers' supporters neared. Several bottles were thrown by Rangers supporters as they neared the retreating Celtic fans. Many Celtic fans fled back into the terracing aided by police who opened the gates in the barrier to allow the fans easy access to the terracing. Despite the number of Celtic fans who left the pitch, many fans turned to watch the Rangers supporters who were watching the second place award being presented to the Rangers players. After the award was presented to the Rangers players, the Rangers fans turned and charged at the Celtic fans.

The war was on. Those not interested in the fight quickly scrambled back into the relative safety of the terracing. Those who wanted a shot at the other side quickly climbed the barrier and joined their respective side. As the Rangers supporters charged, the Celtic supporters fell back until the Rangers charge stopped fairly near the Celtic goal. A few brave individuals from each side actually made contact with the opposition and a few punches and kicks were exchanged before the brave individual retreated to the relative safety of his own side. As the thrust and bravery of the Rangers charge ebbed they slowly retreated towards their own end. This gave the Celtic supporters a great opportunity and they charged at the Rangers fans. The Rangers supporters fell back towards their own end. During this charge, a no man's land was immediately set upon by several members of the opposition. Anyone who tried to stop an on-coming charge by waiting in no man's land was also attacked by several of the opposition. As a result, most of the fights were very one-sided affairs with brave or dumb individuals being set upon by several members of the other side. The no man's

land was maintained throughout the charges and counter charges of each side.

The police were totally helpless to stop the one thousand or so participants on each side. Many police constables generally confined their activities to pushing lone individuals back into the terraces, helping injured participants, and breaking up fights. Only occasionally did an officer try to make an arrest or tackle one of the participants. Even with reinforcements, the police could not stop the sides from charging at one another.

When the Celtic charge neared the Ranger's end the spectators in the terraces began to throw bottles at the Celtic supporters. This caused the Celtic fans to retreat and the Rangers supporters then charged down the pitch towards the Celtic fans armed with bottles, cans and anything else that could be thrown. The few Celtic fans who turned to face the Rangers charge were quickly set upon by the charging Rangers fans and punched, kicked and generally maimed for their efforts. As the Rangers charge neared the Celtic end and the Celtic supporters had nowhere to run, a bombardment of bottles, cans and rocks was launched by the Rangers fans. Several Celtic fans were hit by flying objects, but most landed harmlessly on the pitch. When the thrown objects landed, they were quickly picked up by the Celtic fans. As the Rangers fans ran out of objects to throw, they quickly retreated. This led to a counter charge by the Celtic supporters now armed with all the bottles thrown at them by the Rangers fans. The Celtic fans charged down the pitch to unleash another bombardment of bottles at the retreating Rangers fans. Again few were hit and the bottles were picked up as ammunition for another charge.

Like gladiators in the ancient colosseum the opposing sides charged at one another,

bottles flying, fists punching and feet kicking. Charge and counter charge, back and forth, no side was winning or losing, just participating and collecting a growing number of casualties. The police tried to help the injured of both sides but there were not enough police to cope with the growing number felled by the violence. The first-aid teams were hopelessly swamped by the injured who required treatment. Stretcher after stretcher was taken out to waiting ambulances for the ride to the hospital. Despite the losses the fight continued, back and forth, charge after charge. Many wounded victims lay on the pitch waiting for help and trying to avoid the stampeding feet of the next charge. Most victims of the fight were left alone by the opposition when they met on the pitch.

Finally after what seemed like an eternity, which was only half an hour, the police appeared with four club-wielding horse-mounted constables. Four abreast the constables on Clydesdale horses charged at the Celtic supporters. With batons drawn the constables thundered down the pitch towards the Celtic fans. The Celtic fans quickly ran as fast as they could go towards their end. The police opened all the gates into the terracing and many fans quickly jumped into the terracing for safety. Several combatants who did not get out of the way were knocked over by the galloping horses.

The Rangers fans seeing their new allies push the Celtic supporters back into their own end massed for one more attack. As the horses circled in the Celtic end, Rangers supporters crept up towards the Celtic end but the police were no one's allies and four abreast the horses at full gallop charged down the pitch into the Rangers supporters. Rangers fans scattered everywhere just trying to avoid the on-charging Clydesdale horses and baton-wielding constables. Again the police opened the gates in the barrier to allow the participants to get into the terraces. Many did not have time to queue to go

through the narrow gates so they vaulted and scrambled over the barrier as best they could. Most got out of the way of the horses, some got knocked down, some went back into the terraces, but many were still left on the pitch.

If Rangers supporters could try a sneak attack behind the charging horses so could the Celtic supporters, so off they went. As they neared the middle of the pitch, four more mounted horses joined the four already dispatching the participants. Eight abreast, the mounted horses charged the Celtic supporters who instantly ran for cover. Almost every Celtic participant moved back off the pitch and into the terracing with the second charge by the mounted police. Another four mounted constables joined their colleagues.

Not to be out-done, a few Rangers fans moved towards the Celtic end and once again the police charged down the pitch. Twelve abreast with batons drawn they went. The Rangers fans all climbed back into the terracing. The mounted police moved to the middle of the pitch and the police on foot moved to protect the barriers from further spectators trying to climb over and back on to the pitch. The Rangers supporters did not appreciate the police stopping their fight with the Celtic supporters and they began to bombard the police on the pitch with every bottle and can they could find. The bombardment continued until there were no more bottles to throw. The Celtic end started to do the same thing but fights broke out in the terracing between the Celtic fans who wanted to throw bottles and those who did not. The Celtic support threw only a small fraction of the number of bottles and cans compared to the number thrown as from the Rangers end.

With the ammunition gone and the police in charge of the pitch there was only one place to turn.....the streets. As the participants were forced off the pitch they moved out into the streets running along side Hampden Park. The two sides had lined up across the street between the houses and the brick wall surrounding Hampden Park. Fewer in number but just as mean the participants charged back and forth at one another throwing anything handy at the other side. Again a no man's land developed between the two sides. Only brave or stupid participants ventured into no man's land. This usually resulted in the person being hit, kicked and generally maimed by the opposing side. Several Celtic supporters, all quite young, were standing inside the Hampden Park wall on the earthen back side of the terraces throwing dirt clods, bottles and chunks of concrete at the massed Rangers supporters. Several Ranger's fans were hit by these flying objects.

Finally the police called in the twelve mounted constables who once again charged at a full gallop into the participants. Everyone in the street ran for safety. The horses ran over anyone who tried to stand against them. With one fell swoop the last major fighting was ended. Skirmishes took place in many side streets between Hampden Park and the Mount Florida train station. The mounted constables riding in groups were able to keep most of the belligerents separated and only minor fights broke out. The Celtic and Rangers supporters were separated on the trains back into Glasgow Central station.

The police, although unprepared for the massive spectator participation on the pitch after the end of the match, showed good restraint in not taking advantage of the situation and unnecessarily using excessive force. The mounted constables did not use their drawn batons in any of their charges into the participants. In only a few instances

did a constable try to tackle any of the belligerents. The police on foot generally tried to get people off the pitch and back into the terracing or lent aid to injured participants.

A survey of the damage outside Hampden Park, found the streets littered with debris from the rock and bottle throwing. One house had a second floor window broken which caused much disgust from the people occupying the house. The other major damage was done to a police vehicle. A small vehicle equipped to carry dogs had been parked right in the middle of the area the Rangers supporters had decided to defend outside Hampden Park. The police car was totally demolished. Every piece of glass was broken by large rocks being thrown through them. The horns mounted on top of the cars were twisted and bent. The side, top and bonnet were all dented by rocks or kicks. A police constable with a police dog had been standing near the vehicle as it was being destroyed, but did not release the dogs.

A short uneventful walk to the Mount Florida train station found twelve mounted horses in full control of the streets outside the station. Inside the station everyone was being separated by scarf colour by the police for the ride back to Central station. While standing with Rangers supporters, they were quite friendly and in good spirits despite the match loss. While on the train, the Rangers supporters continually sang songs recalling past glory. Several references were made to a previous altercation with the Barcelona police in Spain. They sang "bring on the dogs, bring on the fucking dogs", and other songs about triumphs in the past. By the time the train arrived at Central Station, everyone was ready to head for home so there was no evidence of more trouble between Rangers and Celtic fans. In fact, several groups of mixed supporters were standing around the station talking about the day's activities.

The Hampden Park riot was a classic example of collective behaviour. Every element of the value-added theory of collective behaviour was present in the crowd. The structure was perfect, Hampden Park accommodated 80,000 supporters, divided almost perfectly in half. The stadium had only a low retaining fence around the pitch. The supporters were highly emotional due to religious divisions, anxiety over the match, and recent political events in Northern Ireland. The crowd settled into traditional roles of singing and chanting which was fuelled by high levels of alcohol consumption. When the game ended in victory for one end and defeat for the other, the situation was perfect for violence. Each side began to mobilize under a general belief (support) to follow their teams up to witness the presentations. When a Celtic supporter kicked a loose football into the Rangers net the precipitating factor had taken place. The support groups quickly altered their make up so that those who wanted to participate in the violence went onto the pitch while those who only wanted to see the awards presented retreated to the safety of the terraces.

The violence itself was intense, of a duration indicated by police action, and not as Marsh claimed ritualized or governed by rules restricting the amount of violence inflicted on an opponent. When the focussing process occurred due to the precipitating event under the mobilization for action, the supporters turned on each other - no other instrument was available to alter the focus of the supporters from each other. The violence was shaped by two features; the confines of the pitch, and the weapons available for use. Since bottles were the main source of weaponry, a no man's land appeared between the attacking support groups, so the sides had time to avoid the onslaught of missiles as they were launched by the opposition. The no man's land also provided a safety zone against personal contact, but this was often used as a staging

ground for very violent interpersonal fights, which usually left one or more individuals injured.

The police did little to intervene and stop the violence until the mounted officers appeared on the pitch. Only one foolish Rangers supporter was seen to stand up to the horses, and he was run over. The police with batons drawn (the batons were approximately three feet long) never actually used them to strike any of the participants. Within ten minutes of the mounted officers appearance on the pitch, the 'riot' was over. The organisation of the mounted police and their use of tactics totally out-maneuvered the supporters' groups who had to retreat to the terraces for fear of arrest or being trampled under the large horses. Police action, both on the pitch and on the streets quickly defused the situation by altering the focus of the support from each other to the police, but only when the police had a superior force to that of the combatants.

Although an exceedingly large number of individuals participated in the violence, most supporters remained on the terraces or left the stadium. Many supporters became angry at those participating in the violence and tried to stop more from joining or resisted attempts by people on the terraces to throw bottles at the police. Social control on the terraces did not totally break down, it only broke down for the younger supporter and those suffering from high levels of intoxication. The vast majority of the crowd remained outside the collective violence itself, but some of the non-participants still supported the violence.

The newspaper report of the riot was in many ways fairly accurate. The detail was lacking and the terms of description elegant, but the true picture never totally emerged. The collective action was not a 'war' and the battle was fought all over Hampden Park,

not in the centre circle. The bottles that were thrown from the terraces were generally thrown at the police after the riot was over, not at the participants. Unless the participants were very close to the terraces the distance was too great for someone to hit a participant with an empty bottle. The reporter's description lacked any real detail of the incident on the pitch before the horses appeared, which went on almost twenty minutes. None of the real reasons for the violence were mentioned, but the major precipitating incident was picked out of the series of developments which led directly to the violence. Although the newspaper account gave a brief account of the incident, it was more interested in the shock, newspaper selling feature of the violence. Although reprinted here, the original story was done with two inch block headlines to attract attention to the lead story of the day.

<u>Hearts versus Hibs</u>:

East Of Scotland Shield Final,

Tynecastle Park, Edinburgh: August, 1980

After a very eventful match in which Hibs scored two late goals to draw the match. Hibs won the Shield on penalty kicks. After the final penalty kick, violence broke out on Gorgie Road as Hearts and Hibs supporters exited the stadium.

Hearts supporters' exits from Tynecastle allow them to surround visiting supporters on Gorgie Road. Realising they were going to lose the penalty kicks many supporters headed for the exits. Hearts supporters often plan to use this tactic and when the clamjamfry leaders shouted "let's get the bastards", the clamjamfry split into two groups and ran for the exits. Once in position on Gorgie Road, all the Hearts

supporters had to do was wait for the Hibs supporters to appear, and the fight was on. All available rocks, bottles, cans and anything else handy was thrown by Hearts supporters at Hibs fans from both sides. Many Hibs supporters retreated back into Tynecastle, while many others rushed to join the fight. Hibs supporters who stayed on Gorgie Road started throwing back all the missiles that had previously been thrown at them. After the initial stone throwing, Hibs supporters charged up Gorgie Road and took possession of a small derelict patch of ground on the side of the road. This presented plenty of ammunition in the form of rocks and also a high point from which to throw objects and defend against attack. The Hearts supporters quickly launched a prolonged attack on the Hibs support occupying the derelict ground. Hundreds of rocks and other and other missiles flew in both directions. Many people were hit and suffered injury. Most of those hit were local residents and non-participants trying to leave the area.

As the support groups milled around with more and more people exiting the ground onto Gorgie Road, many fist fights broke out as the support groups jockeyd for position on the street. After several minutes of missile throwing and fist fights, the police moved in to break up the combatants. The police, on foot, were able to stop most of the missile throwing and fist-fighting at first. The Hearts supporters assembled behind the Hibs support and charged up Gorgie Road. The Hibs support ran up the road toward Haymarket Station. The Police were caught in an unorganised situation. Unable to stop the charge by Hearts supporters, fighting continued as the supporters clashed all the way up Gorgie Road to Haymarket. [4] Once the support groups reached the Haymarket the large-scale violence ceased as the supporters dispersed into

4. This incident was not uncommon between the two clubs in the past. During the course of this study the opportunity for such incidents were few because Hearts and Hibs played in different league divisions over a four year period.

the dozens of roads in the area.

Having stood in the 'corner' at Tynecastle, with the Hearts support, observations were made of the support groups during the match and on Gorgie Road during the violence after the game. The supporters groups were participating in their normal 'ritualised' singing and chanting throughout the match. When Hibs scored two late goals and went on to win the match, frustration set into the Hearts fans. The frustration was vented through organised collective violence. Hearts support, through ritualised behaviour, had built up to the point where they had a 'generalised hostile belief', and by following crowd leaders out of the ground 'mobilised under the generalised belief'. The 'precipitating events' included, Hibs winning the match, Hearts support following their leaders out of the ground, and the first missile thrown. The supporters had by this point, focused on the opposition and the 'mobilisation for action' had taken place. Once the first missile was thrown the fighting continued until the police intervened and crowd movement allowed the support groups to disperse. The setting in Gorgie Road limited the scope and the participants' ability to become active in the violence. As in all football crowd situations the triangular crowd placed three separate groups against one another.

The violence, in this case, was a direct result of frustration caused by the expectation of victory which was quickly changed by a late Hibs surge. The frustration became an indirect precipitating event. It sharpened the deprivation created by city and club rivalry, and religious intolerance. It helped Hearts support create the omnipotence necessary to focus on Hibs fans. The focussing, in this case, was Hearts supporters diverting their attention from the penalty kicks on the pitch to moving out of the ground and into position for the attack. The focusing for Hibs supporters did not take place

until they left the ground and were attacked by the first missile being thrown at them. Once both sets of supporters were firmly focused on one another the violence became prolonged, organised, and able to out-manoeuvre an undermanned police force.

Dundee United versus Dundee

Scottish Premier League, Tannadice Park

12 September 1981

A crowd of 17,000 saw a 5-2 victory for Dundee United. A derby atmosphere, combined with a good match kept the crowd excited. The support groups kept taunting each other throughout the match, maintaining a high level of ritualised crowd activity. Two arrests were witnessed during the second half. When the match ended and the spectators were leaving the ground, groups of Dundee fans began to throw stones at Dundee United supporters. This incident took place behind directly behind the side terrace which had been recently renovated. The main exits from the side terrace are within easy stone throwing distance of each other and stones were used to cover the exit pathways. The stones made excellent missiles to throw at opposing supporters. The police quickly moved in and stopped the stone throwing. No other incidents were witnessed.

This incident is typical of minor violence at matches. Frustration at having lost, limited focusing by a small group of Dundee fan on Dundee United supporters created a short burst of violence. Those who participated may have been violent supporters using the opportunity to try and start large-scale violence. Due to the physical barriers separating the exiting supporters direct contact was not possible. Stones were thrown as the only

form of contact available. The quick intervention by the police limited the scope of the violence to a few dozen stones being thrown. Quick police intervention broke the focusing process as those involved became more aware of the police and the avoidance of arrest than throwing stones.

Rangers versus Celtic

Scottish Premier League, Ibrox Stadium

1 January 1982

After a "routine" Old Firm match at Ibrox, with no violence witnessed inside the stadium, major collective violence erupted outside the stadium. With the supporters well segregated in a modern stadium, seating almost eighty percent of the crowd, the fans were satisfied to engage in the normal singing and chanting of a Rangers versus Celtic match. After the final whistle, the crowd began to leave the stadium peacefully. Upon reaching Edminton Drive, the main road next to Ibrox stadium, Rangers fans had blocked the egress route of the Celtic supporters. Several fist fights broke out and many supporters from both sides rushed to join the fray. The exiting crowd was swayed by conflicting forces as many tried to leave the area while others tried to get into the violence. Many combatants, bystanders and innocent supporters were injured, some severely, due to punches, kicks and missiles being indiscriminately thrown. The conflict developed distinct lines of demarcation, with a contact line stretching across the street between the support groups. The no-mans land kept most of the combatants apart, but several fist fights developed as the support groups charged at one another. After a five minute initial contact period between the support groups, horse mounted police moved in to stop the fighting. Many large groups of supporters, when seeing the charging police horses, immediately ran off down side streets in an effort to avoid

arrest.

Since the violence stated almost one hundred yards away from the point of observation, the specific crowd structural steps were difficult to identify. No precipitating incident was observed, but the crowd quickly developed lines of demarcation with those wishing to participate rushing in and those not wanting to participate trying to leave the area. Not being close enough identify the focusing process when it happened, it was present in the confrontation. Only when the police arrived to complete the triangular crowd did the focus of the combatants alter from one another to the avoidance of arrest. This broke up the collective violence, simply because the focus of the participants was no longer on violence. By the time observations were made at the point of the violence only bloody bodies were visible and the police were well in control of the situation. No further violence was observed.

Much of the violence was the result of heavy police presence inside Ibrox due to the Cup Final riot the previous season. Heavy police presence combined with the all seated stadium which restricts physical movement restricted opportunity for supporter confrontation. Once outside the ground the police were stretched to cover all possible points of confrontation between the supporters. Strict segregation and heavy police presence inside the ground had a dislocation effect. The supporters waited until the restrictions of the stadium and the police were reduced and the opportunities for contact increased. If violence is going to occur, physical and police restrictions will not stop supporters from fighting each other. The collective nature of the football crowd means the support groups will seek alternative points for contact, usually immediately outside the ground.

Hibs versus Dundee United

Scottish Cup Replay, Easter Road

March 1983

The match itself was a boring encounter which was drawn at the end by a late equalising goal by Dundee United. The crowd was small due to the game being played on a Wednesday evening. No trouble occurred during the match.

After the match Hibs supporters got behind the Dundee United supporters walking down Bothwell Street. The police had made no attempt to segregate the support groups after the match. By chasing the Dundee United fans down Bothwell Street to the narrow Bothwell Street Bridge the Hibs supporters created a large group waiting to get onto the narrow foot bridge. The structure of the Hibs crowd was not witnessed because fellow researcher John White and I were in the Dundee United support waiting to cross the bridge when the first rocks began to rain in on the crowd. Several people were hurt by the first rocks thrown.

When the first rocks landed the Dundee United support quickly recognised what was happening and the crowd developed the same organisation present on the terraces. The clamjamfry and violent supporters assembled close to the Hibs supporters while the average supporters moved quickly to the Bothwell Street Bridge in an effort to escape. Since the attack was sudden, the focusing process was very quick. The precipitating incident for the Dundee United supporters being the first stones to hit the crowd. As the crowd divided into segments to resist or escape the attack a crush of individuals trying to escape ensued at the bridge because it can only accommodate a few people at a time. The clamjamfry responded to the stone throwing Hibs support by picking up

stones in the road and throwing them back.

One stone that was thrown by the Hibs supporters broke a second floor window in a block of flats along the road. The occupants of the flat responded to having their window broken by taking the broken glass and throwing it into the Dundee United supporters waiting to cross the bridge. Several people were badly cut by the flying glass, especially those whose attention was on gaining access to the bridge and not watching the proceedings.

The triangular crowd did not develop in this confrontation. The police did not arrive while the confrontation was in progress. The violence was confined by the physical limitations of the streets leading onto the Bothwell Street Bridge and the missiles the supporters had to throw. A no man's land developed between the Hibs and Dundee United supporters in the street. No charges were made by either group so no fist-fights developed. Hibs supporters would run forward only far enough to throw rocks or other objects before retreating.

The violence only ended when the Dundee United supporters were safely across the bridge. When the Hibs supporters tried to cross the bridge, United supporters threw stones at them stopping any further charge forward. Most of the Dundee United supporters went on down to Easter Road where there was a police presence which was enough to stop any further attacks from Hibs fans.

Although the build-up to the violence was not witnessed, the lack of effective police crowd segregation after the match provided the opportunity for Hibs supporters to

begin collective action. The frustration of losing a late goal when the game should have been won may have been the precipitating factor which focused the Hibs fans on violence. Leaders in the crowd become very important in this situation because they must take the participants out of the ground, formulate a plan of action, and get the supporters to follow. The focus of the participants on the leader and violence makes this easier to accomplish than if the leaders or individual were acting independently. Since the Dundee United supporters were not mobilised for crowd violence and the focus was on leaving the area most people continued to try to cross the bridge. Only the clamjamfry and violence prone supporters tried to assemble and confront the Hibs assault. Since only a small percentage of the United support turned and focused on the Hibs fans and tried to fight back, the violence was of short duration and limited in scope to stone throwing. The focus of the majority of United supporters continued to be crossing the bridge and escaping the violence.

Although several groups of Hibs and United supporters were seen running up Easter Road after the violence, it was not until the following morning that it was learned the one of the supporters had thrown a brick through Professor McClintock's front window. This illustrates the limitations associated with participant observation. Violence can easily take place outside the view of the observer and not be recorded.

<u>Hearts versus Aberdeen</u>

Scottish League, Tynecastle Park

April 1984

After another match in which Hearts lost when expectations of victory were high, Hearts supporters attacked Aberdeen supporters outside Tynecastle Park on Gorgie

Road. The match was typical in that the support groups engaged in ritualised singing and chanting throughout. Many references were made to the casuals in the songs and chants. Aberdeen scored a late goal for the victory and Hearts fans, in known tradition, ran for the exits in order to run Aberdeen out of town. Hearts supporters occupied Gorgie Road and waited for the Aberdeen fans to come out of the ground after the match. As they had done to Hibs fans in the past, Hearts supporters, or as they call themselves, "Gorgie Boys" attacked the Aberdeen fans with rocks, bottles and anything else that could be thrown. As the Aberdeen fans came under attack they quickly organised to fight. Those wishing to fight in the street quickly moved forward while others moved back into the stadium for protection.

The Aberdeen supporters organised with the clamjamfry and violent supporters moving to the forefront of the confrontation. The ability of the Aberdeen fans to organise quickly may have reflected the presence of the casuals or been the result of the focusing process in response to the assault. As the rocks and other missiles flew in, they were picked up and thrown back. A no man's land developed between the support groups on the road. The pavement became a safe zone for Aberdeen and Hearts supporters trying to avoid the violence and walk up Gorgie Road toward the centre of Edinburgh. Hearts supporters used the tattered ruins of the Gorgie Farm as ammunition to throw at Aberdeen fans. Bricks, bottles and old boards flew in the direction of the Aberdeen fans. After being on the receiving end of the attack for ten to fifteen minutes, Aberdeen fans launched a counter attack which disrupted the demarcation lines and allowed most non-participants to escape the area. The counter attack brought the two support groups together and resulted in many fist fights. Since many of the participants were armed with missiles, they were used as weapons in the fights and resulted in many serious injuries. When the charge by Aberdeen supporters disrupted the demarcation lines of

the no mans land, running battles developed on Gorgie Road as various groups tried to find positions to defend. Missile throwing and fist fights went on all over Gorgie Road as the groups ran around looking for victims to attack. One group of Aberdeen supporters ran back into Tynecastle through the open exit gates and pushed down the flimsy fence surrounding the pitch. They ran back out into the road when the police and club stewards intervened. When the group returned to Gorgie Road they found themselves back in the middle of another stone throwing confrontation.

The police finally moved in with horses to separate the support groups. The supporters, despite several attempts to avoid police control, were herded down Gorgie Road towards Haymarket. The police intervention was slow in arriving which meant the violence was prolonged between the support groups. When the police did move in they were very effective in stopping the violence, although several windows were broken when the supporters were forced down the road. In this case the triangular crowd only existed for a few minutes. The slow police response to the violence, their effective intervention, and the supporters' refusal to fight them meant that the violence remained two dimensional through most of the incident.

The violence was again fueled by frustration from Hearts supporters at the loss when the expectation of victory was high. The game was marked by intense ritualised behaviour created by the possibility of the casuals being in the ground. This created the mobilisation under the generalised belief. The frustration, the major precipitating factor, was vented as anger and aggression. In addition to the frustration aggression, the presence or supposed presence of the casuals meant Hearts supporters were ready and willing for a fight. The first rock thrown signalled the start of prolonged intense

violence. By surrounding the Aberdeen supporters and not allowing easy escape by the average supporters many people became involved in the confrontation. The casuals may not have been a major force in the crowd, but two groups of youths without scarves were witnessed running along Gorgie Road as the police moved in. The violence was limited by the confines of Gorgie Road. The violence lasted for a prolonged period due to slow intervention by the police. Once the police had moved in between the support groups and moved them far enough apart to prevent rock throwing the violence ended.

This entire incident was witnessed from the centre of no man's land on Gorgie Road. Hundreds of stones and missiles flew overhead as the support groups jockeyd for positions of advantage. The group who ran into Tynecastle looking for victims were witnessed from the rear of the running group, before returning to no man's land on Gorgie Road. Several scarf clad supporters from both sides threatened violence, but none of them made any overt advances. Many missiles had to be avoided, which disrupted concentration on the violence between the support groups. The position in the middle of no man's land was maintained until the police move into it to separate the combatants, at which point I gave way to the police horses. Once the police had the Aberdeen supporters ushered down Gorgie Road, I followed with the Hearts support who were held back by more police in a successful effort to keep a substantial distance between the two groups.

APPENDIX B

MAPS OF FOOTBALL GROUNDS VISITED

The following Scottish football grounds were visited at least once during the course of the is study. The actual layout of the grounds are found in the following pages. The grounds visited in Scotland include: Pittodrie Stadium, Aberdeen; Celtic Park, Glasgow; Dens Park, Dundee; Tannadice Park, Dundee (United); Easter Road, Edinburgh (Hibernian); Fir Park, Motherwell; Ibrox Stadium, Glasgow; Love Street, Paisley (St. Mirren); Tynecastle Park, Edinburgh (Heart of Midlothian); Douglas Park, Hamilton; Muirton Park, Perth (St. Johstone); Kilbowie Park, Clydebank; Cappielow Park, Greenock (Morton); Rugby Park, Kilmarnock; Broomfield Park, Airdrie; Shawfield Stadium, Glasgow (Clyde); Firhill Park, Glasgow (Partick Thistle); Hampden Park, Glasgow (Queen's Park and Scotland); Shiefield Park, Berwick; East End Park, Dunfermline; and Meadowbank Stadium, Edinburgh. [1]

In addition to the grounds visited in Scotland, the following grounds were visited in England. Annfield, Liverpool; Roker Park, Sunderland; Portman Road, Ipswich; Loftus Road, London (Queens Park Rangers); Highbury, London (Arsenal); White Hart Lane, London (Tottenham Hotspur); Stamford Bridge, London (Chelsea); Vicarage Road, Watford; and the Manor Ground, Oxford.

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1. Individual stadium maps are from the Scottish Football League Review, Scottish Football League, 1982.

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

PITTODRIE STADIUM



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

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

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

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

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

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

ST. MIRREN PARK

TYNECASTLE PARK



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

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

KILBOWIE PARK

CAPPIELOW PARK



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

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

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

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

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

HAMPDEN PARK



EAST END PARK



MEADOWBANK STADIUM



APPENDIX C

SUPPORTER QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questionnaire was designed and tested on the football terraces during the 1980 football season. Due to sampling problems, study design problems, and advice from Dr. A. N. Oppenheim, the questionnaire was abandon in favour of participant observation as a method of gathering data about football crowds. [1]

SURVEY OF FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS

Instructions: Complete each question by placing a tick in the proper column, or circle the answer to the question or by filling in your answer in the space provided. Yes No

1. How many or (name of team) home matches do you attend each month? _____

2. How many or (name of team) away matches do you attend each month? _____

3. Do you attend matches not involving (name of team)? _____

4. Are you involved in a (name of team) supporters club? _____

5. How many pints or whiskeys do you drink on an average day? _____

6. How many pints or whiskeys die you drink before the match? _____

7. Did you bring any alcohol in with you today? _____

8. If the answers yes, how much alcohol did you bring in? _____

1. The questionnaire originally was on one sheet of paper for easier use. It appears here in a longer form for ease of reading.

9. Have you ever participated in a fight insides a football ground? _____

10. If the answer is yes, how many times? _____

11. Have you ever participated in a fight outside a football ground? _____

12. If the answer is yes, how many times? _____

13. Have you ever participated in a pitch invasion? _____

14. If the answer is yes, how many times? _____

15. Have you ever thrown objects at opposing supporters? _____
16. If the answer is yes, how many times? _____

17. Have you ever thrown objects at opposing players? _____
18. If the answer is yes, how many times? _____

19. Have you ever damaged property outside a football ground? _____
20. If the answer is yes, how many times? _____

21. Would you participate in a fight against (opposing team of the day) supporters? _____

22. Concerning the police at football matches, do you, strongly like, generally like, have no opinion, generally dislike, or strongly dislike them?
23. Why do you (answer from #22) the police? _____
_____
_____

24. Concerning the police in (cities name) do you, strongly like, generally like, have no opinion, generally dislike, or strongly dislike them?
25. Why do you (answer from #24) the police? _____
_____
_____

26. Have you ever been arrested for your conduct at a football match? _____

28. Do you identify with any of these youth groups: Mods, Punks, Rockers, Skinheads, or some other group? _____

29. How old are you? _____

30. What is your religion? _____

31. How many times a month do you attend church? _____

32. What level of education have you obtained? _____

33. Do you attend school or university? _____
34. If the answer is yes, what is the name of the school? _____

35. What is the name of your job? _____

36. What is your take home pay each week? _____

37. Are you married? _____

38. What type of accommodation do you live in? _____

39. What is the name of your fathers job? _____

_____

Date _____ Cup or League match Day or evening match

Time of interview _____ Home team _____ Away team _____

End _____ Final score _____ Supporter train or coach

Description of participants dress_____

_____

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